The appellants contend fact issues precluding summary judgment are raised by summary judgment evidence that capital stock was issued by the corporation when it re-incorporated in 1930; articles of amendment filed in 1979 and 1981 to comply with requirements in the Internal Revenue Code are void because, contrary to recitals in the articles, no shareholders' meeting was in fact conducted; and TVE has been charged county ad valorem taxes. Appellants refer to Coefficient Foundation v. Kennedy, 188 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1945, no writ), and Coefficient Foundation v. Edwards, 188 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1945, no writ), to remind us that a charitable purpose alone does not determine the non-profit character of the corporation. However, the charitable-purpose rooming house had been operated for profit in Coefficient Foundation, while in this case, both appellants and appellees agree the shareholders of TVE did not receive any dividends or personal benefit.

What is important under that case is the recognition that the tenant does have a suit in tort and the holding that the tenant, having been wrongfully ousted or evicted, is entitled to recover any loss or injury which is shown to have been the foreseeable consequence of the eviction. In Coefficient Foundation v. Kennedy, 188 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1945, no writ), and the companion case Coefficient Foundation v. Edwards, 188 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1945, no writ), the action was for wrongful eviction where the door and windows were locked and there was a posted eviction notice and exemplary damages sustained by the tenant for the humiliation suffered were awarded. See also the broad terms of Art. 5236, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. In the case before us, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs their actual damages from the eviction and has let stand Special Issue No. 9 and its answer, being that the defendants acted with conscious indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs in making the eviction.

The defendant did not sell plaintiff's furniture, fixtures and other personal property on November 20, 1972, as threatened in the letter of November 7, 1972; but on November 22, 1972, defendant effectively evicted plaintiff from the premises by padlocking the door. Coefficient Foundation v. Kennedy, 188 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1945, no writ). The provision of the lease agreement giving the defendant the right to terminate plaintiff's right of possession is found in Article 24, the pertinent parts of which are as follows:

In support of its assertion that appellee was engaged in a commercial activity, appellants rely on the charter provision designated as (d) earlier in this opinion, and on the fact that appellee charges $30 per pint for blood and has been known to sue users for failure to pay their accounts. In support of their contention that these facts render the Blood Bank liable for damages though it may be a charitable organization, appellants rely, among others, on these authorities: City of Houston v. Shilling, 150 Tex. 387, 240 S.W.2d 1010, 26 A.L.R.2d 935; Coefficient Foundation v. Kennedy, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W.2d 694; City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Ass'n, 111 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978; Armendarez v. Hotel Dieu, Tex.Civ.App., 145 S.W. 1030; and Hotel Dieu v. Armendariz, Tex.Civ.App., 167 S.W. 181, affirmed Tex.Com.App., 210 S.W. 518. We see no merit in appellants' contentions under their first and second points.

All defendants except James McLeod have appealed. This is a companion case to that of Coefficient Foundation v. Kennedy et vir., 188 S.W.2d 694. The same statement of facts is filed in both cases; there are duplicate findings of fact and conclusions of law in the two records. We refer to the opinion in the above-cited companion case for the fact findings by the court.