Coe v. Kutinsky

7 Citing cases

  1. State ex Inf. McKittrick v. Jones

    353 Mo. 900 (Mo. 1945)   Cited 6 times

    33 C.J., p. 1000, sec. 151; State v. Slate, supra. (13) If the matter alleged in a pleading may, in any view of the controversy, become pertinent, or if it can have any proper influence in the decision of the controversy, the nature and extent of the kind of relief to be granted, or as to costs, it will not be expunged, for being impertinent and scandalous. 21 C.J., p. 374, secs. 385, 386; 49 C.J., p. 83, sec. 81; Coe v. Kutinsky, 82 Conn. 658, 75 A. 1065; Tucker v. Randall, 2 Mass. 293; People v. Church, 55 Barb. 204, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 459. (14) The matters set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 of relator's motion for a new trial were not impertinent or scandalous, because they raised issues pertinent to the relief sought and brought to the attention of the trial court matters which affected the decision in the case, and which, if true, showed that the trial judge was disqualified to hear and determine the issues in this cause, in the only manner which could be used by the relator to call said matters to the attention of the Supreme Court in the event of an appeal.

  2. Bailey v. Bobecki

    166 A. 677 (Conn. 1933)   Cited 10 times

    It is well settled that agency cannot be proven by the declarations of the alleged agent. Metropolitan Cleaners Dyers, Inc. v. Tondola, 114 Conn. 244, 158 A. 240; Commercial Investment Trust, Inc. v. Carrano, 104 Conn. 302, 132 A. 870; Coe v. Kutinsky, 82 Conn. 685, 74 A. 1065. The plaintiffs state in their brief that the only question involved is whether the authority of an agent to act for his principal must be shown before evidence may be admitted to show what the agent did and said in connection with his agency. It is true that the order in which evidence is received is largely in the discretion of the trial court, and that in the exercise of its discretion the court may receive evidence of such declarations subject to subsequent proof of the authority of the agent.

  3. Metropolitan Cleaners Dyers, Inc. v. Tondola

    158 A. 240 (Conn. 1932)   Cited 6 times

    Even if the driver had in express terms held himself out as the agent of the defendant, such a representation, in the absence of facts estopping her from denying it, would not be admissible to prove agency. Fitch v. Chapman, 10 Conn. 8, 12; Butte Hardware Co. v. Wallace, 59 Conn. 336, 342, 22 A. 330; Coe v. Kutinsky, 82 Conn. 685, 688, 74 A. 1065. There was prejudicial error in the rulings on evidence complained of. As a new trial must be had for the reasons indicated, it is unprofitable to discuss the ruling on the motion to set aside the verdict or the claimed errors in the charge, which will not be likely to recur on a retrial.

  4. Siller v. Philip

    141 A. 872 (Conn. 1928)   Cited 13 times

    Chesebro v. Lockwood, 88 Conn. 219, 223, 91 A. 188; Quint v. O'Connell, 89 Conn. 353, 356, 357, 94 A. 288; and even if she had claimed the authority to act as her husband's agent in signing Exhibit A, Siller would not have been entitled to rely upon her statement alone. Fitch v. Chapman, 10 Conn. 8, 12; Butte Hardware Co. v. Wallace, 59 Conn. 336, 342, 343, 22 A. 330; Coe v. Kutinsky, 82 Conn. 685, 688, 74 A. 1065. The seventh claim of law may be disregarded, in view of the conclusions already reached.

  5. Berkley v. Burlington Cadillac Co. Inc.

    97 Vt. 260 (Vt. 1923)   Cited 20 times

    The facts which he has a right to prove must be pertinent to the merits of the claim attempted to be set up; and if the complaint contains impertinent and immaterial allegations, it is the duty of the trial court to reject evidence in support of such allegations as tending to mislead the jury and taking up the time of the court for no valuable purpose. Drew v. Chamberlin, 19 Vt. 573; Adams v. Way, 32 Conn. 160, 168; Coe v. Kutinsky, 82 Conn. 685, 74 A. 1065; White v. Spencer, 14 N.Y. 247, 251; Corning v. Corning, 6 N.Y. 97; Powell v. Davis, 19 Tex. 380; Bradley v. Onstott, 180 Ind. 687, 103 N.E. 798; Emerson, etc. Co. v. Growe (Ind. Sup.), 133 N.E. 919; Givens v. North Augusta Electric, etc. Co. 91 (S.C.) 417, 74 S.E. 1067; 22 C.J. 161; 31 Cyc. 684. It was said in Drew v. Chamberlin, supra, respecting the claim that certain evidence was admissible because it tended to support the allegations, that there was no doubt as to the general soundness of the proposition when properly applied and understood, but that it was very liable to misconstruction; that it is never understood in such a sense as to require that every immaterial circumstance which may happen to be embraced in the issue shall be open to proof; that evidence adapted to prove the material and substantial part of the issue is admissible, although the pleading of the party offering it may be defective.

  6. Samstag Hilder Brothers v. Ottenheimer

    90 Conn. 475 (Conn. 1916)   Cited 9 times

    " Morgan v. Farrel, 58 Conn. 413, 421, 20 A. 614. "Contracts made by one of several partners, in respect to matters not falling within the ordinary business, objects, and scope of the partnership, are not binding on the other partners, and create no liability to third persons, who have no knowledge that the partner making the contract is acting in violation of his duties and obligations to the firm of which he is a member." Kimbro v. Bullitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 256, 266, 16 L.Ed. 313, 316; Coe v. Kutinsky, 82 Conn. 685, 691, 74 A. 1065. It cannot be seriously claimed that the character of this transaction in New York City was such as to justify the plaintiff in assuming that the defendant could be made liable for these goods.

  7. Sutera v. Washton

    2003 Ct. Sup. 3366 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)   Cited 6 times

    In reaching the conclusion that a question of fact on the representation of partnership claim is presented the court does not rely on Sutera's statement that Washton represented Segal and Rotella were his partners — there is no indication Segal and Rotella were aware of the representations. The party sought to be bound by the apparent partnership doctrine must know of the explicit representation to such effect by another purported partner. Cf. Davies v. General Tours, Inc., 63 Conn. App. at p. 31; see also Coe v. Kutinsky, 82 Conn. 685, 688 (1910). Despite the foregoing, it is true, as the defendants argue, that: "It is only in exceptional circumstances that fraud can be based on nondisclosure."