Upon the dissolution of the marriage, the husband is no longer the head of the family, and where the marriage is dissolved for his wrongful act, the wife (unless it be shown that the interests of the children require a different custodian,) is entitled to their society, care, and custody. (See Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, Secs. 643, 636, 641; Bedell v. Bedell, 1 Johns. Ch. 604; Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 5 Har. Del. 8; Codd v. Codd, 2 Johns. Ch. 141; Janes v. Janes, 2 Har. Del. 142; Clark v. Clark, Wright, 225; Hansford v. Hansford, 10 Ala. 561; Bascomb v. Bascomb, Wright, 632; People v. Mercein, 8 Paige, 47; Richmond v. Richmond, 1 Greenl. Ch. 90; Cook v. Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. 639.)          Our statute, (Wood's Dig. 491, Sec. 7,) conferring power on the courts pending a suit for divorce, or at the final hearing, or afterwards, to make proper orders for the support of the wife and the support and education of the children, is substantially the same as the statutory provision in most of the States.

If the party have information sufficient to warrant the belief that the offense has been committed, or the expectation that it can be proved on the trial, that information must extend at least to the particular place or locality where it occurred, though the name of the person with whom may be unknown." (Codd v. Codd, 2 John. Ch. 224; Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige, 113; Wright, 98; Richards v. Richards, Id. 302; Stokes v. Stokes , 1 Mo. 322; Wright v. Wright, 3 Tex. 168.)          The defendant, by failing to demur, waived the objection, so far as the want of specification of the acts constituting the charge is concerned.

As to the asserted breach of fiduciary duty, it is not a statutory factor required to be considered (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d]). Further, we find no reason to disturb Supreme Court's discretion in giving defendant a credit for the mortgage payments she made on the marital residence during the pendency of this litigation since plaintiff enjoyed the exclusive use and possession of this property during the action (see e.g. Codd v. Codd, 270 A.D.2d 880; Field v. Kaliszewski, 250 A.D.2d 728, 729). Likewise, we find no error in Supreme Court's distribution of the parties' personal property (see Stricos v. Stricos, 263 A.D.2d 659, 660). Lastly, turning to defendant's purchase of 167 Hoyt Street, plaintiff correctly asserts that he is entitled to a credit of $10,000, representing half of the down payment.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention on appeal, the Supreme Court properly denied her request for credits for the capital improvements which she made to the former marital residence (see Soyer v. Perricone, 222 A.D.2d 496; Borock v. Fray, 220 A.D.2d 637, 638; see also Hnis v. Hnis, 300 A.D.2d 629, 630), and for the amount by which she reduced the principal due on the mortgage on the former marital residence (see Borock v. Fray, supra; Field v. Kaliszewski, 250 A.D.2d 728, 729; see also Codd v. Codd, 270 A.D.2d 880; Martin v. Martin, 82 A.D.2d 431). However, the Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiff's request for a credit for the child support arrears owed by the defendant (see Bittner v. Bittner, 296 A.D.2d 516, 518).