Coburn v. State

10 Citing cases

  1. Hartsfield v. State

    294 Ga. 883 (Ga. 2014)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that defense counsel's failure to object to hearsay statements in an effort to show that defendant had nothing to hide was reasonable trial strategy

    Second, once the State rested its case and failed to call the declarants to testify, it was a sound defense strategy to minimize objections in an effort to show the jury that the defense had nothing to hide and to instead focus on discrediting Detective Wallace's testimony in counsel's closing argument. See Alexis v. State, 313 Ga.App. 283(3)(a), 721 S.E.2d 205 (2011) (finding no deficient performance where trial counsel did not raise a hearsay objection to a detective's testimony because he opted to discredit the detective's investigation through cross-examination and at closing, and noting that if an objection had been sustained, the prosecution could have simply recalled the declarant to the stand); Coburn v. State, 252 Ga.App. 315(4)(a), 555 S.E.2d 750 (2001) (trial counsel's strategy, to not object to hearsay testimony from a detective because he did not want the jury to have the impression he was trying to hide something, was reasonable). Finally, the record shows that part of the defense's theory of the case was to establish that there was no evidence that Hartsfield was in the car, even though his car may have been used by others to commit the crimes.

  2. Williams v. State

    282 Ga. 561 (Ga. 2007)   Cited 22 times

    An attorney's decision to forego objecting to hearsay or to leading questions used to establish routine points constitutes reasonable trial strategy. See Smith v. State, 275 Ga. 326 (3) ( 565 SE2d 453) (2002) (hearsay); see Reynolds v. State, 269 Ga. App. 268 (2) ( 603 SE2d 779) (2004) (leading questions); Coburn v. State, 252 Ga. App. 315 (4) (a) ( 555 SE2d 750) (2001) (hearsay). The trial court did not err in concluding trial counsel's performance was not deficient.

  3. Baugh v. State

    276 Ga. 736 (Ga. 2003)   Cited 35 times
    Explaining prior consistent statements are admissible to rebut attack on witness's veracity

    In Woodard, at 320, we pointed out that a witness's prior consistent statement is admissible at trial "only where (1) the veracity of a witness's trial testimony has been placed in issue at trial; (2) the witness is present at trial; and (3) the witness is available for cross-examination." See also Coburn v. State, 252 Ga. App. 315 (4c) ( 555 S.E.2d 750) (2001); Astudillo v. State, 244 Ga. App. 612 ( 536 S.E.2d 271) (2000); Phillips v. State, 241 Ga. App. 764, 766 ( 527 S.E.2d 604) (2000); Jenkins v. State, 235 Ga. App. 53(1) ( 508 S.E.2d 710 (1998). We went on to hold that "[a] witness's veracity is placed in issue so as to permit the introduction of a prior consistent statement only if affirmative charges of recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive are raised during cross-examination."

  4. Stokes v. State

    362 Ga. App. 223 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 2 times
    Concluding that although trial counsel did not testify to a strategic reason for not calling witness, a reasonable attorney could have chosen not to call witness because of concerns with his credibility

    We therefore decline to hold that a victim's "consciousness of the taking" is an essential element of armed robbery. See Coburn v. State , 252 Ga. App. 315, 316 (1), 555 S.E.2d 750 (2001) ("The victim here was lucky enough to escape before the gun was actually used to force her to turn over her property, but that fact should not serve as a shield to prevent [the defendant] from being held responsible for what was clearly an armed robbery."). Accordingly, Mew need not have been conscious of the taking for the jury to have found that his property was stolen from his immediate presence, and the trial court properly denied Mew's motion for directed verdict on the armed robbery charge.

  5. Jackson v. State

    336 Ga. App. 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 1 times

    We have held under similar circumstances—in which a victim faced with an offensive weapon fled the scene, leaving behind property that the defendant then took—that the evidence was sufficient to support an armed robbery conviction. See Lester v. State, 267 Ga.App. 795, 796 –798(1), 600 S.E.2d 787 (2004) (after defendant beat store clerk with bat, clerk fled store but remained in vicinity; defendant then took items from store); Baldivia v. State, 267 Ga.App. 266, 267 –269(1), 599 S.E.2d 188 (2004) (defendant shot at victims who fled scene for ten to fifteen minutes; defendant then took their car); Coburn v. State, 252 Ga.App. 315, 315–316(1), 555 S.E.2d 750 (2001) (defendant pulled gun on victim, who dropped her backpack and fled; defendant then took backpack); Kemper v. State, 251 Ga.App. 665, 665–666(1), 555 S.E.2d 40 (2001) (defendant pointed gun at victim and told her to get into trunk of vehicle; instead victim placed money in trunk and fled, and defendant then drove away with money); Wilson v. State, 207 Ga.App. 528, 528–529(1), 428 S.E.2d 433 (1993) (restaurant cashier left her register and went to her manager's office after defendant displayed gun; when she returned, cash from register was gone); Heard v. State, 204 Ga.App. 757, 757–758(1), 420 S.E.2d 639 (1992) (after defendant shot into victims' car, striking one victim and forcing them from road, victims left car and fled into woods; defendant then stole car); Morgan v. State, 195 Ga.App. 732, 732–734(1), 394 S.E.2d 639 (1990) (store clerk fled store after defendants threatened him with a knife; defendants then stole items from store); Maddox v. State, 174 G

  6. Bennett v. State

    279 Ga. App. 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 3 times

    "[T]here was simply no error in proceeding with the limited inquiry outside the presence of the defendant." Coburn v. State, 252 Ga. App. 315, 318 (2) ( 555 SE2d 750) (2001) (brief colloquy with alternate juror regarding alleged misconduct). Trial counsel's failure to object to this brief conference therefore was not ineffective. "Failure to raise a meritless objection cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

  7. Henderson v. State

    627 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)

    Failure to make the requisite showing on either prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Coburn v. State, 252 Ga. App. 315, 320-321 (4) (c) ( 555 SE2d 750) (2001). At the motion for new trial hearing, the trial judge explained that his sentencing decision was based upon the victim's graphic testimony, the severity of the beating inflicted upon her, and the extreme violence of the act — not upon Henderson's two prior misdemeanors.

  8. Dye v. State

    266 Ga. App. 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 20 times

    Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 ( 93 SC 375, 34 LE2d 401) (1972).Coburn v. State, 252 Ga. App. 315, 320 (4) (b) ( 555 SE2d 750) (2001). Moreover, co-defendant objected to the photographic lineup on the same grounds Dye now advances, and the trial court overruled the objections.

  9. Dukes v. State

    264 Ga. App. 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 12 times
    Upholding against unspecified claim of error jury instruction that "it's only necessary to prove burglary in Georgia that ... the accused did, without authority, enter a building or dwelling house of another with the intent to commit the alleged felony"

    Trial counsel's actions in these respects were a matter of trial strategy. See, e.g., Coburn v. State, 252 Ga. App. 315, 319(4)(a) ( 555 S.E.2d 750) (2001) (permitting testimony so the jury did not think defense was trying to hide something was a permissible matter of trial strategy). With regard to the prosecutor's questioning of Harris about an arrest, as opposed to a conviction, Harris denied the arrest and the trial court instructed the prosecutor to move on to the next question.

  10. McCollum v. State

    257 Ga. App. 330 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times

    Arnold v. State, 253 Ga. App. 307, 308(1) ( 560 S.E.2d 33) (2002).Coburn v. State, 252 Ga. App. 315, 319-320(4)(b) ( 555 S.E.2d 750) (2001). c. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to notify the trial court that a juror was sleeping.