Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:01CV-62-H.
July 24, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On November 7, 2000 the voters of Jefferson County, Kentucky approved House Bill 647 ("HB 647") merging the governments of Jefferson County and the City of Louisville. (KRS § 67C.101). Plaintiffs, Daniel Cobble, Eustice Durrett, Gracie Lewis, and Elizabeth Elliott bring this action against Defendant, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, seeking a declaration that HB 647 is unconstitutional and in violation of certain Kentucky statutes. Plaintiff Cobble filed a similar complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court on September 29, 2000 (the "Original Circuit Complaint"). The Original Circuit Complaint also alleged that HB 647 is unconstitutional and in violation of various statutory provisions. Cobble later sought to amend this complaint to add two additional causes of action, [three] other Plaintiffs, and certification as a class action (the "Amended Complaint"). In Cobble v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 00CI6302 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 2001) (" Cobble I "), the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed with prejudice both the Original Circuit Complaint and the Amended Complaint. Defendant moves to dismiss the present action in its entirety on the grounds of res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court will dismiss all but one of the causes of action due to the res judicata effects of Cobble I and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The only remaining claim, Count IV, alleges a violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, et seq. That issue was not decided in Cobble I and cannot be resolved as a matter of law without further briefing.
I.
Res judicata precludes re-litigation of claims that have been resolved, or could have been resolved, in a prior proceeding. The doctrine "protects. . . adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions." United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1180 (6th Cir. 1982). It promotes comity between the state and federal courts. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980).
The res judicata effects of a state court proceeding preclude subsequent federal litigation through 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which provides that the judicial proceedings of any state court shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States as they have by law in the courts of that state. Thus, whether this Court may hear Plaintiffs' claims depends on whether Kentucky's law of res judicata would bar a Kentucky court from hearing these claims. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).
In Kentucky res judicata bars repetitious suits involving the same claims or causes of action. Yeoman v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Ky. 1998). A claim bars further litigation on the same causes of action when: (1) there is an identity of parties; and, (2) an identity of the causes of action that were brought or could have been brought; and (3) the action has been resolved on the merits. Id.
The requirement of an identity of parties is satisfied by both an actual identity at parties and also when a party to a subsequent action is in privity with a party to a former action. BTC Leasing, Inc., v. Martin, 685 S.W.2d 191, 197-98 (Ky.Ct.App. 1984); Penco, Inc., v. Detrex Chemical Indus., Inc., 672 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Ky.Ct.App. 1984). Privity between parties exists when they share the same legal right. BTC Leasing, Inc., 685 S.W.2d at 198; Penco, Inc., 672 S.W.2d at 950. Cobble brought the September 29, 2000 complaint as a "worried inhabitant of Jefferson County." His standing to do so rested on his status as a citizen of Jefferson County. In the present action Plaintiff Cobble, along with Plaintiffs Gracie Lewis, Eustace Durrett, and Elizabeth Elliott, purport to bring this action "as themselves." As themselves alone, Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this action. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiffs are residents of the City of Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky and as such they do have standing to bring this action. Since no other basis for standing is alleged, the Court presumes that Plaintiffs bring this action as citizens of The City of Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky. The legal rights of each Plaintiff at issue in this action are therefore identical to those of Plaintiff Cobble in Cobble I. The first element for res judicata claim preclusion is satisfied.
Although the complaint is entitled "Class Action Complaint," it does not define the class of individual it seeks to include. The Court expresses no opinion on the propriety of maintaining this suit as a class action.
The second element of res judicata claim preclusion requires that the causes of action to be precluded are identical to those brought in an earlier suit. The rule does not act as a bar if the earlier suit presented different issues or the questions of law. City of Louisville v. Louisville Prof'l. Firefighters Ass'n., 813 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Ky. 1991). In analyzing this second element Kentucky courts apply the res judicata rule to preclude not only those issues which were actually raised and litigated but also to any issues which might reasonably have been litigated. See e.g., Arnold v. K-Mart Corp., 747 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988); Stephens v. Goodenough, 560 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Ky. 1977); Newman v. Newman, 451 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky. 1970). Thus, "Res judicata applies not only to the points upon which the court was required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time." Arnold, 747 S.W.2d at 132 (quoting Hays v. Sturgill, 193 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Ky. 1946)).
Determining an identity of causes of action requires a court to analyze the scope of the claims in the prior suit. Kentucky law takes a transactional approach to such an analysis. The factual transaction forming the controversy between the parties "is the basis of the litigative unit or entity. . ." Dennis v. Fiscal Court, 784 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Ky.Ct.App. 1990) (quoting Restatement (second) Judgments, § 24, comment a).
The facts underlying the present complaint are identical to those which underlie Cobble I. Both rest on the passage of HB 647. With the exception of Count IV, each claim was either actually decided by the circuit court or should have been because it rests on the same factual transaction as in the original complaint.
Counts I, II, III, and VIII were expressly decided in Cobble. Count I alleges in essence that the Merger of Louisville and Jefferson County violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution by depriving Louisville citizens of a vested right to their city government. Cobble I held that "the taxpayers of the City of Louisville do not have a contractual right to keep that municipal corporation in perpetual existence." Count II argues that in bypassing the local board of aldermen, HB 647 violates the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment. Cobble I held that separate referenda, with concurrent majorities, in the City of Louisville and Jefferson County are not required by the Constitution. Counts III and VIII are the same, alleging that HB 647 abridges the First Amendment right to freedom of assembly by preventing the citizens of Louisville from assembling as a "corporate entity." Cobble I held that "[c]ombining the governments of the City of Louisville and Jefferson County does not deny the residents of the City of Louisville their right to peaceably assemble within the meaning of the First Amendment."
Count VI alleges that the citizens of Louisville are denied equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment by the dissolution of the City of Louisville while retaining other municipalities within Jefferson County. This claim was raised in the Amended Complaint and was dismissed with prejudice along with all the other claims in that complaint. That same order denied Plaintiff Cobble's motion to amend his Original Circuit Complaint to include this claim and does not mention a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. Cobble I did not address the merits of this claim. However, as the Cobble I explained, once a complaint is served the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to amend an original complaint only with permission of the court or by written consent of the adverse party. Ky. R. Civ. Proc. ("CR") 15.01. By denying permission to amend the complaint the Court evidently believed that the interests of justice would not be served by amending the complaint. Cf., id. ("leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires"). This claim clearly rests on the same underlying facts as the claims in the Original Circuit Complaint. Exercising due diligence, Plaintiff Cobble could have brought this claim in the Original Circuit Complaint. The res judicata effect of Cobble I's dismissal of the Original Circuit Complaint bars Plaintiffs from bringing Count VI in a subsequent action.
Count VII asserts that HB 647 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it creates a conflict of interest among the leaders of the independent cities within Jefferson County and between these cities and the post-merger Jefferson County government. This claim was first brought as Count VIII of Plaintiff Cobble's Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint this count was styled "Conflict of Interests/Anti-Trust Matters Being Inherent to KRS 67C.101-137." The state court held that "the federal antitrust laws do not apply to the sovereign acts of a State. . .", apparently construing the conflict of interest claim to be identical to the antitrust claim. Count VII of the present complaint differs from count VIII of the October 9, 2000 amended complaint only in dropping any reference to anti-trust violations. By addressing the antitrust and conflict of interest claims as a single cause of action Cobble I implicitly held there is no independent cause of action for a conflict of interest among elected representatives. This holding precludes Plaintiffs from bringing the conflict of interest claim as a separate and distinct cause of action.
Count IV alleges that the merger of Louisville and Jefferson county violates the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. In Cobble I the court expressly refused to consider the merits of this claim because it was not ripe when that decision was issued. Under Kentucky law, the rule of res judicata does not encompass those potential claims that were not ripe when the first suit was filed. Watts v. K, S H, A Partnership, 957 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Ky. 1998). Count V asserts that the Voting Rights Act claim brought in Count IV is ripe because the voters for merger have a right to the district plan proposed in the election. This is not so much a cause of action as a potential response to an affirmative defense that could possibly be raised by Defendants. In so far as it attacks Cobble I's ruling that the Voting Rights Act claim was not ripe when Cobble I was decided it is precluded by the res judicata effects of Cobble I. In so far as this count seeks to pre-empt a ripeness objection which Defendants have not yet made it is not yet ripe and must be dismissed.
II.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine identifies the well-settled principle that lower federal courts may not review state court decisions. The doctrine operates similarly to res judicata in these circumstances. Rooker-Feldman has come to stand for the proposition that lower federal court's do not have jurisdiction to hear claims that were actually litigated or "inextricably intertwined" with adjudication by a state's courts. Patmon v. Michigan Supreme Court, 224 F.3d 504, 510 (6th Cir. 2000); Parkview Assoc. Partnership v. Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3rd. Cir. 2000). This is true where "federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong." Parkview, 225 F.3d at 325.
The doctrine is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states, in relevant part: [f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. Construing this statute in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923), the Supreme Court held that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to review a state supreme court decision, the only recourse being an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court under § 1257. Sixty years later in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), plaintiffs filed suit in federal court seeking permission to sit for the District of Columbia bar examination without having attended an ABA accredited law school, a violation of D.C. bar rules. Before filing in federal district court the D.C. Court of Appeals had rejected plaintiffs' petition to sit for the D.C. bar based on equitable considerations. The federal suit appealed the decision of the D.C. Court denying a waiver and also alleged Constitutional violations. The Court held that the district court could not hear the waiver claim because it was "inextricably intertwined" with the state court proceedings. Id. at 482-83. However, to the extent that plaintiffs "mounted a general challenge to the constitutionality of [the rule]. . .the district court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaints. Id. See also, Parkview, 225 F.3d at 324-25.
As explained above, Counts I, II, III, V and VIII were actually litigated and expressly decided in Cobble I and counts VI and VII were implicitly decided in that opinion. This Court could consider these claims only by holding that Cobble I's ruling, reaching the merits of the claims brought in counts I, II, III, and VIII of the present complaint and dismissing them with prejudice, was wrongly decided. Counts VI and VII rest on the same factual controversy litigated in Cobble I and are inextricably intertwined with the issues litigated in that case. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider Counts I, II, III, V, VI, VII and VIII. In contrast the claim brought in Count IV was not ripe when Cobble was decided. If this claim is now ripe for decision, an issue not presently before the Court, the factual basis for this claim is necessarily different from the facts at issue in Cobble I. Therefore, neither res judicata nor the Rooker-Feldman doctrine apply to Count IV.
The Court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
ORDER
Having carefully considered the pleadings of the parties and being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss is SUSTAINED as to all counts of the complaint except Count IV. All counts except Count IV are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Court will consider the ripeness of Count IV after the parties have had an opportunity to brief this issue.