“Whether a witness can be covered with the expert veil depends on his acquired knowledge in a field of endeavor not ventured into by the layman. If that knowledge extends beyond or supersedes that of an ordinary witness, as determined by the trial judge, the witness can become an expert.” Cobb v. State, 50 Ala.App. 707, 710, 282 So.2d 327, 329 (Ala.Crim.App.1973). As explained in Charles v. State, 350 So.2d 730 (Ala.Crim.App.1977):
If that knowledge extends beyond or supersedes that of an ordinary witness, as determined by the trial judge, the witness can become an expert." Cobb v. State, 50 Ala. App. 707, 710, 282 So. 2d 327, 329 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973). As explained in Charles v. State, 350 So. 2d 730 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977):
If that knowledge extends beyond or supersedes that of an ordinary witness, as determined by the trial judge, the witness can become an expert.” Cobb v. State, 50 Ala.App. 707, 710, 282 So.2d 327, 329 (Ala.Crim.App.1973). As explained in Charles v. State, 350 So.2d 730 (Ala.Crim.App.1977) :
[An appellate court] will not disturb the trial judge's finding of expert qualifications vel non, unless there is a clear abuse of this discretion." ' Slay v. Keller Indus., Inc., 823 So. 2d 623, 625 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Cobb v. State, 50 Ala. App. 707, 710, 282 So. 2d 327, 329 (1973))." 261 So. 3d at 177.
[An appellate court] will not disturb the trial judge's finding of expert qualifications vel non, unless there is a clear abuse of this discretion.’ " Slay v. Keller Indus., Inc., 823 So.2d 623, 625 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Cobb v. State, 50 Ala.App. 707, 710, 282 So.2d 327, 329 (1973) ).1. Timeliness of Mazda's Objection
"`[A]n expert witness' competence to testify is an inquiry substantially within the discretion of the trial judge. [An appellate court] will not disturb the trial judge's finding of expert qualifications vel non, unless there is a clear abuse of this discretion.' Cobb v. State, 50 Ala.App. 707, 710, 282 So.2d 327, 329 (1973), citing King v. State, 266 Ala. 232, 95 So.2d 816 (1957)."
[An appellate court] will not disturb the trial judge's finding of expert qualifications vel non, unless there is a clear abuse of this discretion." Cobb v. State, 50 Ala. App. 707, 710, 282 So.2d 327, 329 (1973), citing King v. State, 266 Ala. 232, 95 So.2d 816 (1957). The Slays' expert witness, Dr. B.J. Stephens, is a mechanical engineer with degrees from Duke University. His deposition testimony made it clear that Dr. Stephens is not an accident reconstructionist and that, in fact, he did not reconstruct this accident.
[I]t is today universally conceded that the fact of an accused's flight, escape from custody, resistence to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself. And Cobb v. State, 282 So.2d 327 (Ala. App. 1973), is persuasive to the same point of view. We think this assignment without merit.
356 So.2d at 149. See also Smoot, supra; Reynolds v. State, 346 So.2d 979, 982 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 346 So.2d 986 (Ala. 1977); Luckie v. State, 55 Ala. App. 642, 318 So.2d 337 (Civ.), cert. denied, 294 Ala. 764, 318 So.2d 341 (1975); Cobb v. State, 50 Ala. App. 707, 282 So.2d 327 (1973). However, the trial court's discretion is not unlimited.
This court, on appeal, will not disturb the trial judge's determination of expert qualifications unless there is a clear abuse of this discretion. Cobb v. State, 50 Ala. App. 707, 282 So.2d 327 (1973); Luckie v. State, 55 Ala. App. 642, 318 So.2d 337, cert. denied, 294 Ala. 764, 318 So.2d 341 (1975)."