Plaintiff did not report this allegedly disabling symptom to her myriad providers, despite years of consistent treatment. See Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (ALJ may rely on a failure to report symptoms to health care providers in affording less weight to the claimant's testimony); see also Coaty v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1137189, *4-5 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2015), aff'd, 673 Fed.Appx. 787 (9th Cir. 2017) ("contemporaneous self-reports to medical providers, as memorialized by their treatment notes, are the most accurate portrayal of functioning" where "there is a remote date last insured"). In addition, plaintiff stated to Dr. Alvord that her biggest impediment to working is not blackouts, but rather "spinal arthritis."
Plaintiff repeatedly reported to her treatment providers that her mental health symptoms eventually increased after she stopped using drugs and alcohol. See Coaty v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1137189, *4-5 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2015), aff'd, 673 Fed.Appx. 787 (9th Cir. 2017) ("contemporaneous self-reports to medical providers, as memorialized by their treatment notes, are the most accurate portrayal of functioning" where "there is a remote date last insured"). The evidence here reflects that plaintiff's anxiety and depression became more prevalent in 2017, at which point she began regular mental health treatment, but nonetheless experienced a significant disruption in functioning.
Moreover, the majority of the evidence from the adjudicative period is consistent with plaintiff's testimony and, as such, does not support a negative credibility finding. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) ("claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations"); see also Coaty v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1137189, *4-5 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2015), aff'd, 673 F. App'x 787 (9th Cir. 2017) ("contemporaneous self-reports to medical providers, as memorialized by their treatment notes, are the most accurate portrayal of functioning" where "there is a remote date last insured"). In particular, the record indicates plaintiff frequently struggles with daily activities and medication generally provides only limited relief. Tr. 304, 345, 385, 471, 505.
Nevertheless, these records generally suggest that plaintiff lived a sedentary lifestyle and was struggling with dizziness, fatigue, and labored breathing. See Tr. 645 (plaintiff "complaint[ing] [of] dizziness, fatigue as the day goes by" in May 2014); see also Coaty v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1137189, *4-5 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2015), aff'd, 673 Fed.Appx. 787 (9th Cir. 2017) ("contemporaneous self-reports to medical providers, as memorialized by their treatment notes, are the most accurate portrayal of functioning" where "there is a remote date last insured"). In any event, the majority of this post-adjudicative period evidence is entirely consistent with plaintiff's hearing testimony and, as such, does not support a negative credibility finding.
Moreover, because the Social Security Administration was unable to secure records from the other doctor (i.e., Yan Tan Cheng, M.D.) who treated plaintiff prior to May 10, 2013, Dr. Richenstein's records represent the only medical evidence from the dispositive time-frame. Tr. 49, 56, 60-62, 74-77, 108, 312, 341, 354; see also Coaty v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1137189, *4-5 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2015), aff'd, 673 Fed.Appx. 787 (9th Cir. 2017) ("contemporaneous self-reports to medical providers, as memorialized by their treatment notes, [provide] the most accurate portrayal of functioning" where the period at issue is remote). Second, the record has been fully developed and there are no outstanding issues, such that further proceedings would not be useful.
The ALJ's reason for rejecting Dr. Allen's opinion was clear and convincing. "[A]n ALJ may reject a medical opinion, even that of a treating doctor, where it was completed years after claimant's date last insured and was not offered as retrospective analysis." Coaty v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1137189, at *6 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2015) (internal quotations omitted); see also Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1999) (as amended) (holding that the fact that a treating physician did not examine the claimant until more than a year after expiration of her insured status supported the ALJ's rejection of that physician's opinion); Lindquist v. Colvin, 588 F. Appx. 544, 547 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a remand was not required where the new evidence did not relate back to the relevant period of disability); Carroll v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4830747, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2013) (stating that "[t]he fact that the opinion does not relate to plaintiff's proof of disability during the relevant time period is a clear and convincing reason for rejection supported by substantial evidence"); McCutchen v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4046335, at *10 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2013) (stating that "[e]vidence about [claimant's] increased depression after his date last insured is not probative, in that it does not materially relate back to the pe
Further, chart notes generated immediately prior to the adjudication period do not contain any reports of back or right arm pain. Tr. 160, 209-12, 223-24; see also Coaty v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1137189, *4 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2015) ("contemporaneous self-reports to medical providers, as memorialized by their treatment notes, are the most accurate portrayal of functioning" where the period at issue is remote). While, on one occasion in October 2009, plaintiff described right hand numbness, he did not follow up on his doctor's referral to nerve conduction testing until 2012, despite the fact that he had more than two months to pursue this testing before losing his insurance.
Plaintiff's hearing testimony was often imprecise. See, e.g., Tr. 30, 42 (plaintiff "honestly can't remember" what her symptoms were like prior to treatment or what prevented her from performing her previous caregiving job); see also Coaty v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1137189, *3 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2015) ("an adverse credibility finding is a determination that a claimant's testimony is not reliable, as opposed to dishonest") (citations omitted). Nevertheless, this evidence belies plaintiff's implication that her depression prevented her from maintaining a schedule or leaving the house to complete necessary activities.