Opinion
Sept. 19, 1972.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Page 1348
William Pehr, Westminster, for plaintiff-appellant.
Wolvington, Dosh, DeMoulin, Anderson & Campbell, William P. DeMoulin, for defendant-appellee.
COYTE, Judge.
On April 26, 1967, defendant issued to the deceased, Wayne M. Coates, an insurance policy providing certain benefits for accidental death.
On June 4, 1969, Mr. Coates, who was 59 years of age, was injured when he was pinned between the bumpers of two automobiles. He sustained a fracture of his right fibula and a crushing-type injury to the soft tissue surrounding the bony structure of his right leg. Mr. Coates' leg was placed in a cast for approximately ten days. The cast was then removed and he remained at home for approximately three weeks. On July 1, 1969, he returned to his place of employment to assist in paper work. On July 5, 1969, he collapsed while at home. Efforts to revive him were unsuccessful and he died.
An autopsy was performed, and the cause of death was determined to be coronary thrombosis.
Mrs. Coates, beneficiary under the insurance policy, made claim against the insurance company for the proceeds thereof. The claim was denied by the company on the basis that there was no causal relationship between the injury sustained by Mr. Coates on June 4, 1969, and Mr. Coates' subsequent death on July 5, 1969, as required by the insurance policy.
Trial was to the court, which found that plaintiff had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Coates' death was a result of the accident of June 4, 1969, and dismissed her complaint. She appeals, alleging error. We affirm.
The chief deputy coroner, licensed to practice medicine in Colorado since 1943, had performed the autopsy on Mr. Coates' body shortly after his death. He testified that he had found a thrombus in the left coronary artery and that, in his opinion, this thrombus was the cause of death. He was then asked to give his opinion as to how the thrombus was connected to the leg fracture and he replied:
'Well, any type of tissue injury, whether it be a blunt force blow with resulting tissu damage, whether it be a sharp laceration, all of that is going to have an effect on the elements contributed to the coagulability of the blood.'
He further testified that he was of the opinion that tissue changes contributed to some type of change in the blood, but that he could not point out the mechanism that caused the thrombus to form. He further testified that, from what he observed while performing the autopsy, it was his opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the cause of death was coronary thrombosis, probably due to the fracture of the right fibula.
A doctor who specialized in internal medicine and cardiovascular diseases was called by defendant, and he testified that, in his opinion, there was no causal connection between the tissue damage and fracture of the right fibula suffered by Mr. Coates and the subsequent coronary thrombosis. He also testified that the coagulation of the blood resulting from the leg injury would be largely localized and basically confined to the injury site; that such coagulation would be minimal or unnoticeable throughout the rest of the system and not measurable by ordinary clinical testing; and that any such coagulation of the blood would be confined to a short period of time such as a day or so. He further testified that thrombosis in the left coronary artery is the most common cause of death in this age group and six, and that it can often develop without trauma. He further testified that the factors affecting the coagulation of blood was in his field, but that he was not a research hematologist.
By cross-examination, plaintiff established that the defendant's doctor was not a specialist in the field of hematology and then moved to strike the doctor's testimony on the issue of coagulability of the blood. The court ruled that his testimony was within his specialty and denied the motion.
Plaintiff contends that, since defendant's doctor admitted on the stand that he was not a specialist in the field, it was error for the court to refuse to strike his testimony on the issue of coagulation of the blood.
Plaintiff attempts to draw too fine a line. As long as the doctor was a medical expert qualified in the field, his testimony was admissible. The doctor having qualified as an expert, it then becomes a question for the trier of fact to determine the weight to be given to his testimony on this issue rather than the question of the admissibility of that testimony. Frederick v. Younger Van Lines, 74 N.M. 320, 393 P.2d 438; Hanberry v. Fitzgerald, 72 N.M. 383, 384 P.2d 256.
The court in making its decision as to the cause of death had before it the conflicting testimony of two medical experts. The finding of the court that the evidence did not establish a causal connection between the injury suffered by Mr. Coates and his subsequent death is supported by the record.
The credibility, sufficiency, probative effect and weight of the evidence, together with the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are all within the province of the trial court, whose determination will not be disturbed on review unless it is manifestly erroneous. Broncucia v. McGee, 173 Colo. 22, 475 P.2d 336; Byrne v. Stone & Birkle, Inc., 156 Colo. 445, 399 P.2d 940. Where the evidence is conflicting, its credibility and weight are for determination by the trial court, and its findings will not be disturbed on review. Briano v. Rubio, 141 Colo. 264, 347 P.2d 497; Stewart v. Stout, 143 Colo. 70, 351 P.2d 847.
Judgment affirmed.
DWYER and PIERCE, JJ., concur.