Opinion
No. 05-07-00433-CR
Opinion Filed January 24, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 004-87189-05.
Before Justices O'NEILL, RICHTER, and LANG.
OPINION
Darren Scott Coakwell appeals the judgment of the County Court at Law No. 4, convicting him of driving while intoxicated and assessing his punishment at thirty days of confinement, probated for one year, and a fine of $500. In his sole issue on appeal, Coakwell argues the County Court at Law No. 4 erred when it denied his motion for new trial. We conclude the County Court at Law No. 4 did not err when it denied Coakwell's motion for new trial. The judgment of the County Court at Law No. 4 is affirmed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 8, 2005, Coakwell was arrested for the offense of driving while intoxicated. A Frisco police officer requested that Coakwell submit to an intoxilyzer test, but he refused. Consequently, the Texas Department of Public Safety instituted proceedings to suspend Coakwell's driver's license. Coakwell challenged the proceedings and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Coakwell, No. 2005-11-31735 (State Office of Admin. Hearings, May 4, 2006). On May 4, 2006, after a hearing, the administrative law judge entered an order sustaining the suspension of Coakwell's license. Coakwell appealed the administrative law judge's decision to the County Court at Law No. 4. On January 9, 2007, the County Court at Law No. 4 reversed the decision of the administrative law judge, finding the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Coakwell. Coakwell v. Tex. Dep't of Public Safety, No. 004-1341-06 (Co. Ct. at Law No. 4, Collin County, Tex. Jan. 9, 2007). Meanwhile, on November 9, 2005, Coakwell was charged by information with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. After a trial before the court, the County Court at Law No. 4 found Coakwell guilty and assessed his punishment at thirty days of confinement, probated for one year, and a fine of $500. State v. Coakwell, No. 004-87189-05 (Co. Ct. at Law, Collin County, Tex. Jan. 9, 2007). Coakwell filed a motion for new trial arguing the County Court at Law No. 4 erred when it found there was probable cause to stop or detain him because that same court had already found there was no probable cause to stop or detain him in his appeal of the administrative law judge's decision. On March 20, 2007, after a hearing, the County Court at Law No. 4 denied Coakwell's motion for new trial.II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In his sole issue on appeal, Coakwell argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial. He argues the State was barred from relitigating the issue of reasonable suspicion under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because: (1) the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's decision in Brabson and this Court's decision in Burrows are contrary to established precedent; and (2) he appealed the administrative proceeding to the County Court at Law No. 4, which found the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him.A. Standard of Review
A trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Lee v. State, 186 S.W.3d 649, 658 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. ref'd). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112; Lee, 186 S.W.3d at 658. A trial court is given wide latitude in making the decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial. See State v. Boyd, 202 S.W.3d 393, 401 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. ref'd). An appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. See Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112; Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Lee, 186 S.W.3d at 658. An appellate court will affirm a trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112; Wead, 129 S.W.3d at 129. A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no reasonable view of the record could support the trial court's ruling. See Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112; Lee, 186 S.W.3d at 658.B. Applicable Law
Chapter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code concerns the suspension of a driver's license for refusal to take an intoxication test when suspected of driving while intoxicated. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 724.001-724.064 (Vernon 1999 Supp. 2007). A person may challenge the suspension by requesting a hearing before an administrative law judge. See id. § 724.041. The issues at the hearing are whether: (1) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person; (2) probable cause existed to believe the person was operating a motor vehicle in a public place; (3) the person was placed under arrest by the officer and was requested to submit to the taking of a specimen; and (4) the person refused to submit to the taking of a specimen on request of the officer. See id. § 724.042. If the administrative law judge finds in the affirmative on each issue, the suspension order is sustained. See id. § 724.043. An appeal of the administrative law judge's decision is governed by chapter 524 of the Texas Transportation Code. See id. § 724.047. A suspension that is sustained by the administrative law judge may be appealed to a county court at law. See id. § 524.041(b) (Vernon 2007). Review on appeal is limited to the record of the administrative hearing with no additional testimony. See id. § 524.043(a). However, a party may apply to the court to present additional evidence. See id. § 524.043(b). The United States Supreme Court adopted the rule of collateral estoppel as embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970). However, collateral estoppel applies to the states only in cases that implicate the protections of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. See Reynolds v. State, 4 S.W.3d 13, 20 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). A prosecution for driving while intoxicated following an administrative driver's license suspension does not implicate the rule of collateral estoppel because: (1) the Texas Department of Public Safety and the district attorney are not the same parties; and (2) civil administrative license revocation proceedings do not constitute successive criminal prosecutions or carry the possibility of multiple criminal punishments. See Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 16, 18-21; State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Further, Ashe does not prohibit the legislature from expressly providing that the determination of an administrative judge in a civil administrative proceeding to a suspend a person's driver's license does not preclude litigation of the same or similar facts in a criminal prosecution. See Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 20. The determination of the administrative law judge is a civil matter. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.048(a)(1); Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 19. It is independent of and is not an estoppel to any matter in issue in the adjudication of a criminal charge arising from the same occurrence that is the basis for the suspension. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.048(a)(2). Also, it does not preclude litigation of the same or similar facts in criminal prosecutions. See id. § 724.048(a)(3). Further, except in situations where the criminal prosecution results in an acquittal, the disposition of the criminal charge does not affect an administrative license revocation proceeding. See id. § 724.048(b), (c). As a result, a person may not invoke the common law doctrine of collateral estoppel because the legislature has declared it to be inapplicable to a criminal prosecution following an administrative license revocation proceeding. See id. § 724.048. A district attorney, when prosecuting an offense for driving while intoxicated, is not collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop or arrest even though the Texas Department of Public Safety received an adverse ruling on that issue in a prior administrative proceeding. See Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 14-22; Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 183, 185. Collateral estoppel applies only when the criminal charge arising from the same arrest results in an acquittal. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.048(c); Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 21-22.C. Application of the Law to the Facts
First, we address Coakwell's argument that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's decision in Brabson and this Court's opinion in Burrows are contrary to its prior decisions in Groves and Ex Parte Tarver. Compare Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 182; Burrow v. Texas, 740 S.W.2d 19 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.) with State v. Groves, 837 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Ex Parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). The State responds that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal's decisions in Brabson and Reynolds show that neither Groves nor Ex parte Tarver are applicable to this case. We note that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's decisions in Groves and Ex parte Tarver predate its decisions in Brabson and Reynolds. Coakwell argues that in Groves, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals implicitly held that collateral estoppel would preclude the relitigation of the issue of probable cause in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated if the issue was litigated and determined adversely to the State in an administrative license revocation proceeding. See Groves, 837 S.W.2d at 106. However, in Brabson, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed Groves stating:[ G] roves . . . did not require this Court to decide whether collateral estoppel principles precluded the "State" from litigating at a criminal proceeding an ultimate fact issue that was decided adversely to the "State" in the prior administrative proceeding to revoke a person's driver's license. [citations omitted.] Any suggestion in Groves . . . that collateral estoppel principles would apply in cases like this was pure dicta and unnecessary to our ultimate disposition of those cases.Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 185-86. Also, Coakwell argues that in Ex parte Tarver, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel "to the traditional administrative function of a probation revocation hearing." See Ex Parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195. However, in Brabson and Reynolds, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined Ex parte Tarver was distinguishable. In Brabson, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
Our opinion does not conflict with the "narrowness" of this Court's holding in Tarver. [citation omitted.] In Tarver, the parties were the same, the ultimate fact issue in the probation revocation proceeding and the subsequent criminal prosecution was the same, the ultimate fact issue was decided adversely to the "State" in the probation revocation proceeding, and that fact issue was "properly before" the trial court in the probation revocation proceeding. [citation omitted.]Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 186. Similarly, in Reynolds, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished Ex parte Tarver, stating:
Therefore, Tarver apparently decided jeopardy attached in the probation revocation proceeding because the probation revocation proceeding was close enough to a criminal prosecution or was "essentially criminal." [citations omitted.] Otherwise, Tarver could not have decided the "narrow" circumstances of that case implicated "one of the risks" against which the double jeopardy clause protects and it could not have applied federal constitutional collateral estoppel principles under Ashe. [citations omitted.]
We can easily distinguish Tarver from the present case. A license revocation administrative proceeding is nothing like a probation revocation proceeding. It is not a "criminal prosecution" and it is not "essentially criminal." [citations omitted.]Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 20-21. We conclude the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's opinions in Groves and Ex parte Tarver do not bar the State from relitigating the issue of reasonable suspicion in the criminal proceeding after it was adversely decided to the Texas Department of Public Safety in the civil administrative license revocation proceeding. See Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 20-21; Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 185-86. Second, we address Coakwell's argument that the State was barred from relitigating the issue of reasonable suspicion under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because once he appealed the administrative proceeding to the County Court at Law No. 4, it was no longer a civil proceeding and, in that appeal, the County Court at Law No. 4 determined the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. The State responds that the adverse findings in the administrative proceedings do not implicate collateral estoppel in the criminal proceedings because the proceedings involve different parties, do not implicate federal double jeopardy concerns, and were statutorily exempted from estoppel. Also, the State contends the determinative factor is not the court that heard the administrative license revocation proceeding, but the applicability of double jeopardy, which forms the basis for the collateral estoppel doctrine. The County Court at Law No. 4's order reversing the decision of the administrative law judge states, in part:
After reviewing the transcript to determine if substantial evidence supported the officer's decision to stop Coakwell on the date of the arrest, this Court finds that the officer received a report of a traffic complaint involving Coakwell, not an "intoxicated driving complaint" as indicated on the findings. The officer proceeded to follow behind the vehicle of Coakwell and noted "weaving left and right." The officer failed to note any traffic offenses and failed to mention any other vehicles in the area. The officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Coakwell on October 8, 2005.The order is styled "Coakwell v. Texas Department of Public Safety" and at the top states "Civil No. 004-1341-06." The administrative license revocation proceeding was brought by the Texas Department of Public Safety, while the criminal proceeding was brought by the District Attorney of Collin County. The Texas Department of Public Safety and the Collin County District Attorney are not the same parties. See Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 16; Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 184. Also, the decision of the administrative law judge is a civil matter and does not implicate the rule of collateral estoppel as embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy because it does not constitute a successive criminal prosecution, it is not an "essentially criminal" proceeding, and it does not carry the possibility of multiple punishments. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.048(a)(1); Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d 18-21. A civil administrative license revocation proceeding does not preclude litigation of the same or similar facts in a criminal prosecution. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.048(a)(3). However, Coakwell argues once he appealed the administrative law judge's decision to the county court at law, it was no longer a civil proceeding. Coakwell does not explain or point us to any authority showing that an administrative license revocation proceeding becomes a criminal prosecution, an "essentially criminal" proceeding, or carries the possibility of criminal punishment when it is appealed to the county court at law. We conclude the State was not barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating the issue of reasonable suspicion in the criminal proceeding after it was adversely decided to the Texas Department of Public Safety in the appeal of the civil administrative license revocation proceeding. Coakwell's sole issue on appeal is decided against him.