Opinion
A152461
01-04-2018
COUNTY OF SONOMA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THE FIELDS OF THE WOOD, INC., Defendant; TONY AVILA SAMPSON, Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCV-257212)
Judgment was entered against The Fields of the Wood, Inc. (TFOW) in a code enforcement proceeding brought by the County of Sonoma (County). The trial court later issued an order awarding the County the costs it incurred in enforcing the judgment, and Tony Avila Sampson now seeks to appeal that order. The County has moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Sampson lacks standing: he cannot challenge the award as an individual because he is not a party to the proceeding below, and he cannot challenge the award on behalf of TFOW because he is not an attorney. We agree with the County, and accordingly dismiss the appeal.
As we discussed in our unpublished opinion in the related case County of Sonoma v. The Fields of the Wood, Inc. (Nov. 30, 2017, A148672) [nonpub. opn.], Sampson, the chief executive officer of TFOW, applied to intervene in the code enforcement proceeding after the County filed a motion for entry of default judgment. (Id. at p. 3.) The trial court denied Sampson's application and granted the County's motion for entry of judgment. (Id. at p. 4.) Sampson unsuccessfully appealed the denial of his application to intervene. (Id. at p. 7.) Meanwhile, the trial court awarded the County its costs in enforcing the judgment, and Sampson initiated an appeal of the cost order. The County then moved to dismiss the appeal.
On our own motion we take judicial notice of the background facts stated in our unpublished opinion in the related appeal. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (a) & (d); 459, subd. (a).)
With its motion to dismiss, the County submitted a request that we take judicial notice of certain court records under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459. The request was unopposed, and we now grant it. --------
Appeals may be taken only by those who have standing to appeal. (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide, Civil Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 2:270, p. 2-170.) In general, only parties of record in the trial court may appeal. (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 736.) A person or entity who is denied the right to intervene may appeal from the order denying intervention, but may not appeal from the judgment or from an order subsequently entered in the case, absent circumstances not present here. (Ibid.) Sampson was denied the right to intervene below, and therefore he had the right to appeal from the order denying intervention, which he did. But he has no standing to appeal an order subsequently entered in the case, including the order awarding costs.
Sampson objects that the standing issue raised by the County in its motion to dismiss is "untimely" and has "possibly . . . been waived." The objections lack merit. Sampson also objects that his response "may require the introduction of evidence," but does not indicate what that evidence might be. To the extent Sampson would have us take judicial notice of the documents he attached to his declaration, we do so. Finally, Sampson objects that he may require "an opportunity to be heard on the subject in the trial court." We disagree. The motion to dismiss concerns Sampson's standing to appeal, which we can decide on the basis of the limited record before us.
Sampson acknowledges that TFOW, the defendant in the code enforcement proceeding, owns the property at issue. He argues that because he "gift deeded" the property to TFOW in 1975, he has standing in the case. He also argues that he has standing because the County has referred to the property as the "Sampson Property." Sampson cites no authority to support his arguments, and we are aware of none.
Sampson also argues that he has standing to appeal the costs order because he is part of the corporation, TFOW. But under California law, a corporation cannot appear in court in propria persona, or through any officer or agent who is not an attorney. (Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 727; Vann v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 199.) Sampson is not an attorney, and therefore he cannot appeal the costs order on TFOW's behalf.
Because Sampson is not a party to the code enforcement proceeding, he cannot appeal the costs order as an individual; because he is not an attorney, he cannot appeal the costs order on behalf of TFOW. He lacks standing to appeal the order, and therefore we must dismiss the appeal.
DISPOSITION
Respondent's request for judicial notice is granted. The appeal is dismissed.
/s/_________
Miller, J. We concur: /s/_________
Kline, P.J. /s/_________
Richman, J.