Opinion
2014-04098
03-04-2015
In the Matter of COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, respondent, v. CORRECTION OFFICERS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF ROCKLAND COUNTY, INC., appellant.
Koehler & Isaacs LLP, New York, N.Y. (Julie Pearlman Schatz of counsel), for appellant. Thomas E. Humbach, County Attorney, New City, N.Y. (Matthew J. Byrne of counsel), for respondent.
Koehler & Isaacs LLP, New York, N.Y. (Julie Pearlman Schatz of counsel), for appellant.
Thomas E. Humbach, County Attorney, New City, N.Y. (Matthew J. Byrne of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
Opinion In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Garvey, J.), dated March 14, 2014, which granted the petition to permanently stay arbitration and denied the cross petition to compel arbitration.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.A correction officer filed a grievance after he was denied a longevity pay increase. After his grievance was denied, the appellant, Correction Officers Benevolent Association of Rockland County, Inc. (hereinafter the Union), filed a notice of intent to arbitrate the grievance.
The County of Rockland commenced this proceeding to permanently stay arbitration on the ground that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate this type of grievance. The Union cross-petitioned to compel arbitration, arguing that the collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter the CBA) permitted arbitration of this dispute.
The Supreme Court determined that the parties had only agreed to arbitrate certain limited matters expressly delineated in the CBA and that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate the type of grievance at issue. Accordingly, the court granted the petition, denied the cross petition, and permanently stayed arbitration.
“The determination of whether a dispute between a public sector employer and employee is arbitrable is subject to [a] two-prong test” (Matter of Board of Educ. of Deer Park Union Free School Dist. v. Deer Park Teachers' Assn., 77 A.D.3d 747, 747–748, 909 N.Y.S.2d 738 ; see Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 N.Y.2d 132, 137–138, 688 N.Y.S.2d 463, 710 N.E.2d 1064 ; Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. [United Liverpool Faculty Assn.], 42 N.Y.2d 509, 512, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 369 N.E.2d 746 ). “Initially, the court must determine whether there is any statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance” (Matter of Board of Educ. of Deer Park Union Free School Dist. v. Deer Park Teachers' Assn., 77 A.D.3d at 748, 909 N.Y.S.2d 738 ; see Matter of County of Chautauqua v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL–CIO, County of Chautauqua Unit 6300, Chautauqua County Local 807, 8 N.Y.3d 513, 519, 838 N.Y.S.2d 1, 869 N.E.2d 1 ; Matter of County of Rockland v. Civil Serv. Empl. Assn., Inc., 93 A.D.3d 721, 721–722, 940 N.Y.S.2d 285 ). “If there is no prohibition against arbitrating, the court must examine the parties' collective bargaining agreement and determine if they in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute” (Matter of Board of Educ. of Deer Park Union Free School Dist. v. Deer Park Teachers' Assn., 77 A.D.3d at 748, 909 N.Y.S.2d 738 ; see Matter of County of Chautauqua v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL–CIO, County of Chautauqua Unit 6300, Chautauqua County Local 807, 8 N.Y.3d at 519, 838 N.Y.S.2d 1, 869 N.E.2d 1 ; Matter of County of Rockland v. Civil Serv. Empl. Assn., Inc., 93 A.D.3d at 722, 940 N.Y.S.2d 285 ).
Here, the County did not contend that arbitration of the subject matter of the dispute was prohibited by law or public policy. Thus, the only issue is whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute (see Matter of Board of Educ. of Deer Park Union Free School Dist. v. Deer Park Teachers' Assn., 77 A.D.3d at 748, 909 N.Y.S.2d 738 ).
“Unlike general labor disputes in the private sector involving arbitration, the intent to arbitrate of parties to a collective bargaining agreement in the field of public employment may not be presumed” (Matter of Board of Educ. of Valhalla Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Valhalla Teachers Assn., 112 A.D.3d 620, 621, 976 N.Y.S.2d 528 ; see Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 N.Y.2d at 141–142, 688 N.Y.S.2d 463, 710 N.E.2d 1064 ; Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. [United Liverpool Faculty Assn.], 42 N.Y.2d at 513–514, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 369 N.E.2d 746 ). “Indeed ... it must be taken, in the absence of clear, unequivocal agreement to the contrary, that the [parties to a collective bargaining agreement] did not intend to refer differences which might arise to the arbitration forum” (Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. [United Liverpool Faculty Assn.], 42 N.Y.2d at 514, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 369 N.E.2d 746 ; see Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 N.Y.2d at 141–142, 688 N.Y.S.2d 463, 710 N.E.2d 1064 ; Matter of Board of Educ. of Valhalla Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Valhalla Teachers Assn., 112 A.D.3d at 621, 976 N.Y.S.2d 528 ).
Here, contrary to the Union's contention, the CBA did not broadly provide for the arbitration of any grievance that may arise under the CBA (cf. Matter of City of White Plains v. Professional Firefighters Assn., Local 274 I.A.F.F., 298 A.D.2d 456, 748 N.Y.S.2d 762 ). Rather, as the Supreme Court correctly concluded, the CBA limited the availability of arbitration to specifically enumerated matters (see Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. [United Liverpool Faculty Assn.], 42 N.Y.2d at 515, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 369 N.E.2d 746 ; Matter of Pocantico Hills Cent. School Dist. v. Pocantico Hills Teachers Assn., 264 A.D.2d 397, 398, 694 N.Y.S.2d 417 ). Since the grievance at issue in this case fell outside the arbitration provisions of the CBA, the Union failed to demonstrate that “the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate [this] particular dispute” (Matter of County of Chautauqua v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL–CIO, County of Chautauqua Unit 6300, Chautauqua County Local 807, 8 N.Y.3d at 519, 838 N.Y.S.2d 1, 869 N.E.2d 1 ; see Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. [United Liverpool Faculty Assn.], 42 N.Y.2d at 515, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 369 N.E.2d 746 ; Matter of Town of Hempstead v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., 286 A.D.2d 401, 401, 728 N.Y.S.2d 715 ; Matter of Pocantico Hills Cent. School Dist. v. Pocantico Hills Teachers Assn., 264 A.D.2d at 398, 694 N.Y.S.2d 417 ; Matter of Board of Educ. of Pine Plains Cent. School Dist. v. Pine Plains Fedn. of Educators, 248 A.D.2d 612, 612, 669 N.Y.S.2d 929 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the petition to permanently stay arbitration and denied the cross petition to compel arbitration.