Opinion
A146627
01-06-2017
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; CITY OF OAKLAND, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 608346)
This case presents the question whether, pursuant to Penal Code section 4015, persons arrested by city police officers who are in need of immediate medical attention and transported to a hospital prior to being booked into county jail must be received by the county sheriff.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
After an arrestee in need of immediate medical attention was transported by the Oakland Police Department (OPD) to Highland Hospital, OPD asked the superior court to issue an ex parte order transferring custody of the arrestee to the Alameda County Sheriff's Office (ACSO). Shortly after the court did so, Alameda County (County), filed a motion to vacate the order transferring custody of the arrestee to ACSO. Concluding that the arrestee had been arraigned a day or two after his custody was transferred to the sheriff, and that arraignment justified placing the arrestee in the custody of the sheriff, the court denied the motion to vacate the transfer order solely on the ground the arraignment rendered the propriety of the order moot.
Subdivision (b) of section 4015 states that "[n]othing in this section [which includes the statement in subdivision (a), that: The sheriff shall receive all persons committed to jail by competent authority] shall be construed [or interpreted] in a manner that would require the sheriff to receive a person who is in need of immediate medical care until the person has been transported to a hospital or medical facility so that his or her medical needs can be addressed prior to booking into county jail." The sheriff maintains that this provision relieves him, and all California sheriffs, of any duty to take physical custody of an arrestee in need of immediate medical attention and transported to a hospital or medical center, until after the arrestee's medical needs have been addressed, and asks us to issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order transferring custody of an arrestee from OPD to ACSO. According to the County, the issue is not moot. Claiming that the meaning of subdivision (b) of section 4015 is an important issue of continuing interest to cities and counties throughout the state, the County urges that the controversy be adjudicated by us in this writ proceeding.
As we shall explain, the issue in this case was not adequately clarified by the parties in the trial court or in this court, and the trial court therefore did not accurately frame the genuine issue, nor did it decide that issue. The trial court assumed, as did we when we granted the order to show cause, that the custodial costs at issue included the medical care costs incurred by the hospitalized arrestee, as those are the only costs to which section 4015 seemingly relates, and neither the parties nor the record indicated that medical costs were not here at issue. Although paragraph No. 11 of the petition states that the "[T]he Sheriff invested a total of 1,405.8 hours at an expense of $70,300, devoted exclusively to guarding [Stout] pursuant to the custody order," the declaration of Sheriff's Captain David R. Brady, which was offered by the County in support of the petition focuses on medical costs, not the cost of guarding hospitalized arrestees. Captain Brady states that "hospitals will often insist we pay the medical bills [incurred by arrestees] because the individual is in our custody," despite the fact that "[ACSO] does not budget for these instances" and section 4015 relieves the sheriff of the need to bear "the medical costs associated with [an arrestee's] medical care." Inexplicably, the City of Oakland's (City) opposition to the County's motion to vacate in the trial court, and its opposition to the petition for writ of mandate filed in this court, never clearly state that Stout's medical care costs are not at issue in this case, and this was only made clear at oral argument.
Thus, the issue in this case is not, as the trial court assumed and we at first believed, whether the sheriff can be obliged "to pay the cost of medical services rendered to any individual in need of immediate medical care who has been arrested by city law enforcement personnel and transported to a hospital or medical facility prior to being delivered to and received at the county jail or other detention facility" (§ 4015, subd. (c).), but whether subdivision (b) of section 4015 relieves the sheriff of the duty to incur all other custodial costs incurred by a hospitalized arrestee whose medical needs have not been fully attended to. Neither the briefs in this court nor the record before us provide an adequate basis upon which to adjudicate that issue.
Concluding mandamus is therefore inappropriate in this case, we shall deny the petition.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On August 7, 2015 (all dates are in that year), Timothy Eric Stout was contacted in Oakland by Contra Costa County law enforcement officers attempting to serve him with an arrest warrant. After he drew a gun, the officers shot Stout and he sustained serious injuries. OPD officers immediately transported Stout to Highland Hospital. Several hours later that same day, and without notice to the sheriff or any other county official, OPD made an ex parte request for a superior court order transferring custody of Stout from OPD to the sheriff. Superior Court Judge Joseph Hurley, who was sitting in a criminal department of the superior court, granted the request in a brief order directing that the transfer "occur no later than 5:00 P.M. on the day this order is signed." Neither OPD, the City, the sheriff, or the County were nominal parties to the criminal proceeding, in which Stout was the defendant, and it is unclear whether any judicial proceeding of any sort was conducted prior to issuance of Judge Hurley's ruling and, if so, when.
OPD immediately provided ACSO a copy of Judge Hurley's order and the sheriff assumed custody of Stout at Highland Hospital before the end of the day Stout entered that facility. At some point after Stout was delivered to Highland Hospital, OPD investigated the matter and recommended charging Stout with drawing a firearm in the presence of a law enforcement officer, and the Alameda County District Attorney filed a complaint charging Stout with that offense.
On August 11, the sheriff moved to vacate and/or reconsider the transfer order on the grounds it violated section 4015, subdivision (b), and the absence of any notice of OPD's ex parte request for the transfer order or opportunity for the sheriff or the County to be heard. The motion asked the court to release Stout from the sheriff's custody, and order that neither the sheriff nor Alameda County should be responsible for any "financial burden related to the medical expenses of [Stout]." The motion was scheduled to be heard on August 18, 2015, by Superior Court Judge Gregory A. Syren, but the matter was postponed at the request of OPD.
At the hearing, which took place on September 3, Judge Syren allowed that "the Sheriff's Department does deserve some sort of notice before a court formally signs a transfer of custody from an agency like [OPD] to the Sheriff's Department." Judge Syren said he would discuss the matter with other judges, but did not rule on the sheriff's claim that the denial of notice and a right to be heard constituted denial of due process of law.
As to the merits of the motion, the sheriff relied not only on subdivision (b) of section 4015, which we earlier quoted, but subdivision (d) of that statute, which states that the intent of the Legislature in enacting section 4015 was "to ensure that the costs associated with providing medical care to an arrested person are borne by the arrested person's private medical insurance or any other source of medical cost coverage for which the person is eligible."
Ignoring the fact that the cost of medical care was not at issue, but only the cost of guarding Stout, the City argued that while section 4015, subdivision (b), "allows the sheriff to turn away a defendant who is taken to a county jail," no court "has taken that to mean that the sheriff can refuse a defendant who has been lawfully committed." OPD pointed out that subdivision (a) of section 4015 mandates that "[t]he sheriff shall receive all persons committed to jail by competent authority," and a superior court commitment order constituted "competent authority." City also relied on Government Code section 69922, which provides that the sheriff shall obey all lawful orders and directions of all courts held within his or her county, and Pasadena v. County of L.A. (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 497, 499, which held that "the county jail is the proper place of confinement of person accused of a felony pending the examination of the charge, and pending and until the completion of a trial of the charge." The City's opposition contemplated that the issue presented by the County's motion to vacate Judge Hurley's order was the sheriff's "request for an order allocating responsibility for Stout's medical bills," which the City contended was "premature."
Judge Syren did not adopt these arguments. Instead, he adopted the City's alternative argument which, as succinctly stated by the city attorney, was that "Stout has been arraigned, so there really is no question that he has been committed to the sheriff's custody." According to the city attorney, two cases, Sharp Healthcare v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1301 (Sharp Healthcare) and Hospital Committee for Livermore-Pleasanton Areas v. City of Oakland (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1360 (Hospital Committee), support the proposition that once a defendant is arraigned, and even charged with a [criminal] complaint, that defendant has been committed [to county jail]." Accepting this argument, Judge Syren denied the motion to vacate on the ground that at the time Judge Hurley issued his order transferring custody of Stout to the sheriff, Stout had been arraigned and probable cause was found. As the court stated, "Stout has now been arraigned [and] bail has been set in this complaint, and so the request to vacate the order for transfer is moot." Admitting he was unsure whether Judge Hurley knew a criminal complaint had been filed at the time he issued his order, Judge Syren felt that the dispositive factor was that "at the time that order for transfer was signed, that a criminal complaint, a felonious criminal complaint had been filed against Stout."
Although Judge Syren considered the fact that Stout had been arraigned as dispositive—indicating that a hospitalized arrestee who has been arraigned is thereby constructively committed to the custody of the sheriff—Judge Syren expressly refused "the County's request that the court make some sort of finding as to when it was . . . appropriate for the Police Department to have retained custody of Stout," and whether the County "should . . . through their hospital, seek recompense for the services, the medical services provided to Stout." As to that matter, "the court declines to make any ruling."
The City now relies solely on the theory that the arraignment of a hospitalized arrestee that results in a finding of probable cause constitutes the constructive booking of such an arrestee into county jail, and does not conflict with section 4015.
On October 30, 2015, the County filed a petition for writ of mandate directing respondent superior court to vacate its ex parte order transferring physical custody of Stout to the sheriff during his hospitalization.
On January 11, 2016, we issued an order to show cause why the relief requested by County's writ petition should not be granted.
DISCUSSION
" 'Although it is well established that mandamus cannot be used to control a court's discretion, in unusual circumstances the writ will lie where, under the facts, that discretion can be exercised in only one way.' [Citations.]" (Hurtado v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574, 579.) That is not, however, the case here, as we have learned only belatedly.
As we have said, nothing in the record before Judge Hurley, Judge Syren, and this court clarifies whether the issue in this case relates to the cost of guarding Stout, or the cost of his medical care at Highland Hospital, or perhaps both costs. Nor do the briefs of the parties in this case make clear whether the costs related to the provision of medical care relate only to the expenses associated with guarding Stout while he was hospitalized. Though we do not think it was intended to mislead the court, that was the result of the parties' silence. The omission was significant. As indicated, the County's claim is based on section 4015, but the purpose of subdivision (b) appears to be to ensure only that "costs associated with providing medical care to an arrested person" are not borne by the sheriff, but are borne instead "by the arrested person's private medical insurance or any other source of medical care coverage for which the arrested person is eligible." (§ 4015, subd. (d), italics added.) Because the briefs of the parties and the record were silent on the nature of the costs at issue, we did not until oral argument learn that the costs at issue in this case relate entirely to the expenses associated with guarding Stout while he was hospitalized. The parties advised us at oral argument that the sheriff was never required to bear the cost of providing Stout medical care while he was hospitalized, and Stout is no longer hospitalized and was granted bail. The briefs of the parties do not specifically address the issue whether, as the County appears to claim, subdivision (b) of section 4015 empowers a sheriff to refuse to take custody of a hospitalized arrestee even if taking custody would not require him to bear the costs of the medical care provided the arrested person.
Furthermore, none of the cases relied upon by the trial court and the parties that interpret subdivision (b) of section 4015—the meaning of which is the central issue in this case—is between a county and a city; this case is the first. Sharp Healthcare, supra, 256 Cal.App.4th 1301, Hospital Committee, supra, 176 Cal.4th 1360, and all of the other cases interpreting section 4015 are actions initiated by a hospital or other health care provider against a county for reimbursement of the cost of providing medical care to an arrestee in need of immediate medical attention. So far as we know, no court has ever previously been asked to determine whether section 4015, subdivision (b), relieves a sheriff of the legal obligation to pay the non-medical custodial costs incurred by a hospitalized arrestee. Because we cannot say that discretion as to that matter can only be exercised in only one way, we cannot say that mandamus is appropriate. (Hurtado v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 579.)
Additionally, we lack the ability to fully review the trial court's belief that a hospitalized arrestee is constructively committed to the custody of the sheriff as a result of being arraigned, because the record does not show when Stout was arraigned, and whether the arraigning magistrate was asked to issue an order pertaining to custody, or did so. Although the parties opine about these matters, the facts are not provided by the record.
Finally, the facts that Stout is no longer hospitalized and the sheriff is not seeking reimbursement of the County's payment of the cost of the medical care Stout received in Highland Hospital render moot the County's claim under subdivision (b) of section 4015.
The County's claim that the ex parte proceeding below—which denied the sheriff notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with the City's request to transfer custody—denied the sheriff due process is also moot. A "supplemental" document filed with the clerk of our court by the County on August 18, 2016, indicates that, pursuant to a "recent agreement between the parties," OPD now regularly provides the ACSO notice of its motion for a superior court order transferring a hospitalized arrestee to the custody of the sheriff. If that is the case, the due process issue raised in the trial court but not decided by that court is also moot.
The pleadings entitled "Supplemental Documentation" repeatedly filed by the County consist for the most part of hearsay information regarding "recent agreements" between the parties or developments in other pending cases assertedly involving issues that are similar or relevant to those in this case. Information such as this should properly have been brought to the court's attention by means of a motion to augment the appellate record or a motion to take judicial notice. --------
The deficiencies in the briefing and the record, and the mootness of the claims presented, are reason enough for us to deny the petition. But denial of the petition is also warranted because it would not leave the County without an adequate legal remedy.
We agree with the County and the parties that have filed amicus curiae briefs in its support, that uncertainty exists as to the meaning of subdivision (b) of section 4015 and future controversies leading to litigation are sure to re-occur, not only in Alameda County but probably in other counties in this state. It appears to us that the best way to prevent that from happening may well be, as the City urges, a civil action for declaratory relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)
" 'The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to "serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation." ' [Citation.] 'Another purpose is to liquidate doubts with respect to uncertainties or controversies which might otherwise result in subsequent litigation [citation].' [Citation.] The proper interpretation of a statute is a particularly appropriate subject for judicial resolution. [Citation.] Additionally, judicial economy strongly supports the use of declaratory relief to avoid duplicative actions to challenge an agency's statutory interpretation or alleged policies. [Citations.]" (In re Claudia E. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 627, 633, italics added; accord 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed.), Pleading, § 859 (1).) In any case, as the trial court observed, this case raises a civil issue and should be decided in the first instance in a civil proceeding.
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of mandate is denied.
/s/_________
Kline, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Stewart, J. /s/_________
Miller, J.