Opinion
1-20-0591
09-06-2022
CNTRST DEBT RECOVERY CORP., an Illinois Corporation,Plaintiff, v. 7550 KINGSTON LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company and YOLANDA YBARRA, Defendants, YOLANDA YBARRA, Judgment Debtor-Appellant, and YRY HOLDINGS, LLC; BOULDER HILLAPARTMENTS, LLC; and BOULDER HILLCONDOS, LLC, Third-Party Citation Respondents-Appellants.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 2015 CH 07695 Transferred to Law Division The Honorable James McGing and Mary Colleen Roberts, Judges Presiding.
JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hyman and Walker concurred in the judgment.
PUCINSKI, JUSTICE
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the circuit court's order imposing sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) against Defendant and Judgment Debtor Yolanda Ybarra and Third-Party Citation Respondents YRY Holdings, LLC, Boulder Hill Apartments, LLC, and Boulder Hill Condos, LLC upon the court's findings of repeated and purposeful noncompliance with discovery requests and court orders in post-judgment supplementary proceedings. We further affirm the court's subsequent related orders denying Defendant and Third-Party Citation Respondents' motions to reconsider and to amend and modify the judgment order, and granting Plaintiff and Judgment Creditor CNTRST Debt Recovery Corp.'s petition and supplemental petition for attorneys' fees and costs.
¶ 2 Defendant and Judgment Debtor Yolanda Ybarra ("Ybarra") and Third-Party Citation Respondents YRY Holdings, LLC, Boulder Hill Apartments, LLC, and Boulder Hill Condos, LLC (collectively "Third-Party Citation Respondents") appeal from the circuit court's granting Plaintiff and Judgment Creditor CNTRST Debt Recovery Corp.'s ("CNTRST") Amended Motion for Rule to Show Cause and Sanctions against Ybarra, Third-Party Citation Respondents, and their counsel. The court found that Ybarra and Third-Party Citation Respondents repeatedly and purposefully failed to comply with CNTRST's citations to discover assets, as well as with several court orders related to those discovery requests, and imposed sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) in the form of CNTRST's attorneys' fees and costs related to the sanctions findings, including the specific orders identified by the court as having been issued in response to Appellants' noncompliance.
¶ 3 Ybarra and Third-Party Citation Respondents argued that the court lacked authority to sanction them under Rule 219(c) for numerous reasons, including that the rule did not apply to post-judgment proceedings, that CNTRST had specifically pled for sanctions under Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 137 and thus no motion had been filed seeking Rule 219(c) sanctions, and that the sanctioned parties were not given due process. The circuit court rejected their arguments, denied their motion to reconsider, and granted CNTRST's petition for attorneys' fees and costs in a modified amount. The judge who had been handling the case then retired, and the sanctioned parties filed a motion to amend and modify the judgment order awarding sanctions. The subsequent judge assigned to the case denied this motion, and Ybarra and Third-Party Citation Respondents now appeal.
¶ 4 BACKGROUND
¶ 5 The underlying matter arises from post-judgment supplementary proceedings brought by CNTRST pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1402 against Yolanda Ybarra and 7550 Kingston LLC. The case was filed in the circuit court, Chancery Division, before Judge Senechalle, was later transferred to Judge Mitchell, and finally transferred to Judge Cleary of the Chancery Division, who entered judgment in favor of CNTRST on September 19, 2017. The matter was transferred from the Chancery Division to Judge Flannery, Presiding Judge of the Law Division, for transfer to the Law Division, Tax and Miscellaneous Remedies, for post-judgment proceedings. The case was assigned to Judge White, and then upon CNTRST's motion for substitution of judge, to Judge Kubasiak. Judge Kubasiak oversaw the issuing of citations to discover assets on Ybarra and Third-Party Citation Respondents (collectively, with Ybarra, "Appellants"), before the matter was transferred to Judge McGing on April 18, 2018, and then to Judge Roberts in October of 2019, following Judge McGing's retirement. Citations proceedings against Appellants followed.
¶ 6 Judge McGing entered several orders over the course of the proceedings, regarding the status of Appellants' compliance with the citations and the court's discovery orders. Of relevance to the present appeal are: a May 21, 2018 order granting CNTRST's motion to compel document production against Third-Party Respondent YRY Holdings, LLC ("YRY") and setting a deadline for YRY to comply; a June 12, 2018 order ruling that CNTRST was entitled to certain subpoenaed documents and setting a deadline for their production; a June 28, 2018 order continuing all citations and noting that all Appellants made untimely document production one day after the deadline set by the court; a July 5, 2018 order noting deficiencies in Appellants' document production as set forth by CTRST, and ordering Appellants to cure those deficiencies within two weeks; and a July 26, 2018 order noting that Appellants made untimely production six days after the deadline set in the July 5 order and continuing CNTRST's motion for rule to show cause and sanctions (collectively, "Discovery Orders.")
¶ 7 On July 24, 2019, CNTRST filed a motion for rule to show cause and sanctions pursuant to Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 137 against Appellants and their counsel for failure to comply with the first of the five Discovery Orders (as the fifth had not been issued at the time of filing) and for alleged false statements Ybarra made in her citation rider response. CNTRST filed an amended motion ("Sanctions Motion") on August 2, 2018, identifying at least three separate categories of requested documents that Appellants failed to produce. Appellants filed a response, first on August 14, 2018, and then on August 27, 2018 after Appellants' counsel withdrew and its new counsel had filed its appearance. Appellants argued that they had fully complied with the citations to discover assets and the Discovery Orders, and that Rule 137 did not apply to the alleged failure to produce documents in supplementary proceedings.
¶ 8 Judge McGing entered an order on January 23, 2019 terminating all supplementary proceedings against Judgement Debtors Ybarra and 7550 Kingston LLC, terminating all citations served on Ybarra and Third-Party Citation Respondents, granting Judgment Debtors' and Third-Party Citation Respondents' counsel's motion to withdraw, and continuing CNTRST's motion for sanctions. The judgment was paid in full and a Release and Satisfaction of Judgment was entered on February 7, 2019.
¶ 9 Judge McGing entered an order on the Sanctions Motion on February 13, 2019, granting the motion not pursuant to Rule 137 but Rule 219. He stated in the order and opinion that Rule \ 219(c) governed noncompliance with discovery requests and court orders. He further found that Appellants' noncompliance with discovery occurred as follows: YRY's failure to produce requested documents led to the May 21, 2018 court order compelling production; the June 12, 2018 order granted Ybarra's motion for an extension of time and CNTRST's motion to compel production against Boulder Hill Apartments, LLC, and Boulder Hill Condos, LLC; Third-Party Citation Respondents made incomplete production one day late; the court ordered them to cure the deficiency on July 5, 2018; and the court again entered an order compelling production on August 3, 2018 to cure further deficiencies. He noted that even at the time of its ruling on the Sanctions Motion, it was unclear whether Appellants had fully complied with CNTRST's citations, and found that an appropriate sanction was payment of attorneys' fees and costs related to the misconduct. Specifically, the court ordered Appellants to pay CNTRST's fees and costs associated with the court hearings that took place on June 12, June 28, July 5, and July 27. He also ordered that CNTRST submit fees and costs incurred relating to the sanctions findings including, but not limited to, the May 21, June 12, June 28, July 5, and August 3 Discovery Orders "and any other dates specifically related to this issue."
¶ 10 Appellants filed their Motion to Reconsider and Vacate Order Granting Rule 219(c) Sanctions ("Motion to Reconsider") on March 15, 2019. Appellants argued that it was improper for the court to impose Rule 219(c) sanctions when none had been sought, as Appellants were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard, Rule 219(c) did not apply to post-judgment supplementary proceedings, Rule 277(h) was the proper Supreme Court Rule governing sanctions for violations of court orders, citations, and subpoenas in supplementary proceedings and allows for punishment for contempt, and Rule 219(c) did not allow for sanctioning third parties. They also requested that the court correct the inconsistency between granting fees and costs for the four hearing dates but ordering that CNTRST submit fees and costs associated with the dates of the Discovery Orders. Appellants also argued that even if there had been any noncompliance with the discovery citations, it did not rise to the level of unreasonable noncompliance necessary to impose Rule 219(c) sanctions.
¶ 11 Judge McGing issued an Opinion and Order on July 30, 2019 denying the Motion to Reconsider, summarizing Appellants' history of noncompliance with citations and court orders in this matter and finding that the noncompliance was repeated and purposeful and that the court had discretion to sanction the relevant parties and third parties. Applying the reasoning of the Second District in Mehalko v. Doe, he held that Rule 219(c) and a trial court's inherent authority to enforce its own orders through the use of contempt proceedings granted the court jurisdiction to enter a rule to show cause, and this authority extended post-judgment to enforce a pre-judgment order. 2018 IL App (2d) 170788, ¶ 25. He found that proper due process was given, in the form of notice and an opportunity to be heard, in accordance with the minimal due process requirements of indirect civil contempt proceedings. Appellants were given that notice and opportunity to be heard on January 23, 2019 when the court held a hearing on the Sanctions Motion, which was continued to a hearing on February 13, 2019 due to the withdrawal of Appellants' original counsel. Appellants did not appear at the hearing. The court gave them further opportunity to respond by setting a briefing schedule on their Motion to Reconsider. Addressing Appellants' argument that Rule 219(c) did not apply to sanctions against third-party citation respondents, Judge McGing held that the exception for third parties that were found to be in collusion with a party to the litigation, as was the case here, where the Third-Party Citation Respondents were completely controlled by Ybarra, the Judgment Debtor. He further stated that Appellants were incorrect in alleging that Rule 219(c) required a finding of unreasonable noncompliance before issuing sanctions.
¶ 12 CNTRST filed its Supplemental Petition for Fees and Costs on August 20, 2019, adding the fees and costs incurred since its original fee petition in February 2019, seeking attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $39,644.55. Appellants responded with their challenges to the amount sought, and Judge Roberts ruled on the petition on December 5, 2019. The order listed reductions and adjustments made to several of the line items, and granted fees and costs in the amount of $28,021.50.
¶ 13 On December 16, 2019, Appellants filed a Motion to Amend and Modify Judgment Order, arguing that the judgment order was actually for indirect criminal contempt and not for indirect civil contempt because it was imposed for past conduct that did not contain a purge provision or compel compliance, and the order should be modified to reflect as such, and should further be amended to correct alleged mathematical errors to the amount of $25,905.05 based on the court's listed modifications to the fee petition. Judge Roberts denied the motion on March 9, 2020, stating that she had already ruled on a motion to reconsider the sanctions order and Appellants were attempting to file an additional post-judgment motion after the entry of final judgment, where only one post-trial motion attacking a final judgment in a nonjury case was allowed. She further ruled that the court had already undergone a detailed review of the fee petition and all reductions to the amounts sought were final.
¶ 14 Appellants now appeal from the entry of Rule 219(c) sanctions, granting of the fee petition in the amount of $28,021.50, and denial of the motions to reconsider and to amend and modify the judgment order.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Standard of Review
¶ 17 The decision to impose sanctions under Rule 219(c) is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill.2d 112, 123 (1998); Redelmann v. K.A. Steel Chemicals, Inc. 377 Ill.App.3d 971, 976 (1st Dist. 2007); Obermeier v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 2019 IL App (1st) 170553, ¶ 127; Nedzvekas v. Fung, 374 Ill.App.3d 618, 620-21 (1st Dist. 2007). An order imposing sanctions under Rule 219(c) must set forth with specificity the reasons and basis for any sanction imposed; however, a court's failure to do so is not per se reversible error. See Glover v. Barbosa, 344 Ill.App.3d 58, 63 (1st Dist. 2008).
¶ 18 Appellants argue that the proper standard of review in this case is de novo, because while the choice to impose sanctions is usually reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, there is an exception where the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing and observe the testimony of live witnesses, relying instead entirely on documentary evidence. They cite Nolan v. Hearthside Homebuilders, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 182492, where we found de novo review to apply to an appeal of the court's issuance of Rule 137 sanctions because of the facts of the case. In Nolan, the judge who originally ruled on the Sanctions Motion had retired, and a different judge set a hearing date on the motions to reconsider the sanctions. The case was then assigned to yet another judge, who conducted that hearing and vacated the sanctions order in part. Id. at ¶¶ 59-69. The last judge's order was the first final order entered at that point, and the judgment creditors appealed this order that vacated the sanctions order. Id. at ¶ 72. We found de novo review to apply because while the last judge held oral arguments, he "conducted no evidentiary hearing and did not base his ruling on any matter other than the record that is currently before us." Id. at ¶¶ 83-84. His findings as to the original judge's basis for imposing sanctions were expressly based in law. Id. at ¶ 84.
¶ 19 While we do not find any error in our prior ruling in Nolan, we do not find the present matter to fall within the same conditions warranting de novo review. It is true that Judge McGing, who originally entered the sanctions order, did retire during the post-judgment proceedings, but here, he ruled on both the original Sanctions Motion and the Motion to Reconsider. Judge Roberts ruled on the motion to amend and modify the judgment. Appellants are clear that they are appealing the original judge's imposition of Rule 219(c) sanctions. While there was no evidentiary hearing held in this case, Judge McGing had held many hearings on this matter, including the hearings in connection with each discovery order that the court found Appellants to have violated. Appellants chose not to appear at the hearing set for argument on CNTRST's motion for sanctions, and we will not alter the standard of review because Appellants chose not to be present before the court and instead relied on their briefs. The only order entered by a different judge—Judge Roberts— was one finding that Appellants improperly attempted to take a second shot at a post-judgment motion after the entry of final judgment and after their Motion to Reconsider had been denied. This order did not address the basis for or propriety of the order imposing sanctions, the order denying reconsideration, or the order awarding CNTRST a specific amount of its submitted fees and costs. Judge McGing did not base any of his three relevant orders solely on the documentary record before us on appeal. We therefore reject Appellants' argument that Nolan is inapplicable in determining the proper standard of review, and we instead proceed under an abuse of discretion standard.
¶ 20 Sanctions Order
¶ 21 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) governs noncompliance with court orders and rules, providing in relevant part:
Failure to Comply with Order or Rules. If a party, or any person at the instance of or in collusion with a party, unreasonably fails to comply with any provision of part E of article
II of the rules of this court (Discovery, Requests for Admission, and Pretrial Procedure) or fails to comply with any order entered under these rules, the court, on motion, may enter, in addition to remedies elsewhere specifically provided, such orders as are just, including, among others, the following:
* * *
In lieu of or in addition to the foregoing, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the offending party or his or her attorney, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the misconduct, including a reasonable attorney fee, and when the misconduct is wilful, a monetary penalty. When appropriate, the court may, by contempt proceedings, compel obedience by any party or person to any subpoena issued or order entered under these rules. Notwithstanding the entry of a judgment or an order of dismissal, whether voluntary or involuntary, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, any order imposing monetary sanctions, including such orders as may be entered on motions which were pending hereunder prior to the filing of a notice or motion seeking a judgment or order of dismissal.
Where a sanction is imposed under this paragraph (c), the judge shall set forth with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order.
Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 219(c).
¶ 22 Our courts have repeatedly held that a court is vested with authority under both Rule 219 and, independently of Rule 219, its own inherent authority to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases, to enter sanctions for violations of its orders. Cronin v. Kottke Assocs., LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 111632, ¶ 39; see also Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 166 Ill.2d 48, 61-63 (1995); Patel v. Illinois State Medical Soc., 289 Ill.App.3d 356, 366-67 (1st Dist. 1998); Redelmann, 377 Ill.App.3d at 976-77. Rule 219(c) is clear on its face that a court may sanction a party both upon motion or of its own initiative. Therefore, Appellants' argument that the circuit court could not issue sanctions pursuant to Rule 219(c) where CNTRST's petition sought sanctions pursuant to Rule 137 is irrelevant, as the court did not need a motion for any form of sanctions in order to properly enter an order imposing sanctions based on its findings of repeated and purposeful noncompliance with its orders and with the discovery citations. The text of the Rule on its face does away with several of Appellants' challenges to the circuit court's Sanctions Order. Judge McGing set forth with specificity in his January 23, 2019 order the basis for the sanctions, identifying each of the discovery orders that Appellants violated, and the form of that noncompliance. As previously stated, Appellants are incorrect that the court lacked authority to enter an order of Rule 219(c) sanctions without an explicit motion requesting such relief from the judgment creditor.
¶ 23 Furthermore, the court's authority to control its docket and impose sanctions in response to noncompliance addresses Appellants' claim that the court erred in issuing sanctions because CNTRST's Sanctions Motion failed to adequately plead a claim for contempt or for Rule 137 violations. Appellants' argument regarding the definition of civil contempt and willful disobedience is irrelevant, as is their argument that CNTRST failed to plead Appellants' making false or frivolous filings pursuant to Rule 137. CNTRST's argument in support of sanctions is not under review on appeal—rather, it is the circuit court's reasoning in imposing sanctions. Appellants clearly take issue with CNTRST's claims of their discovery noncompliance, providing various reasons why they believe they gave timely and complete responses to discovery. However, their argument that CNTRST did not properly plead Appellants' misconduct does not address the fact that Judge McGing gave a detailed basis for his finding of Appellants' repeated, purposeful noncompliance with discovery requests and court orders. Appellants' defense of their conduct in the discovery process does not convince us that the circuit court abused its discretion in sanctioning them. Again, even if CNTRST's Sanctions Motion was lacking—which we decline to find here— we find no reason to reverse the circuit court's decision based on the justifications it provided.
¶ 24 Appellants next argue that Rule 219 applies only to sanctionable conduct that occurs pre-trial, and not in post-judgment proceedings, which are governed by Rule 277; Rule 277(h) provides that "[a]ny person who fails to obey a citation, subpoena, or order or other direction of the court issued pursuant to any provision of this rule may be punished for contempt." Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 277(h). However, nothing in Rule 219 limits a court's authority to impose sanctions for noncompliance with discovery rules and orders to the pre-trial stage of litigation. Court rules and orders regarding discovery apply equally to post-judgment supplementary proceedings, and Rule 277, which further permits the court to sanction misconduct in supplementary proceedings, does not prevent a court from ruling that sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees and costs are warranted pursuant to Rule 219(c). Appellants read into our rules limitations and requirements that simply are not there, and they cite no caselaw that supports their reading of the rules. Rule 219(c) applies to violations of Article II, Part E of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, which includes Rule 201—"General Discovery Provisions." This rule requires full compliance with discovery requests and empowers the court to prevent abuses of the discovery process. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 201(b)-(c).
¶ 25 Appellants further argue that sanctions pursuant to Rule 219(c) were improper because there was no petition for contempt and the procedures for contempt proceedings were not followed, and therefore Appellants were not given notice whether indirect or direct contempt was being sought, and whether it was civil or criminal contempt. In making this argument, Appellants again raise their issues with CNTRST's allegations of misconduct and noncompliance with the discovery process, stating that CNTRST failed to plead willful disobedience of the court's orders. This point continues to be irrelevant to whether the circuit court abused its discretion, as the court made several findings of late or incomplete disclosures that required the court to issue orders that Appellants cure their discovery responses, and identified which orders those were and used them as the basis for ruling that CNTRST was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs relating to the hearings, filings, and other efforts behind those court orders. While Rule 219(c) permits a court to compel a party's obedience through contempt proceedings, that provision does not create any additional requirements for a circuit court ordering monetary sanctions under the Rule. Appellants again attempt to latch onto any language in Rule 219(c) from which they seek to create limitations on the court's broad authority to manage the discovery process.
¶ 26 This further applies to the due process argument that Appellants include in claiming that a contempt petition and contempt proceedings were required. Appellants claim that they were not given the notice and opportunity to be heard to which they were entitled in indirect civil contempt proceedings. See Mehalko, 2018 IL App (2d) 170788 at ¶ 31 ("In indirect civil contempt proceedings, a respondent is entitled to minimal due process, which consists of notice and an opportunity to be heard.") Judge McGing already thoroughly addressed this argument, and Appellant has not presented us with any reason to question the court's reasoning. In his July 30, 2019 order denying Appellants' Motion to Reconsider, he wrote that they were given notice and an opportunity to be heard on January 23, 2019 when the court held a hearing on CNTRST's Sanctions Motion, which was continued to a hearing on February 13, 2019 due to the withdrawal of Appellants' original counsel. Appellants did not appear at the hearing. The court then set a briefing schedule on the Motion to Reconsider, giving Appellants further opportunity to be heard.
¶ 27 Appellants next claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to order sanctions after the judgment had been paid in full, the supplementary proceedings were terminated, and citations and third-party citations were dismissed as of January 23, 2019. Appellants further argue that the fact that the court's sanctions order came after the termination of supplementary proceedings means that the sanctions were improperly punitive in nature, rather than meant to compel Appellants' compliance with discovery and court orders. Rule 219(c) states in relevant part, "Notwithstanding the entry of a judgment or an order of dismissal, whether voluntary or involuntary, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, any order imposing monetary sanctions, including such orders as may be entered on motions which were pending hereunder prior to the filing of a notice or motion seeking a judgment or order of dismissal." Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 219(c); see also Mehalko, 2018 IL App (2d) 170788 at ¶ 25. Furthermore, Judge McGing wrote in his order denying Appellants' Motion to Reconsider that he continued the matter of sanctions because Appellants' counsel had moved to withdraw, and he was allowing Appellants time to obtain new counsel before hearing the Sanctions Motion. This is directly counter to Appellants' claims that the court's sanctions order was punitive because it was entirely after the fact and backward-looking. Judge McGing even noted at the time of ruling on the Sanctions Motion that it remained unclear whether Appellants had properly complied with discovery. Nothing in this argument leads us to find that the court abused its discretion by continuing the Sanctions Motion for ruling as it did.
¶ 28 Even if Rule 219(c) did not apply, the court had the inherent authority to issue sanctions for noncompliance with its orders, and we would not disturb its decision to do so if it had not selected the correct rule under which it could do so. See Cronin, 2012 IL App (1st) 111632 at ¶ 39 ("[I]ndependent of any authority granted by Rule 219(c), a trial court has the inherent authority to control its docket and impose sanctions for the failure to comply with court orders."); see also Bank of America v. WS Management, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132551, ¶ 84 ("We also note that '[w]e may affirm the judgment of the trial court on any basis in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied upon that basis or whether the trial court's reasoning was correct.'") (quoting Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Sharif, 2014 IL App (1st) 133008, ¶ 25, Alpha School Bus Co., Inc. v. Wagner, 391 Ill.App.3d 722, 734 (1st Dist. 2009) (stating the same). Appellants cannot escape the consequences of their attempts to evade the discovery process by finding fault with CNTRST's pleadings or the circuit court's procedural handling of the sanctions.
¶ 29 Appellants plead in the alternative that the circuit court miscalculated the sum of CNTRST's submitted time entries after identifying which ones were permitted, permitted in part, or denied as attorneys' fees and costs relating to Appellants' discovery misconduct. They argue that the judgment amount should be modified from $28,021.50 to $25,905.05. Appellants raised this argument in their Motion to Amend and Modify Judgment Order, following the denial of their Motion to Reconsider. Judge Roberts ruled that the motion in its entirety was an improper second attempt at a post-judgment motion directed against the judgment pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) ("In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment *** file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.") Appellants had already had a chance to challenge the judgment when they moved for reconsideration and more than 30 had passed since the court entered the sanctions judgment. See also Sizer v. Lotus Grain & Coal Co., 70 Ill.App.3d 739, 740 (4th Dist. 1979) (trial court lacks authority to grant more than one opportunity for post-trial motions); see also Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill.2d 253, 259 (1981) (Permitting a losing litigant to file successive post-judgment motions indefinitely is counter to the efficient administration of justice and the need for finality in litigation, particularly where a second post-judgment motion is filed more than 30 days after judgment.) Judge Roberts further stated that Judge McGing had reviewed CNTRST's fee petition in great detail and determined that $28,021.50 was appropriate for the time and effort spent by CNTRST's counsel.
¶ 30 We agree with the circuit court that Appellants' second post-judgment motion attacking the judgment was improperly brought. As Appellants did not raise the argument of mathematical error in their first, timely Motion to Reconsider, the argument is, in effect, being raised for the first time on appeal, and we deem it waived. See Mabry v. Boler, 2012 IL App (1st) 111464, ¶ 15 ("Generally, arguments not raised before the circuit court are forfeited and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.") We further agree with the circuit court that the court was best positioned to determine an appropriate sum to enter as discovery sanctions against Appellants in the form of CNTRST's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Even if the individual modifications the court listed in ruling on the fee petition do not add up to a total of $28,021.50, we do not find any basis for determining that this amount is so unreasonable that the circuit court abused its discretion in choosing that amount to enter as the sanctions judgment. We therefore deny Appellants' alternative argument.
¶ 31 CONCLUSION
¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 33 Affirmed.