Cmnty. State v. Cmnty. State

11 Citing cases

  1. City of Okoboji v. Parks

    830 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa 2013)   Cited 10 times
    Stating same requirements for injunction

    Third, Parks further claims the City has failed to meet its burden in demonstrating a need for injunctive relief under all the facts and circumstances of this case. See Cmty. State Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Cmty. State Bank, 758 N.W.2d 520, 528 (Iowa 2008) (setting forth factors a party seeking an injunction must establish). Parks also challenges the scope of the injunction.

  2. Iowa Entrepreneur v. Clear Channel Outdoor

    801 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011)

    See Harvey v. Care Initiatives, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Iowa 2001) (using common law to find meaning in a statute). Based on that common law, TIE argues there was (1) "a likelihood of confusion," see Cmty. State Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Cmty. State Bank, 758 N.W.2d 520, 527 (Iowa 2008), or alternately, (2) "reverse confusion," see Freedom Card, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Co., 432 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2005). The district court gave TIE the benefit of the doubt on the question of whether CCO used that precise phrase.

  3. Souza v. Charmed LLC

    715 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (N.D. Iowa 2024)

    In that case, Judge Locher explained that the right of publicity is recognized by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which the Iowa Supreme Court has favorably cited in previous decisions. See id. (citing Cmty. State Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Cmty. State Bank, 758 N.W.2d 520, 525-27 (Iowa 2008)) (relying on the Restatement to assess a trademark infringement claim); Cemen Tech, Inc. v. Three D Industries, L.L.C., 753 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2008) (relying on the Restatement to assess a claim of misappropriation of trade secrets); Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 761 (Iowa 1999) (relying on the Restatement to assess the enforceability of an employment agreement containing a non-disclosure provision). The right of publicity, found in § 46 of the Restatement, is the historical descendent of the right of privacy.

  4. Estate of Bisignano v. Exile Brewing Co.

    694 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (S.D. Iowa 2023)   Cited 2 times
    Finding "the Iowa Supreme Court would recognize the right of publicity if presented with the question"

    This tort is recognized in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995), which the Iowa Supreme Court also often favorably cites. See, e.g., Cmty. State Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. Cmty. State Bank, 758 N.W.2d 520, 525-27 (Iowa 2008); Cemen Tech, Inc. v. Three D Indus., L.L.C., 753 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2008); Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 761 (Iowa 1999). Section 46 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition explains that the "principal historical antecedent of the right of publicity is the right to privacy," which it traces to back to

  5. Moon Seed LLC v. Weidner

    604 F. Supp. 3d 780 (S.D. Iowa 2022)   Cited 2 times

    Though Plaintiff's claims for unfair competition under the Lanham Act in Count I and a trademark infringement in Count II are distinct, they are based on the same substantive allegations and require Plaintiff to prove the same elements. SeeHubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc. , 182 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1999) (outlining elements plaintiff must provide to succeed on a Lanham Act claim); Cmty. State Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Cmty. State Bank , 758 N.W.2d 520, 525–27 (Iowa 2008) (outlining elements plaintiff must prove to succeed on a common law trademark infringement claim); see alsoWeems Indus., Inc. v. Teknor Apex Co. , 540 F. Supp. 3d 839, 847–48 (N.D. Iowa 2021).

  6. Weems Indus., Inc. v. Teknor Apex Co.

    540 F. Supp. 3d 839 (N.D. Iowa 2021)   Cited 5 times

    All four are based on the same substantive allegations and require Weems to prove the same two basic elements: (1) that it has a valid, protectable interest in its trademark, the color chartreuse, and (2) that Teknor's allegedly infringing hoses are similar enough in color to its own that they are likely to cause customer confusion regarding their source.SeeHubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc. , 182 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1999) ; First Bank v. First Bank Sys., Inc. , 84 F.3d 1040, 1044–46 (8th Cir. 1996) ; Cmty. State Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. Cmty. State Bank , 758 N.W.2d 520, 525–27 (Iowa 2008).

  7. TrueNorth Cos. v. TruNorth Warranty Plans of N. Am., LLC

    423 F. Supp. 3d 604 (N.D. Iowa 2019)   Cited 4 times

    Under Iowa law, a plaintiff must prove (1) it has a valid trademark and (2) infringement by the defendant to prove trademark infringement. SeeCommunity State Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. Community State Bank , 758 N.W.2d 520, 525 (Iowa 2008). Proof of infringement is based on the same six factors as under the Lanham Act.

  8. First Natl. Bank in Sioux Falls v. First Natl. Bank S.D

    655 F. Supp. 2d 979 (D.S.D. 2009)   Cited 2 times

    This Court in its 1997 Memorandum Opinion and 2008 summary judgment opinion rejected similar arguments, relying on First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n of Council Bluffs v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n. of Lincoln, 929 F.2d 382, 383-84 (8th Cir. 1991) (The term "First Federal" in a savings and loan association's service mark had acquired sufficient secondary meaning to be protectable in the county in which it did business when it and its competitor were located within one block of each other). See also, Community State Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Community State Bank, 758 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Iowa 2008) ("Community State Bank" had acquired secondary meaning entitling it to trademark protection, even though local competitor began using the same name two months earlier, where bank had used name continuously and exclusively for twelve years.) This Court again rejects Defendants' arguments and finds FNB Sioux Falls' marks to be strong marks in Minnehaha County and the portion of Lincoln County which is within an eighteen-mile radius of First National Bank in Sioux Falls' main office, based on the testimony of area residents, the actual presence of branches in these areas and the history of advertising and signage in these areas.

  9. Carroll Airport Comm'n v. Danner

    927 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 2019)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding case was tried in equity despite evidentiary objections by trial court

    A plaintiff seeking permanent injunctive relief must establish "(1) an invasion or threatened invasion of a right; (2) that substantial injury or damages will result unless the request for an injunction is granted; and (3) that there is no adequate legal remedy available." City of Okoboji v. Parks , 830 N.W.2d 300, 309 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Cmty. State Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Cmty. State Bank , 758 N.W.2d 520, 528 (Iowa 2008) ). The court must undertake "a comparative appraisal of all of the factors in the case," and consider the following:

  10. In re Pelletier

    836 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    Paul requested an injunction barring Jeff Wright from having any contact with N.P. The request is based upon an incident where Paul accuses Jeff Wright of chasing him on a motorcycle and brandishing a knife. An injunction is only to be entered when there has been: “(1) an invasion or threatened invasion of a right; (2) that substantial injury or damages will result unless the request for an injunction is granted; and (3) that there is no adequate legal remedy available .” Community State Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. Community State Bank, 758 N.W.2d 520, 528 (Iowa 2008). Paul fails to establish these elements. It is unclear which right he believes has been or will be invaded, and based upon the testimony provided concerning the incident with Wright, we do not believe Paul has established there is a substantial injury or damage which will result without the injunction.