Although the parties agree that subsection (a) of OCGA § 13-8-53 applies here, non-recruitment restrictions do not fall neatly into that provision. See CMGRP v. Gallant , 343 Ga. App. 91, 100 (3), 806 S.E.2d 16 (2017). "Covenants against employing personnel of a former employer, or soliciting them for employment, have received relatively little attention, and the law appears to be somewhat undeveloped," and there are cases in which "such covenants, ... are considered to be separate from noncompetition ... covenants[.]"
"Restrictive covenants addressing solicitation of employees are enforceable when they are 'reasonably limited in time' and not fatally 'vague or ambiguous.'" Heartland Payment Sys., LLC v. Stockwell, 446 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 2020 WL 1129861, at *5 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (quoting CMGRP, Inc. v. Gallant, 806 S.E.2d 16, 20 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)). Although not challenged, the Court notes that Georgia courts have upheld employee non-solicitation covenants with a two-year time period.
Restrictive covenants addressing solicitation of employees are enforceable when they are "reasonably limited in time" and not fatally "vague or ambiguous." CMGRP, Inc. v. Gallant , 343 Ga. App. 91, 95, 806 S.E.2d 16 (2017). In this case, the employee non-solicitation covenant in the Agreement is reasonable in time (24 months) and is not vague or ambiguous as to the types of activities that are restricted—i.e. , activities that are "directly or indirectly solicit[ing], recruit[ing], entic[ing], or hir[ing] and of HPS's employees to work for a third party."
Given these circumstances, Harrell’s newly asserted, unsupported position that "[t]he law presumes that the previous order will be converted" does not provide a basis for nevertheless affirming the judgment. See Smith v. Layman, 279 Ga. 823, 824 (2), 620 S.E.2d 796 (2005) ("Issues never raised at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal.") (citation and punctuation omitted); Pfeiffer v. Ga. DOT, 275 Ga. 827, 829 (2), 573 S.E.2d 389 (2002) (reciting that "[r]outinely, this Court refuses to review issues not raised in the trial court"); CMGRP v. Gallant, 343 Ga. App. 91, 94 (1), 806 S.E.2d 16 (2017) (reiterating that our right-for-any-reason rule may be invoked only when the issue was raised in the trial court and the opposing party had a fair opportunity to respond); see also Yash Solutions, 352 Ga. App. at 137 (1) (b), n. 30, 834 S.E.2d 126; Higgins, 251 Ga. App. at 178 (3), n. 3, 554 S.E.2d 212; Court of Appeals Rule 25 (b).
Lane Co. v. Taylor , 174 Ga. App. 356, 360 (2) (b), 330 S.E.2d 112 (1985). Cf.CMGRP, Inc. v. Gallant , 343 Ga. App. 91, 95 (2), 97-98 (2) (b), 806 S.E.2d 16 (2017) (upholding language that said former employee could not "(a) directly or indirectly (i) solicit any employee of the Company to leave such employ to enter the employ of Employee or of any person, firm, or corporation with which the Employee is then associated, or (ii) induce or encourage any such employee of the Company to leave the employment of the Company or to join any other company, or (iii) hire any such employee of the Company, or (iv) otherwise interfere with the relationship between the Company and any employee of the Company"); Palmer & Cay of Ga., Inc. v. Lockton Companies, Inc. , 273 Ga. App. 511, 514 (1), 615 S.E.2d 752 (2005) (upholding language that said "the Employee will not, directly or indirectly, attempt in any manner to cause or otherwise encourage any employee of the Company to leave the employ of such corporation"), reversed on other grounds 280 Ga. 479, 629 S.E.2d 800 (2006) ; Sanford v. RDA Consultants, Ltd. , 244 Ga. Ap
(Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) CMGRP, Inc. v. Gallant , 343 Ga. App. 91, 94 (1), 806 S.E.2d 16 (2017). Accordingly, we will not address and we express no opinion on GDOT's argument, raised for the first time in its reply brief, that injunctive relief is not a remedy available to a party pursuing a claim of inverse condemnation.
Thus, we will not consider Baker's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, to the contrary. See CMGRP, Inc. v. Gallant , 343 Ga. App. 91, 96 (2) (a), 806 S.E.2d 16 (2017). Because Baker's new claims for breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel were raised for the first time in the renewal action, after the applicable statutes of limitation had run, the trial court did not err in dismissing those claims.
Federal Trust Bank v. C. W. Matthews Contracting Co. , 312 Ga. App. 200, 203-204 (1), 718 S.E.2d 63 (2011). See CMGRP, Inc. v. Gallant , 343 Ga. App. 91, 99 (2) (b), 806 S.E.2d 16 (2017). The "very point" presented for adjudication in the present case is whether damages under the abusive litigation statutory scheme are limited to special damages.
Rather, the rule appears focused on non-compete and customer non-solicitation covenants. CMGRP, Inc. v. Gallant, 806 S.E.2d 16, 24 (Ga.Ct.App. 2017). A restriction that prevents a former employee from stealing opportunities belonging to his former employer of which the employee became aware because of that employment is a different type of restriction.