Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV159197
RUSHING, P.J.
I. Statement of the Case
Plaintiff Sarah Clyne appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted defendant Robert L. Hoover’s petition to confirm an arbitration award of attorney fees. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6204.) On appeal, Clyne claims the court erred in granting the petition on the ground that she had failed to commence an action concerning the award of fees within the requisite time period. (§ 6204, subd. (c).)
All unspecified statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code.
We affirm the judgment.
II. Background
Hoover, an attorney, represented Clyne in her divorce action. When a dispute arose concerning his fees, the parties submitted it to non-binding arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitrator found that Clyne incurred $87,371.48 in attorney fees, of which she had already paid $20,000. The arbitrator awarded Hoover the balance of $67,371.48 and $2,021.14 for the arbitration filing fee, making a total award $69,392.62. The arbitration award was entered and served by mail on November 17, 2009.
In addition to the award, Clyne was also served copies of the statutes prescribing the procedure for rejecting the award and seeking a de novo judicial determination of the dispute (§ 6204) and the procedure for simply confirming, correcting, or vacating the award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285 et seq.) On December 11, 2009, Clyne filed a rejection of the award and request for trial (Judicial Council form ADR-104). In it, Clyne invoked the court’s jurisdiction over unlimited civil actions and identified herself as the client in an attorney fee dispute. She checked the box labeled “New action, ” as opposed to “Pending action.” Next to the box, the pre-printed form advised: “This Rejection of Award and Request for Trial is being filed with a complaint commencing a new action. (A request for trial must be filed in a pending case or with a complaint commencing a new action.)” The form also asked for additional information: the date of the arbitration, whether she appeared at the hearing, the amount of the award, how she received notice of the award, and the amount of the award in dispute.
Notwithstanding the advisement in the form, Clyne did not file a complaint along with her rejection/request form. Her attorney did, however, seek discovery from Hoover. On January 6, 2010, Hoover received a demand for the production of documents. In response, Hoover opined that Clyne’s demand was premature because he had not as yet been served either a summons or a complaint. Hoover further advised that since Clyne had not commenced a new action within 30 days of receiving notice of the award, as required by section 6204, subdivision (c), it was now too late, and therefore, he would be filing a petition to confirm the award. (See § 6203, subd. (b) [award becomes binding if trial not sought within 30 days].)
In response, Clyne’s attorney filed a complaint for declaratory relief on January 13, 2010. The complaint sought a judicial determination that Clyne owed nothing to Hoover and an award of costs and attorney fees. On January 26, 2010, Hoover filed a petition to confirm the award. At a hearing on March 4, 2010, Clyne’s counsel conceded that he had inadvertently failed to file a timely complaint for declaratory relief. However, he urged the court to view the rejection/request form as a complaint. He further argued that if, as a constructive complaint, the form was deficient, then the court should view the actual complaint as a first amended complaint. Counsel asserted that viewing the documents in this way, the court could find that Clyne had complied with the statutory time requirement in section 6204, subdivision (c).
The court declined to deem the rejection/request form as the functional equivalent of a valid complaint commencing an action and granted Hoover’s petition. It then entered judgment confirming the award.
III. Standard of Review
Whether the trial court erred in finding Clyne’s rejection/request form insufficient to commence an action within the statutory time period presents issues concerning the sufficiency of the form as a complaint and interpretation of section 6204, and those issues present questions of law, which we decide de novo. (Aubry v. Tri–City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967; Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)
IV. Discussion
Clyne contends that the court erred in declining to treat her rejection/request form as a timely complaint commencing an action to resolve the parties’ fee dispute. We disagree.
Section 6204, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part, “The parties may agree in writing to be bound by the award of arbitrators appointed pursuant to this article at any time after the dispute over fees, costs, or both, has arisen. In the absence of such an agreement, either party shall be entitled to a trial after arbitration if sought within 30 days, pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c)....”
Section 6204, subdivision (b) provides, in pertinent part, “If there is an action pending, the trial after arbitration shall be initiated by filing a rejection of arbitration award and request for trial after arbitration in that action within 30 days after service of notice of the award.”
Section 6204, subdivision (c) provides, in pertinent part, “If no action is pending, the trial after arbitration shall be initiated by the commencement of an action in the court having jurisdiction over the amount of money in controversy within 30 days after service of notice of the award.” (Italics added.)
Section 6203, subdivision (b) provides, in pertinent part, “Even if the parties to the arbitration have not agreed in writing to be bound, the arbitration award shall become binding upon the passage of 30 days after service of notice of the award, unless a party has, within the 30 days, sought a trial after arbitration pursuant to Section 6204.”
It is settled that the 30-day limitations period in section 6204, subdivisions (b) and (c) is jurisdictional, and therefore, if a party fails to comply, the trial court may not proceed to try a fee dispute. (Maynard v. Brandon (2005) 36 Cal.4th 364, 373-374.) When a dispute arises, and one party commences an action before arbitration, the filing of rejection/request form within 30 days authorizes the court to resolve the dispute de novo. (§ 6204, subd. (b); Maynard v. Brandon, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 374.) However, when a dispute arises and the parties proceed to arbitration before either has filed an action, a party must reject the award, request a trial, and commence a new action by filing a complaint within 30 days. (§ 6204, subd. (c); see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 350 [action is “commenced” with filing of a “complaint”]; 411.10 [civil action is “commenced” with filing of a “complaint”]; see, e.g., Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 585, 587 [complaint filed after rejecting arbitration award]; McAvoy v. Harvey L. Lerer, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1130 [same].)
Clyne does not dispute that she was required to commence an action by filing a complaint within the statutory time period. She simply reiterates her claim that the form she filed constituted a “complaint” for the purpose of complying with the 30-day limitations period.
Clyne relies on cases where courts disregarded the label on a pleading and determined its true nature by the allegations it contains. For example, when there was a difference between a cross-claim and a counter-claim (see Code Civil Proc., § 428.80 [abolishing counterclaims]), courts often treated a pleading labeled a cross-complaint as a counter-complaint when the allegations did not assert a proper cross-claim but did assert a proper counter-claim. (Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky (1930) 210 Cal. 428, 434; Keenan v. Dean (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 189, 194; cf. also Cornblith v. Valentine (1930) 211 Cal. 243, 248 [treating answer alleging claim for damages as proper cross- or counter-claim].)
Clyne urges us to disregard the label on the form she filed—“Rejection of Award and Request for Trial After Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration”—and treat it as a formal complaint commencing a new civil action against Hoover because, according to Clyne, the information in the form satisfies all of the requirements for a complaint and contains allegations sufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief. We decline to do so.
First, a proper complaint must contain both “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language”; and “[a] demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1) & (2).)
In her proper, but untimely, complaint, Clyne alleged that Hoover is an attorney with whom she entered into a written agreement under which he was to provide legal services in connection with her divorce. Clyne alleged that Hoover billed her a total of $67,371.48, of which she paid $20,000. She alleged that the agreement provided for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in any litigation concerning the agreement. She alleged that an actual controversy existed concerning the parties’ rights and duties under the agreement, in that Hoover sought the balance owed, and she claimed she owed nothing. Clyne further alleged that the parties entered non-binding arbitration to resolve their dispute, and after a hearing, Hoover was awarded $69,392.62. Given these allegations, Clyne sought a judicial determination of the parties’ rights and duties under her agreement with Hoover and prayed for a judgment that she owed nothing and an award of costs and attorney fees and any other relief that the court might deem proper.
In contrast to these allegations and demand for a specific judgment, the rejection/request form stated only that Clyne was the client in an attorney fee dispute who appeared at non-binding arbitration on November 19, 2009, after which she was required to pay $69,392.62. The form further stated that she rejected the award and requested a trial.
Contrary to Clyne’s view of her form, the information it contained is not equivalent to the allegations in her complaint or sufficient to state a cause of action or make a demand such that it would be reasonable to find substantial compliance with the statutory requirements for a complaint.
Indeed, the form was not designed or intended to be used as, or in lieu of, a complaint. The form makes it unmistakably clear that it is not a complaint and is not sufficient, by itself, to satisfy the requirements of section 6304, subdivision (c). As noted, the pre-printed material on the form next to the box labeled “New action, ” which Clyne checked, stated that the rejection/request form was “being filed with a complaint commencing a new action.” (Italics added.) The form also advised Clyne what she must do when, as here, there is no pending action. Moreover, the fact that Clyne did not label her untimely but otherwise proper complaint a first amended complaint reflects that her rejection/request form was not intended to serve as a complaint.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we note that subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 6204 provides different procedures for obtaining a de novo judicial resolution of a fee dispute after non-binding arbitration. The difference in procedures hinges on whether an action for fees was pending when the arbitration award was made. Section 6204, subdivision (b), applies when there is a pending action; and only that subdivision provides that the mere filing of a rejection/request form is sufficient to obtain a trial. Section 6204, subdivision (c) applies when there is no pending action; and it expressly requires the “commencement of an action” to obtain a trial.
The rules governing statutory interpretation are clear. Our fundamental job is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers in order to effectuate the purpose of the statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 666.) We look first to the actual language of the statute. “If the terms are unambiguous, we conclude the lawmakers meant what they said and the plain meaning of the language prevails.” (San Mateo County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Clark (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 834, 841.) As well, we must give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language used in framing them, and construe words and phrases in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purposes of the statute and avoiding consequences that defeat those purposes or lead to absurd consequences. (Civ. Code, § 13; Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977-978; Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32.) Where possible, we must give meaning to every word of a statute and avoid rendering any word surplusage. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118.)
Here, the two different procedures and language in subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 6204 reflect an intent to require a party to do more than file a rejection/request form to obtain a trial when there is no action pending at the time of the arbitration award. Clyne’s view that her pre-printed Judicial Council rejection/request form was enough is inconsistent with this intent and would short-circuit the statutory scheme and effectively negate the language of subdivision (c) of section 6204 and the difference between the two subdivisions. Moreover, neither the rubric that substance should prevail over form nor the judicial practice of disregarding the label on a pleading in favor of its allegations convinces us to disregard the consequences of Clyne’s view and conclude that filing it constituted compliance with section 6204, subdivision (c).
In short, therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly granted Hoover’s petition to confirm the arbitration award.
V. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Hoover is entitled to his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
WE CONCUR: DUFFY, J., LUCAS, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.