Father, in his first point on appeal, contends the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the matter of termination. He alleges that before the juvenile court can proceed on the petitions and adjudication of the termination of his parental rights, there must be a prior hearing as to whether he had in fact abused or neglected his children; he suggests § 211.447.2(2) RSMo 1986, mandates two separate proceedings before termination relying on C.L.P. v. Pate, 673 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Mo. banc 1984), and this court's decision in In the Interest of D.L.D., 701 S.W.2d 152 (Mo.App. 1985). In these cases, the courts dealt with the predecessor statutory subsections, § 211.447.2(2)(i)b, RSMo Supp. 1984, which sets forth the conditions for termination on the basis of neglect.
A statute is presumed constitutional and will not be deemed unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly violates some constitutional provision. In re C.L.P., 673 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Mo. banc 1984); Trapp, 593 S.W.2d at 202. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if its words are of common usage and understandable by persons of ordinary intelligence.
The legislature, by statute and by authorized regulation, adopted a broader definition of visible. In C.L.P. v. Pate, 673 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Mo. banc 1984), we noted: Several well-established principles guide us when considering a facial attack on the constitutionality of duly enacted legislation.
Moore v. Stamps, 507 S.W.2d 939, 948 (Mo.App. 1974). See CLP v. Pate, 673 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.banc 1984). In their objections at trial and their motion for a new trial, mother and father objected to the statutory scheme which places the juvenile officer, the only person who can initiate termination proceedings, under the supervision of the court and allows the court to order the initiation of termination proceedings.
However, § 211.447.2(2)(i)b, one of the sections under which the juvenile officer seeks to terminate the rights of the parents, contemplates two separate proceedings. First, there is a neglect proceeding pursuant to §§ 211.031 — 211.431. Second, there is a parental termination proceeding pursuant to §§ 211.442-211.492. C.L.P. v. Pate, 673 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Mo. banc 1984); R.L.L. v. Strait, supra, at 411 n. 3. The purpose for each of these proceedings is different.
A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly violates some constitutional provision. C.L.P. v. Pate, 673 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. banc 1984); State v. Hampton, 653 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. banc 1983). A statute has a presumption of constitutionality.Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Company v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. banc 1984).
A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly violates some constitutional provision. C.L.P. v. Pate, 673 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. banc 1984); State v. Hampton, 653 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. banc 1983). Very truly yours,
A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly violates some constitutional provision. C.L.P. v. Pate, 673 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1984); State v. Hampton, 653 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1983). A statute has a presumption of constitutionality.Weston Crown Plaza Hotel Company v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. 1984).