Opinion
DA 23-0334
05-14-2024
CLOVER MEADOWS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CORTNEE SPEAR, Defendant and Appellee.
For Appellant: Alanah Griffith, Griffith & Associates, PC, Big Sky, Montana For Appellee: Amy C. McNulty, Tarlow, Stonecipher, Weamer & Kelly, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 20, 2024
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DV-20-850A Honorable Peter Ohman, Presiding Judge
For Appellant: Alanah Griffith, Griffith & Associates, PC, Big Sky, Montana
For Appellee: Amy C. McNulty, Tarlow, Stonecipher, Weamer & Kelly, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana
OPINION
INGRID GUSTAFSON, JUSTICE
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Clover Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. (HOA) appeals the August 9, 2022 Order of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, that granted summary judgment to Cortnee Spear (Spear). The HOA sued Spear alleging she violated the HOA's restrictive covenants by building a second dwelling unit on her property. The District Court found Spear did not violate the covenants based on the covenants' definition of "single-family dwelling." We affirm.
¶3 In 2017, Spear purchased a home within the Clover Meadows subdivision which was governed by the HOA's Amended and Restated Declaration of Protective Covenants (the Restrictive Covenants). Spear contemplated adding an addition to her home so that her parents had a place to stay when they visited her and her children. In 2020, Spear notified the HOA's board of directors that she was building a one-bedroom addition to her home, and she voluntarily provided detailed plans of the addition that included a bedroom, two bathrooms, a kitchen, laundry, living space, separate mechanical room, and additional garage. The addition would be attached to the other side of Spear's already existing garage.
¶4 At the time Spear submitted her plans, the Restrictive Covenants did not require the HOA to approve construction within the subdivision, nor did the covenants provide any process for homeowners to submit their building plans to the HOA. Although the HOA's bylaws do provide for an Architectural Review Committee (ARC) to review submitted plans from lot owners that wish to alter their lot, there was no ARC in existence when Spear submitted her plans.
¶5 The HOA responded by email to Spear's submitted plans. The HOA found the addition violated the Restrictive Covenants because it appeared to be a separate but attached dwelling unit. In response, Spear resubmitted the plans after altering them to remove the laundry and kitchen facilities. The HOA maintained the addition still violated the covenants and filed suit against Spear asking the court to find the addition violated the Restrictive Covenants, enjoin Spear from using the addition, and order her to tear it down. Spear completed the addition anyway, including stubbing out places for kitchen and laundry appliances but did not install any appliances. Spear then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting there was no issue of material fact as the undisputed facts showed she will be using the addition as a single-family dwelling as defined by the Restrictive Covenants.
¶6 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Spear, reasoning the plain language of the Restrictive Covenants supports Spear's assertion that the addition is part of a single-family dwelling unit. The Restrictive Covenants state, "[t]here shall be no more than one single family dwelling on any one lot." The Restrictive Covenants further define "single-family dwelling" as "a building used for residential occupancy by one family household." Further, it is undisputed the Restrictive Covenants do not contain any requirements for how a house may look on the outside or how the layout of a house must be designed to be considered a single-family dwelling. The court found "[w]hen [Spear's] parents are visiting, [Spear], her parents, and her children are part of a family household," and thus meet the qualifications as defined in "single-family dwelling." The court noted the covenants define "single family dwelling," not in terms of how the building is structured, but in terms of whether one or more households are using the building. According to the court, the HOA provided no evidence that Spear would be using the addition in violation of the Restrictive Covenants.
¶7 The District Court also awarded attorney fees and costs to Spear in the amount of $37,621.60 together with accruing interest. After determining the Restrictive Covenant to be clear and unambiguous and then finding Spear did not violate the Restrictive Covenants, the court based the award of attorney fees on Article VII, Section 3 of the Restrictive Covenants that provides, "[i]t is expressly understood and agreed by any person purchasing any or all of the property, that if an action is successfully brought against him for violation of these covenants, that reasonable attorneys' fees shall be assessed against him in addition to any damages incurred therein."
¶8 The issues presented on appeal are whether the District Court erred in interpreting the Restrictive Covenants to determine the addition to Spear's home was a "single-family dwelling," not a second dwelling unit, and whether the court erred in awarding Spear attorney fees.
¶9 We review summary judgment rulings de novo for conformance with M. R. Civ. P. 56. Dick Anderson Constr., Inc. v. Monroe Prop. Co., 2011 MT 138, ¶ 16, 361 Mont. 30, 255 P.3d 1257. "Like interpretations of contracts, a district court's interpretation of a restrictive covenant is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness." Lewis &Clark Cnty. v. Wirth, 2022 MT 105, ¶ 14, 409 Mont. 1, 510 P.3d 1206. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). To meet the Rule 56 burden of showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must set out specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact by more than mere denial, speculation, or pleading allegation. M. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
¶10 When interpreting a restrictive covenant, we apply the same principles applicable to contract interpretation. Lewis &Clark Cnty., ¶ 16. When the language of a covenant is clear, extrinsic evidence is not considered, and "the Court must apply the language as written." Creveling v. Ingold, 2006 MT 57, ¶ 8, 331 Mont. 322, 132 P.3d 531. An ambiguity exists when the language of the covenant can reasonably have two different meanings. Czajkowski v. Meyers, 2007 MT 292, ¶21, 339 Mont. 503, 172 P.3d 94.
¶11 Here, Article IV, Section 1 of the Restrictive Covenants provides, "[t]here shall be no more than one single family dwelling on any one lot." Article III, Section h) of the Restrictive Covenants further defines "single-family dwelling" as "a building used for residential occupancy by one family household. No more than four unrelated adults shall occupy a single-family residence." We agree with the District Court-the language of the Restrictive Covenants is clear and unambiguous. The Restrictive Covenants themselves define what a single-family dwelling is, and that definition is not subject to more than one meaning. The term "single-family dwelling" in general may have more than one meaning-as exampled by the HOA's assertion that a single-family dwelling is one that only has one set of living facilities. However, the HOA's Restrictive Covenants restrict the term's meaning to one clear definition-that a single-family dwelling is one used by one family household comprised of no more than four unrelated adults. When the language of a covenant is clear, extrinsic evidence is not considered, and "the Court must apply the language as written." Creveling v. Ingold, ¶ 8.
¶12 With the language of the Restrictive Covenants clear, we must consider whether Spear's addition violates those covenants. Spear provided evidence that her parents would be living in the addition when they came to visit her. Her parents would be living, cooking, doing laundry, partaking in communal activities, and otherwise acting as a single household with Spear and her children in the main portion of the house and primarily using the addition for sleeping. Spear also provided undisputed evidence that there are no kitchen or laundry facilities installed in the addition that would make it seem like it is a separate or second living facility and she averred she does not plan to add those facilities in the future.
¶13 On the other hand, the HOA has not provided any evidence that Spear's addition will be used by more than one family household or that Spear's parents, when living with her, are not part of a single household. Rather, the HOA focuses its arguments on the structure and facilities within a single-family house, as well as the ability to add separate facilities in the future. The HOA asserts that historically it has used the definitions of "living unit" found in A.R.M. 17.36.101(27) and "family" found in State v. Stewart, 2003 MT 109, ¶ 9, 315 Mont. 335, 68 P.3d 712 to define what "single-family dwelling" means within the context of its own covenants. As the District Court correctly pointed out, this interpretation fails because the Restrictive Covenants themselves provide an unambiguous definition of "single-family dwelling." Thus, it is improper to use extrinsic sources to craft a new definition and insert what is not there. Section 1-4-101, MCA ("In the construction of an instrument, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted.").
¶14 The HOA also asserts "the fact that everyone is related by blood in this case does not turn two Dwelling Units into a Single-Family Dwelling. It is still two Dwellings if it does not share essential services or the two units each have the ability to have separate sleeping, cooking, and sanitation." Again, as the District Court correctly pointed out, this argument fails because the Restrictive Covenants do not define single-family dwellings based on the number of sleeping, cooking, and sanitation facilities, nor their placement within the home. Rather, they define a single-family dwelling as "a building used for residential occupancy by one family household"-and the HOA has not demonstrated there will be more than one household in Spear's home.
¶15 The HOA's speculative argument that Spear could install kitchen and laundry facilities in the addition in the future and thereby create a separate living space with separate facilities fails because there is no evidence to suggest that will happen. On the contrary, Spear declared she does not plan on installing those facilities and her parents plan on using the addition primarily for sleeping purposes. Accordingly, we find the District Court properly interpreted the Restrictive Covenants and granted summary judgment in favor of Spear.
¶16 Finally, we also affirm the District Court's award of attorney fees to Spear. The HOA did not challenge the award of attorney fees to Spear on appeal. Rather, the HOA asserted that if this Court found Spear's addition violated the Restrictive Covenants, then we should award attorney fees in the HOA's favor pursuant to the Restrictive Covenants. The Restrictive Covenants contain an attorney fee provision that states, "[i]t is expressly understood and agreed by any person purchasing any or all of the property, that if an action is successfully brought against him for violation of these covenants, that reasonable attorneys' fees shall be assessed against him in addition to any damages incurred therein." "Contract attorney fee provisions are reciprocal to both parties regardless of express benefit only to one." Associated Mgmt. Servs. v. Ruff, 2018 MT 182, ¶ 81, 392 Mont. 139, 424 P.3d 571; § 28-3-704(1), MCA. Because we find the District Court properly interpreted and applied the Restrictive Covenants to grant Spear summary judgment, we find the court's award of attorney fees in favor of Spear-based on the attorney fee provision in the covenants and its statutory reciprocity-to be proper.
¶17 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
¶18 Affirmed.
We concur: JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, LAURIE McKINNON, BETH BAKER, DIRK M. SANDEFUR, JJ.