Pannell v. State, Ala.Crim.App., 356 So.2d 219, cert. denied, 356 So.2d 222 ([Ala.] 1977).'"Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60, 61-62 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988) (emphasis added). See also Judicial Inquiry Commission Advisory Opinion 84-219 (Aug. 27, 1984) ("[I]t is the opinion of the [Judicial Inquiry] Commission that the mere fact that a party to a proceeding is represented by the defeated opponent of the judge for judicial office does not require the judge's disqualification."); Advisory Opinion 98-694 (May 15, 1998); Advisory Opinion 98-716 (Dec. 18, 1998); and Advisory Opinion 04-838 (April 8, 2004).

Lambeth v. State, 562 So.2d 573 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989). See Molina v. State, 533 So.2d 701 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1547, 103 L.Ed.2d 851 (1989); Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988); Petite v. State, 520 So.2d 207 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987); Clark v. City of Montgomery, 497 So.2d 1140 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986); Adams v. State, 459 So.2d 999 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984); Dent v. State, 423 So.2d 327 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982); While we agree with the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals, we find that the judgment was properly reversed and the case properly remanded for a new trial for a more fundamental and compelling reason.

[C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 242.01(1) (3d ed.1977)]. See also Clontz v. State, 531 So. 2d 60, 61 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988) (wherein a probation officer was allowed to testify that he first became aware the defendant was not at his address through a telephone call from the appellant's mother, because "the testimony was not introduced as proof of the matter asserted, but rather as the motive behind the probation officer's beginning his investigation"); Molina v. State, 533 So. 2d 701, 714 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1086, 109 S.Ct. 1547, 103 L.Ed. 2d 851 (1989) (wherein a police officer was allowed to testify to information concerning a vehicle suspected to be involved in drug activity, received through a radio dispatch, because it was not offered to prove the truth of the contents of the dispatch, but "to explain the reason he pursued and subsequently stopped the defendant"); Petite v. State, 520 So. 2d 207, 211 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) (a radio broadcast, stating that a burglary was in progress, was not hearsay as it was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, "but rather for th

[C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 242.01(1) (3d ed.1977) ]. See also Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (wherein a probation officer was allowed to testify that he first became aware the defendant was not at his address through a telephone call from the appellant's mother, because “the testimony was not introduced as proof of the matter asserted, but rather as the motive behind the probation officer's beginning his investigation”); Molina v. State, 533 So.2d 701, 714 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1086, 109 S.Ct. 1547, 103 L.Ed.2d 851 (1989)

[C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 242.01(1) (3d ed. 1977) ]. See also Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (wherein a probation officer was allowed to testify that he first became aware the defendant was not at his address through a telephone call from the appellant's mother, because “the testimony was not introduced as proof of the matter asserted, but rather as the motive behind the probation officer's beginning his investigation”); Molina v. State, 533 So.2d 701, 714 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1086, 109 S.Ct. 1547, 103 L.Ed.2d 851 (1989) (wherein a police officer was allowed to testify to information concerning a vehicle suspected to be involved in drug activity, received through a radio dispatch, because it was not offered to prove the truth of the contents of the dispatch, but “to explain the reason he pursued and subsequently stopped the defendant”); Petite v. State, 520 So.2d 207, 211 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (a radio broadcast, stating that a burglary was in progress, was not hearsay as it was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, “but rather for the pur

Pannell v. State, Ala.Crim.App., 356 So.2d 219, cert. denied, 356 So.2d 222 ([Ala.] 1977)." ' " Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60, 61-62 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988) (emphasis added). See also Judicial Inquiry Commission Advisory Opinion 84-219 (Aug. 27, 1984) ('[I]t is the opinion of the [Judicial Inquiry] Commission that the mere fact that a party to a proceeding is represented by the defeated opponent of the judge for judicial office does not require the judge's disqualification.'); Advisory Opinion 98-694 (May 15, 1998); Advisory Opinion 98-716 (Dec. 18, 1998); and Advisory Opinion 04-838 (April 8, 2004)."

"'"[M]any statements have been admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule upon the rationale that such statements were admitted for some purpose other than to prove the truth of the statements." [C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 242.01(1) (3d ed. 1977)]. See also Clontz v. State, 531 So. 2d 60, 61 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988) (wherein a probation officer was allowed to testify that he first became aware the defendant was not at his address through a telephone call from the appellant's mother, because "the testimony was not introduced as proof of the matter asserted, but rather as the motive behind the probation officer's beginning his investigation"); Molina v. State, 533 So. 2d 701, 714 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1086, 109 S.Ct. 1547, 103 L.Ed.2d 851 (1989) (wherein a police officer was allowed to testify to information concerning a vehicle suspected to be involved in drug activity, received through a radio dispatch, because it was not offered to prove the truth of the contents of the dispatch, but "to explain the reason he pursued and subsequently stopped the defendant"); Petite v. State, 520 So. 2d 207, 211 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) (a radio broadcast, stating that a burglary was in progress, was not hearsay as it was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, "but rather fo

"'[M]any statements have been admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule upon the rationale that such statements were admitted for some purpose other than to prove the truth of the statements.' Id. See also Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988) (wherein a probation officer was allowed to testify that he first became aware the defendant was not at his address through a telephone call from the appellant's mother, because 'the testimony was not introduced as proof of the matter asserted, but rather as the motive behind the probation officer's beginning his investigation'); Molina v. State, 533 So.2d 701, 714 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1086, 109 S.Ct. 1547, 103 L.Ed.2d 851 (1989) (wherein a police officer was allowed to testify to information concerning a vehicle suspected to be involved in drug activity, received through a radio dispatch, because it was not offered to prove the truth of the contents of the dispatch, but 'to explain the reason he pursued and subsequently stopped the defendant'); Petite v. State, 520 So.2d 207, 211 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) (a radio broadcast, stating that a burglary was in progress, was not hearsay as it was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, 'but rather for the

Thus, Ward's testimony was not hearsay and there was no error in the admission of this testimony. Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988); Brannon v. State, 549 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied (Ala. 1989). Furthermore, even if we had determined that Ward's testimony was hearsay, and thus should have been excluded, we fail to see how the appellant was prejudiced by this evidence since several witnesses testified to the same evidence.

Id. See also Clontz v. State, 531 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988) (wherein a probation officer was allowed to testify that he first became aware the defendant was not at his address through a telephone call from the appellant's mother, because "the testimony was not introduced as proof of the matter asserted, but rather as the motive behind the probation officer's beginning his investigation"); Molina v. State, 533 So.2d 701, 714 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1086, 109 S.Ct. 1547, 103 L.Ed.2d 851 (1989) (wherein a police officer was allowed to testify to information concerning a vehicle suspected to be involved in drug activity, received through a radio dispatch, because it was not offered to prove the truth of the contents of the dispatch, but "to explain the reason he pursued and subsequently stopped the defendant"); Petite v. State, 520 So.2d 207, 211 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987) (a radio broadcast, stating that a burglary was in progress, was not hearsay as it was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, "but rather for the p