The jury would have learned that Wood had previously committed a crime frighteningly similar to his murder of Ruby, which would have demonstrated Wood calculated his killing of Ruby and had a pattern of attempting to kill his ex-girlfriends at their own homes. See Clisby v. State, 26 F.3d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding no prejudice where Clisby committed brutal murder and had killed before). Indeed, the jury might well have concluded that Wood, after shooting Siler, "learned his lesson" and realized that in order to be sure he killed an ex-girlfriend who had the audacity to date another man, he needed to do more than merely shoot through a window — he had to sneak into the house and shoot her from point-blank range in her bed.
Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d at 1312-13 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)); see Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Our analysis of the prejudice prong, however, must also take into account the aggravating circumstances associated with Dobbs's case, to determine whether `without the errors, there is a reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been different.'") (quoting Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1994)).See also Clisby v. Alabama, 26 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Petitioners alleging ineffective assistance in death penalty cases bear the burden of showing prejudice: `the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer — including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence — would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.'") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
We say that such expert testimony "may" have been helpful because it is possible that reasonable defense counsel in a case such as this could conclude that such expert testimony regarding a defendant's intoxication would not be helpful. See Clisby v. Alabama, 26 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Precedents show that many lawyers justifiably fear introducing evidence of alcohol and drug use."). Although counsel in this case did not testify that he made a strategic decision to downplay the intoxication defense at trial and testified that he would have wanted expert testimony regarding alcohol consumption, we note that reasonably competent counsel could have made such a strategic decision. It is conceivable that undue emphasis on a defendant's intoxication — beyond communication of the fact of intoxication itself — could potentially alienate the jury as an attempt to excuse truly horrendous conduct.
This is especially true where the murder is a brutal one—"or, even, a less brutal murder for which there is strong evidence of guilt in fact." Clisby v. Alabama, 26 F.3d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1994).
As an initial matter, it is not self-evident that under the circumstances of this case, the jury would necessarily regard Bolin's alleged contemporaneous substance abuse as mitigating. See, e.g. , Pinholster , 563 U.S. at 201, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (explaining that some mitigating evidence, such as "more serious substance abuse," can be a "two-edged sword" because it might cause the jury to conclude the petitioner is "simply beyond rehabilitation" (quoting Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) )); Wackerly v. Workman , 580 F.3d 1171, 1178 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing case law "demonstrat[ing] that substance abuse evidence often can have more aggravating than mitigating effect"); Clisby v. Alabama , 26 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[M]any lawyers justifiably fear introducing evidence of alcohol and drug use."). Nor is it apparent that a jury would regard an intoxication theory as mitigating alongside Cater's dominant theory that Bolin was a loving and protective father who cared for others.
This Court has upheld death sentences in other gruesome murder cases. See, e.g., Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2010) ; Clisby v. State, 26 F.3d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1994) ; Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1453–54 (11th Cir. 1986). Notably, there is no evidence of intellectual deficiency here, but rather powerful and substantial evidence of a carefully planned and brutal torture of Staker. Krawczuk's cruelty and premeditation make it unlikely that he would have received a different sentence.
And, we have often observed that evidence of a defendant's antisocial personality disordercan negatively impact the jury. See, e.g., Cummings v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1368 (11th Cir. 2009)("[I]n the mental health area, Cummings is left mainly with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, which is not mitigating but damaging."); see also Clisby v. Alabama, 26 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994)(noting that, "by common definition," those who are antisocial "have little respect for social norms or the rights of others").The state also would have been able to bring out information from Dr. Santiago–Ramos's report that one of Jones's prior offenses involved "[breaking] into a house while being completely nude," and, as a result, the DOC had him evaluated for placement in a mentally disordered sex offender program.Moreover, had Dr. Berland testified at the penalty phase, the state could have introduced Dr. McClaren's testimony that Jones's psychological profile, as revealed in the results of Dr. Berland's MMPI testing, matched a malignant pattern frequently found among violent criminals, child molesters, rapists, and exposists.
Assuming that the evidence of Anderson's sexual abuse was added to the mitigating evidence presented to the jury, it was not unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to conclude, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances (including those developed on collateral attack) in the case, that Anderson failed to demonstrate a substantial probability that the sexual abuse evidence would have prompted the jury to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment instead of death. The overwhelming evidence of Anderson's guilt further supports our holding. Clisby v. Alabama, 26 F.3d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir.1994) (“[S]ometimes the best lawyering, not just reasonable lawyering, cannot convince the sentencer to overlook the facts of a brutal murder—or, even, a less brutal murder for which there is strong evidence of guilt in fact.”); see also Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1321 (11th Cir.2002) (partially grounding its finding of no prejudice in the “strength of the evidence both of [the defendant's] guilt and of the aggravating circumstances”). C.
Similarly, Dr. Larson's diagnosis — that Reed had an antisocial personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder — was more harmful to Reed than mitigating. See Parker, 331 F.3d at 788 ("Counsel decided not to put Dr. Stillman on the stand because Dr. Stillman had opined that Parker was antisocial and a sociopath, a diagnosis the jury might not consider mitigating. . . . Counsel cannot be deemed deficient in failing to call a witness whose testimony is of such limited value."); Clisby v. State of Ala., 26 F.3d 1054, 1056 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim on prejudice grounds because mental health expert's testimony would not have changed the result, noting that "[s]entencing courts need no experts to explain that `antisocial' people-people who by common definition have little respect for social norms or the rights of others-tend to misbehave if they abuse drugs and alcohol" and "[i]t has been estimated that 91% of the `criminal element' are `antisocial' personality types"); Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1035 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating antisocial personality disorder is "not . . . mitigating as a matter of law"). Dr. Larson himself admitted that it is an unflattering diagnosis. Indeed, as part of his diagnosis, Dr. Larson characterized Reed as selfish, self-indulgent, hedonistic, and exploitative.
With crimes like this one, that are "carefully planned, or accompanied by torture, rape or kidnapping," we have often held "that the aggravating circumstances of the crime outweigh any prejudice caused when a lawyer fails to present mitigating evidence." Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Clisby v. Alabama, 26 F.3d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1994). Boyd claims that the trial court's findings relied on the testimony of his accomplice, Robert Milstead, who perjured himself.