Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co.

97 Citing cases

  1. Morgan v. Morgan

    46 A.3d 255 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 2 times

    Because the underlying appeal is defective for lack of a final judgment, so, too, is the amended appeal. The granting of a motion to open a nonfinal judgment cannot itself be a final judgment. See Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc. v. Gurski, 49 Conn.App. 731, 733, 715 A.2d 819 (no appeal will lie from ruling on motion to open nonfinal judgment), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 920, 722 A.2d 809 (1998); cf. Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 271, 655 A.2d 814 (1995) (denial of plaintiffs' motion for temporary injunction not an appealable final judgment; therefore, denial of motion to reconsider that order likewise nonfinal judgment). The appeal is dismissed and the case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amount of prejudgment interest to be awarded to the defendant.

  2. Morgan v. Morgan

    AC 29877 (Conn. App. Ct. Jun. 26, 2012)

    Because the underlying appeal is defective for lack of a final judgment, so, too, is the amended appeal. The granting of a motion to open a nonfinal judgment cannot itself be a final judgment. See Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc. v.Gurski, 49 Conn. App. 731, 733, 715 A.2d 819 (no appeal will lie from ruling on motion to open nonfinal judgment), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 920, 722 A.2d 809 (1998); cf. Clinton v.Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 37 Conn. App. 269, 271, 655 A.2d 814 (1995) (denial of plaintiffs' motion for temporary injunction not an appealable final judgment; therefore, denial of motion to reconsider that order likewise nonfinal judgment). The appeal is dismissed and the case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amount of prejudgment interest to be awarded to the defendant.

  3. Rustici v. Malloy

    60 Conn. App. 47 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 42 times

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 37 Conn. App. 269, 270, 655 A.2d 814 (1995). The defendants' right to occupy the firehouse, if such a right exists, will not be irretrievably lost, nor will the defendants be irreparably harmed unless they may immediately appeal. See Ruggiero v. Fuessenich, supra, 237 Conn. 347. The defendants have failed to satisfy the second part of the Curcio test and, thus, there is no final judgment.

  4. Caesar, LLC v. Cassarino

    CV185010735S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2018)

    The primary purpose of a temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the rights of the various parties can be sorted out, after a hearing on the merits. Clinton v. Middlesex Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 279 (1995). In order for the court to issue a temporary injunction, the movant must establish (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits at a final hearing; (2) irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and (3) no adequate remedy at law.

  5. Captain Jack, LLC v. Oenoke Association, Inc.

    FSTCV176033537S (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 2018)

    "The principal purpose of a temporary injunction ‘is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be finally determined after a hearing on the merits.’ Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company, 37 Conn.App. 269, 270 (1995) quoting Olcott v. Pendleton, 128 Conn. 292, 295 (1941). The standard for granting a temporary injunction are well established.

  6. Peterson v. Democratic Party of Connecticut

    HHDCV165042231S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2016)

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 270, 655 A.2d 814 (1995). In order to grant an injunction, the court must consider (1) whether there is a lack of an adequate remedy at law; (2) whether there is a threat of irreparable and imminent injury; (3) whether there is a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) whether a balancing of the equities favors granting the injunction.

  7. LYS Global Technology, LLC v. Bonarrigo

    HHDCV156061764S (Conn. Super. Ct. May. 12, 2016)

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clinton v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 270, 655 A.2d 814 (1995). The " temporary injunction is a preliminary order . . . granted at the outset or during the pendency of an action, forbidding the performance of the threatened acts described in the original complaint until the rights of the parties . . . [can be] finally determined by the court."

  8. High Line Lube, LLC v. Hickory North Properties, LLC

    CVH8461 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2016)

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 270, 655 A.2d 814 (1995). Generally, the party seeking the injunction must prove the lack of a remedy at law and must show irreparable harm and substantial injury.

  9. Weld v. Indian Spring Land Co.

    FSTCV126014308S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2012)

    The principal purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be determined after a hearing on the merits. Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company, 37 Conn.App. 269, 270 (1995). As of right. Ballentine's Law Dictionary 3rd Ed. at 431.

  10. NEW BREED LOGI. v. CT INDY NH

    2011 Conn. Super. Ct. 22673 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011)

    The primary purpose of a temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the rights of the various parties can be sorted out, after a hearing on the merits. Clinton v. Middlesex Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 270, 685 A.2d 814 (1995). The temporary injunction is a preliminary order, granted at the outset or during the pendency of an action, forbidding the performance of matters such as threatened act . . . until the rights of the parties can be finally determined by the court.