OCGA § 13–1–5 (b). See also Cline v. Lee , 260 Ga.App. 164, 168, 581 S.E.2d 558 (2003). To assert a claim for the breach of such a contract, a plaintiff must allege that the parties agreed to the terms of the contract, that consideration was given for the contract, that the defendant thereafter breached the agreement, and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach.

OCGA § 13-3-1. See Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga. App. 164, 168 (1) ( 581 SE2d 558) (2003). Turner's contentions relate only to the assent element.

See Separk v. Caswell Builders, 209 Ga.App. 713, 714 –715(4), 434 S.E.2d 502 (1993). Further, the court instructed the jury that nothing that it had said or done during the trial should be interpreted as intimating, hinting, or suggesting how the case should be decided, see Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga.App. 164, 171(3), 581 S.E.2d 558 (2003), and there is no error. In fact, during closing argument, Propounders mentioned Donald's level of mental competency, and Caveators asked to approach the bench.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cline v. Lee , 260 Ga. App. 164, 168 (1), 581 S.E.2d 558 (2003). Here, Guise alleges that he made numerous repairs and improvements to Leoni's home throughout the course of his romantic relationship with her based on their mutual agreement that equity from the sale of her home would be used toward the purchase of a joint home.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga.App. 164, 168(1), 581 S.E.2d 558 (2003). White argues that there was an absence of evidence of a contract between himself and Jones or between Alisias and Jones with regard to payment of consulting fees for the Perry Homes project. For purposes of Jones's claim against White and Alisias, however, a jury could conclude that Jones and White, either individually or on behalf of Alisias, entered into an oral agreement to split consulting fees, and that the payments Alisias received from Columbia constituted consulting fees subject to that agreement.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga.App. 164, 168(1), 581 S.E.2d 558 (2003). To determine whether the parties mutually assented to all essential terms of the contract,

This is particularly true where, as here, the trial court charged the jury after the close of evidence that anything the court had said or done during the course of the trial was not intended to imply or suggest which of the parties should prevail in the case. See Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga. App. 164, 171 (3) ( 581 SE2d 558) (2003) (no violation of OCGA § 9-10-7 where, among other things, trial court charged the jury that "nothing he did or said was intended to suggest in any way what the verdict should be"). 3. Among other tort principles, the trial court charged the jury that "[w]hen a person has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition on a previous occasion, that person is presumed to have knowledge of it and cannot recover for a subsequent injury resulting therefrom."

In addition, in order to prevail on his or her claim, the plaintiff must present evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant breached the contract. Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga. App. 164, 168 (1) ( 581 SE2d 558) (2003). Once the plaintiff meets these evidentiary burdens, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the claim, even if the plaintiff fails to present any admissible evidence to establish the amount of actual damages flowing from the breach.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga. App. 164, 168 (1) ( 581 SE2d 558) (2003). Under the Georgia Statute of Frauds, however, contracts for the sale of land are required to be in writing.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga. App. 164, 168 (1) ( 581 SE2d 558) (2003). Roland cannot meet this burden as to the window sticker because he cannot establish mutual assent to its terms by each class member.