The burden is on Plaintiffs to show that the statute of limitations has run. See, e.g., Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Blake Const. Co., Inc., 482 F.2d 1260, 1262 (4th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he burden is upon the party pleading the statute of limitations as a defense to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of action arose more than the statutory period before the action was instituted."). Presumably, Plaintiffs lodge the statute of limitations argument with respect to the breach of contract counterclaim.

Generally in a Miller Act dispute the subcontractor cannot sue the government agency that contracted with the general contractor. See, e.g., Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Blake Constr. Co., 482 F.2d 1260, 1262 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1973). Magann therefore may be premised on the fact that the subcontractor had no remedy except against the general contractor.

PER CURIAM: Following remand from this court, Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Blake Construction Co., 482 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1973), the district court proceeded to determine Mayhew's claim for damages on its merits. Having fully and carefully considered the briefs, record and oral arguments, we find ourselves in agreement with the district court's disposition of the case, and we affirm the judgment on the basis of the district judge's memorandum opinion.

.C., 332 U.S. 234, 241, 67 S.Ct. 1599, 1602, 91 L.Ed. 2022 (1947) ("laborers and materialmen do not have enforceable rights against the United States for their compensation"); Warrior Constructors, Inc. v. Harders, Inc., 387 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 1967) ("If a subcontractor is not paid, his only remedy is a suit under the Act"); Active Fire Sprinkler Corp. v. United States Postal Service, 811 F.2d 747, 752 (2d Cir. 1987) (Miller Act does not allow subcontractors to recover from the United States); Erickson Air Crane Company of Washington, Inc. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Arvanis v. Noslo Engineering Consultants, Inc., 739 F.2d 1287, 1290 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S.Ct. 964, 83 L.Ed.2d 969 (1985); United Electric Corporation v. United States, 647 F.2d 1082, 1084, 227 Ct.Cl. 236 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863, 102 S.Ct. 322, 70 L.Ed.2d 163 (1981); Fairchild Industries, Inc. v. United States, 620 F.2d 807, 809, 223 Ct.Cl. 315 (1980); Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Blake Construction Company, Inc., 482 F.2d 1260, 1262 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Challinor, 620 F. Supp. 78, 78 (D.Mont. 1985). The claimants argue that the United States waived sovereign immunity when it entered the marketplace and contracted with TAC.

This period begins to run from the time payment is due under the terms of the contract. Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Blake Construction Co., 482 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1973). In the instant case, the first loan made by Alessio to the debtor was evidenced by a note made payable in full on April 3, 1980.