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Cliffside Condominium Ass'n v. Cushman

Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
Oct 13, 2004
2004 Ct. Sup. 15689 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

Opinion

No. CV-03-0827483

October 13, 2004


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS


The procedural history of this motion pending before this court is as follows. Plaintiff moved to strike the defendant's special defenses and counterclaims on July 7, 2004, and on that same day moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff also filed a memorandum in support of its motions and defendant filed an answering memo. At the argument of the motions on March 1, the plaintiff requested, and the Court granted the plaintiff two weeks to reply to defendant's brief opposing the motion to strike. On March 4, the Court denied the motion to strike on the grounds that the motion itself failed to meet the specificity required by Practice Book § 10-41 and also denied the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff moved on March 10, 2004 for an extension of his time to file a memorandum in reply to the defendant's brief opposing the motion to strike because of a need to take the defendant's deposition. At the argument of that motion on March 29, the Court raised the question why additional evidence was needed with respect to the motion to strike. At argument, the Court reaffirmed its decision to deny the motion to strike, but did set aside its decision on the motion for summary judgment. On March 31, 2004, the defendant moved to strike the defendant's counterclaims and that is the motion presently before the Court.

The Court's decision denying plaintiff's motion to strike on March 4, 2004 was made inadvertently because it had given the plaintiff an additional two weeks to file a memorandum in reply to the defendant's memorandum. On March 10 the plaintiff sought a continuance because it wanted to take the deposition of the plaintiff. The Court indicated that that continuance would be denied because additional evidence was not needed with respect to such a motion. The Court at that time reaffirmed its denial of the motion to strike. Despite the Court having granted the plaintiff additional time to file its memorandum, the plaintiff, instead of filing a memorandum, submitted this new motion to strike the Defendant's counterclaims.

A second motion to strike is prohibited under our practice. In Barasso v. Rear Still Road, LLC, 64 Conn.App. 9 (2001), the Appellate Court remanded the case with the direction to the trial court to deny the plaintiff's motion to strike due to failure to satisfy the specificity requirements of Practice Book § 10-41. Rather than filing a subsequent pleading, the defendant filed a second motion to strike. On remand the trial court found that the second motion to strike was not a subsequent pleading within the meaning of Practice Book and denied the motion. Barasso v. Rear Still Road, LLC, CV 98-0417927, Judicial District, New Haven (Jones J., October 18, 2001), 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 14, 546 (November 19, 2001).

Similarly, in Hart v. Schwartz, CV 92-0331912 (Hodgson, J., March 15, 1994), 11 Conn. L. Rptr. 6, 203 (April 18, 1994), the court denied a second motion to strike on the grounds that it was not permitted by the Practice Book.

On those authorities, this Court denies the instant motion to strike. However, sua sponte the Court bifurcates the trial of this case so that plaintiff's foreclosure of the common charges can proceed separately from the trial of the defendant's counterclaims.

Robert Satter Judge Trial Referee


Summaries of

Cliffside Condominium Ass'n v. Cushman

Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
Oct 13, 2004
2004 Ct. Sup. 15689 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)
Case details for

Cliffside Condominium Ass'n v. Cushman

Case Details

Full title:CLIFFSIDE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ROBERT A. CUSHMAN ET AL

Court:Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford

Date published: Oct 13, 2004

Citations

2004 Ct. Sup. 15689 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)
38 CLR 129