Opinion
Case No. 00 C 5686
July 27, 2001
This is a case of racial discrimination in employment. Ronald Cleveland was an Environmental Services Assistant (ESA), a cleaning and maintenance worker, at Michael Reese Hospital. He accuses the Hospital of racial harassment and a racially discriminatory reduction in force (RIF) that led to his lay-off. (Cleveland was later reinstated in April, 2001.)
Cleveland's supervisor, Casimir Niedos, gave Cleveland several warnings in 1999 and 2000 for not being in his assigned work area, and for failing to perform his job duties. Niedos also suspended Cleveland for two days. In May, 2000, the Hospital decided to eliminate ESAs pursuant to a RIF, and, following the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, laid off workers with the least seniority first. Fourteen ESAs, including Cleveland, were laid off.
Cleveland has no case concerning the RIF. It is undisputed that the Hospital made an economic decision and followed the CBA's seniority preference in determining the lay-offs. There is no evidence of a racially discriminatory motive for the RIF. Cleveland says that Carlos Dart, who is white, was not laid off. In fact he was promoted to Crew Chief. But this does not help Cleveland's case. Dart was promoted several months before the RIF, thus he was not a similarly situated ESA and cannot be compared to Cleveland. While I grant plaintiff considerable leeway since he is proceeding pro se, he must at least provide some evidence that suggests that Michael Reese lied to him when it said it was laying him off pursuant to a legitimate RIF, that is, that its proffered reason for the lay-off was a pretext for racial discrimination. There is no such evidence here. Moreover, because the RIF was undisputably a corporate decision that affected numerous employees, there is no evidence that it was in retaliation for Cleveland's IDHR charge of harassment.
As for the suspension, Michael Reese says it suspended Cleveland because he violated work rules on several occasions. Cleveland suggests that he could not do everything that was expected of him because, after downsizing, he had more responsibilities; therefore, his performance was adequate under the circumstances. He also says that Niedos falsified situations to set up the suspension. Courts do not second-guess an employer's expectations of its employees. It may be that Niedos was a demanding supervisor, but that by itself does not make a racial discrimination claim. Cleveland does not offer evidence as to how Niedos's performance criticisms could be viewed as anything other than, at worst, nit-picking. That is not the same as racism. I have read Cleveland's contemporaneous grievances, and it is clear he has explanations for his performance, but they do not show that Niedos was falsifying the violations of bona fide work rules. Therefore, as with the RIF claim, there is no evidence of pretext.
Finally, there is the harassment claim. This claim was raised in Cleveland's first IDHR charge, and his right-to-sue was issued on June 14, 2000. This complaint was submitted to the court (with a petition to proceed in forma pauperis) on September 15, 2000, a few days over the 90 day requirement. For that reason, the harassment claim is not timely and defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Even if the harassment claim were timely, I would grant defendant's motion. It is clear that Cleveland's conflict with Niedos was not racial harassment, but personality conflict. Viewed in a light favorable to Cleveland, Niedos didn't like him and yelled at him. But there was nothing racial about this harassment. Cleveland admitted that he believed Niedos did not like him because Cleveland's prior supervisor, Linetta Taylor, must have said something to Niedos. Cleveland had problems with Taylor, too. So it is clear, even from Cleveland's perspective, that his situation had nothing to do with race, and everything to do with his reasonable distaste for uncivil, overly-aggressive supervision. The civil rights laws do not provide for relief in this case.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment [17-1] is granted, terminating the case.