Summary
In Cleveland Heights v. Woodle (1964), 176 Ohio St. 113 [27 O.O.2d 5], the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the street there at issue was a through highway but remanded to the trial court to determine whether thirty-six miles per hour, the speed at which defendant was traveling, was a greater speed than was reasonable or proper, having regard to the conditions specified under R.C. 4511.21.
Summary of this case from Euclid v. BittelOpinion
No. 38236
Decided April 22, 1964.
Traffic regulations — "Through highway" defined — Section 4511.01, Revised Code, construed — Prima-facie lawful speed within municipality on through highway — Power of local authorities or Director of Highways to change.
1. A street, or portion thereof, which is intersected by other streets whereon traffic is required to stop before entering or crossing it, is a through highway. (Section 4511.01 (FF), Revised Code, construed.)
2. The prima-facie lawful speed on a through highway within a municipal corporation and outside business districts is 35 miles per hour unless the Director of Highways or local authorities fix a higher prima-facie speed or the Director of Highways declares a lower prima-facie speed. (Section 4511.21, Revised Code, construed.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.
Defendant was convicted in the Cleveland Heights Municipal Court for violating Section 731.05 (speed regulations) of the Codified Ordinances of the city.
Section 731.05 prescribes a prima-facie speed of 20 miles per hour when passing school grounds at certain times; 25 miles per hour in all other portions of the city except on state routes and on through highways outside business districts; and 35 miles per hour on state routes or on through highways within the municipality and outside business districts.
These same limits are also specified by Section 4511.21, Revised Code.
Defendant was arrested at 9:15 a.m. on February 10, 1961. He was driving his automobile 36 miles per hour west on Derbyshire Road, between Overlook Lane and Mornington Lane, within the city. The authorities of the city posted signs fixing the speed on Derbyshire Road at the time and place at 25 miles per hour.
Derbyshire Road is in the residential section of the city. It is intersected by two through highways, Euclid Heights Boulevard and Coventry Road (Section 711.01), by four streets, including Overlook Lane and Mornington Lane, which are designated by ordinance (Section 711.03) as stop intersections, and by three other streets which have stop signs requiring vehicles on them to stop before entering Derbyshire Road.
The Municipal Court held that Derbyshire Road, at the time and place of the occurrence, was restricted to a primafacie speed limit of 25 miles per hour.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Municipal Court, finding that Derbyshire Road was a through highway with a prima-facie speed limit of 35 miles per hour. The Court of Appeals entered final judgment for the defendant.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. King A. Wilmot, director of law, and Mr. Louis H. Orkin, for appellant.
Messrs. Woodle Wachtel, for appellee.
Defendant contends, and the Court of Appeals found, that the trial court erred in holding that traffic on Derbyshire Road was restricted to a prima-facie speed limit of 25 miles per hour.
Section 731.05 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Cleveland Heights, which, in pertinent part, is substantially the same as Section 4511.21, Revised Code, reads as follows:
"It shall be prima facie lawful for the operator of a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar to operate the same at a speed not exceeding the following:
"(a) Twenty miles per hour when passing a school building * * *.
"(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in all other portions of a municipal corporation, except on state routes and on through highways outside business districts.
"(c) Thirty-five miles per hour on state routes on through highways within municipalities outside business districts." (Emphasis added.)
Our determination is thus dependent on whether Derbyshire Road, as to the portion in question, was a through highway within the meaning of Section 731.05 of the Codified Ordinances.
The definition of "through highway" is found in Section 4511.01(FF), Revised Code, and Section 701.39 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Cleveland Heights.
Section 4511.01(FF), Revised Code, provides:
"`Through highway' means every highway or portion thereof at the entrance to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to stop before entering or crossing the same except as provided in Section 4511.65 of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.)
The exception is in an amendment (128 Ohio Laws, 1270, 1277) to Section 4511.65, Revised Code, which permits traffic under certain conditions to enter a through highway without stopping, which amendment reads:
"The Department of Highways or local authorities having jurisdiction need not erect stop signs at intersections they find to be so constructed as to permit traffic to safely enter a through highway without coming to a stop. Signs shall be erected at such intersections indicating that the operator of a vehicle shall yield the right of way or merge with all traffic proceeding on the through highway."
Section 701.39 of the Codified Ordinances provides:
"Through highway includes every highway or portion thereof at the entrance to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to stop before entering or crossing the same." (Emphasis added.)
The language of the statute (Section 4511.01(FF)) and ordinance (Section 701.39) is plain and unambiguous. If vehicular traffic from intersecting streets is required to stop before entering a street, the latter street is a "through highway."
Derbyshire Road is in the residential section of the city, and the portion of Derbyshire Road on which the cause of action arose is between its intersection with Overlook Lane and its intersection with Mornington Lane. There are no streets between these two intersections. There are stop signs at these intersections which require vehicles to stop before entering Derbyshire Road. This portion of Derbyshire Road is, therefore, a through highway, since traffic on intersecting streets must stop before entering or crossing it.
The posting of signs by local authorities limiting the speed on Derbyshire Road to 25 miles per hour had no legal effect. Section 4511.21, Revised Code, permits local authorities to authorize by ordinance higher prima-facie speeds than those set forth in the section, but only the Director of Highways can declare lower prima-facie speeds.
Title 45 of the Ohio Revised Code was enacted to provide uniformity in traffic rules throughout the state. Such uniformity is essential both for traffic safety and for efficient traffic regulation.
If conditions on Derbyshire Road are such that a speed of 35 miles per hour is unsafe or unreasonable, a procedure for correcting such situation is provided by Section 4511.21, Revised Code.
In the instant case, the local authorities did not seek the relief provided by Section 4511.21. They posted signs purporting to set the speed limit at 25 miles per hour. This was not sufficient to change the prima-facie limit, since such posting did not comply with the procedural requirements of Section 4511.21, Revised Code. Derbyshire Road was a through highway, and it was, therefore, prima facie lawful for defendant to drive thereon at a speed of 35 miles per hour.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, so far as it determined that Derbyshire Road is a through highway, is affirmed, but that portion entering final judgment for the defendant is reversed for the reason that the trial court should determine whether, under all the conditions then existing, a speed of 36 miles per hour was "a speed greater * * * than is reasonable or proper, having due regard to" the conditions specified in Section 4511.21, Revised Code.
The cause is remanded for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
TAFT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, KERNS, O'NEILL, GRIFFITH and GIBSON, JJ., concur.
KERNS, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting by designation in the place and stead of MATTHIAS, J.