ant of new trial); Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. 1985) (denial of plea in abatement); State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1984) (refusal to reinstate temporary injunction); Pat Walker Co. v. Johnson, 623 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. 1981) (refusal to extend time for filing statement of facts); State Bar of Texas v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (refusal to suspend attorney); Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. 1969) (refusal to dismiss criminal case pending against relator), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 997, 90 S.Ct. 1138, 25 L.Ed.2d 405 (1970); Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 190, 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959) (discovery order); Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 367-68, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958) (bifurcation of trial); Harrell v. Thompson, 140 Tex. 1, 1, 165 S.W.2d 81, 81 (1942) (restriction of oil and gas production by Railroad Commission); Ben C. Jones Co. v. Wheeler, 121 Tex. 128, 130, 45 S.W.2d 957, 958 (1932) (refusal to enter judgment nunc pro tunc); Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 14, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (1926) (refusal to enter judgment); Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 376-77, 60 S.W. 665, 666 (1901) (refusal to enter injunction); Screwmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 555, 13 S.W. 379, 380 (1890) (expulsion of member from charitable corporation). A few months later, in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1977), the Court again conditionally issued a writ of mandamus to correct a discovery abuse without considering whether the relator had an adequate remedy by appeal.
When suit is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, that court is entitled to proceed to judgment and may protect its jurisdiction by enjoining the parties to a suit subsequently filed in another court of this state. Id. at 305-06 (citing Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, 1072 (1926)); see generally TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (district court has power to issue writs necessary to enforce jurisdiction); TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 21.001(a) (Vernon 1988) (court has authority to issue writs and orders necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdiction). Antisuit injunctions may also issue to prevent a multiplicity of suits or to protect a party from vexatious or harassing litigation.
The latter court being without jurisdiction all its orders, including the appointment of a receiver and issuance of injunction or writ of prohibition by it, or by the Court of Civil Appeals on appeal from its orders, were void and should be vacated on application to the Supreme Court, which could direct the court having jurisdiction to proceed in disregard thereof, and the one not having acquired jurisdiction to refrain from interfering. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, followed. 2. — Same — Issues and Parties.
Id., at 527-528. And, in Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, (Tex. 1926), the Texas Supreme Court stated that: "[T]he . . . court, having . . . acquired jurisdiction, may exercise it to dispose of the whole subject-matter of the litigation and adjust all the equities between the parties, and it is entitled to do so."
It is well settled that when suit would be proper in more than one county, the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974); V.D. Anderson Co. v. Young, 128 Tex. 631, 636, 101 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1937); Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 19, 285 S.W. 1063, 1070 (1926). As long as the forum is a proper one, it is the plaintiff's privilege to choose the forum.
"The rule is well settled that, where two actions involving the same subject-matter are brought in different courts having co-ordinate jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to administer full justice to the rights of all concerned, should retain such jurisdiction, undisturbed by the interference of any other court, and dispose of the whole controversy. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, 1071; Texas Trunk Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1, 8, 16 S.W. 647, 648, 26 Am.St.Rep. 776; Way ( Way) v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 119 Tex. 419, 29 S.W.2d 1067. " McCurdy v. Gage, 123 Tex. 558, 69 S.W.2d 56, 59.
Where a petition has been filed in one district court in which no service was had, the filing of a suit involving the same parties and the same subject matter, in another district court which suit is answered by a plea in abatement raising questions of fact determinable by the latter court alone, jurisdiction lies in the latter court, notwithstanding the rule that the court in which the suit was first filed has jurisdiction of the case. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, and Conn v. Campbell, 119 Tex. 82, 24 S.W.2d 813, distinguished. 4. — Conflict of Jurisdiction — Plea in Abatement — Writ of Prohibition — Costs.
The Supreme Court has authority to take cognizance of the pendency of the same or similar suits, between the same parties in two or more District Courts and to determine which one has original jurisdiction and the authority to proceed with the trial of such suit, and has correlative authority to make all orders, including prohibition and injunction, to protect exercise of that power. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1. The District Court first obtaining jurisdiction and venue of the parties and subject matter of a suit has exclusive right to proceed with the trial of such cause unless such jurisdiction and venue has been lost or otherwise waived.
This case requires us to square a plaintiff's right to choose his forum with the complex jurisdictional regime governing our many courts of original jurisdiction. We begin with the Supreme Court of Texas's decision in Cleveland v. Ward, 285 S.W. 1063 (1926), the seminal Texas authority delimiting the contours of the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction.Dominant Jurisdiction and the Obligation to Abate a Second—Filed Suit Addressing the Same Claim
Dominant jurisdiction recognizes "the plaintiff's privilege to choose the forum" and accepts that choice as correct, provided "the forum is a proper one." Gonzalez, 159 S.W.3d at 622; Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 248; see Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, 1070 (1926) (orig.proceeding), disapproved on other grounds, Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig.proceeding). Thus, "the court in which suit is first filed generally acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts if venue is proper in the county in which suit was first filed."