Clesi v. Cooney

7 Citing cases

  1. Latter Blum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

    208 La. 490 (La. 1945)   Cited 4 times

    It is well settled that an agent or a broker is not entitled to a commission except where he had discharged services or duties entrusted to him or has been the procuring cause of the transaction. Taylor v. Martin, 109 La. 137, 33 So. 112; Ford v. Shaffer, 143 La. 635, 79 So. 172; Grace Realty Co. v. Peytavin Planting Co., Inc., 156 La. 93, 100 So. 62, 43 A.L.R. 1096; Freeman Freeman v. Torre Realty Improvement Co., supra; Kaufman Agency v. Viccellio et al., La.App., 174 So. 709; Bullis Thomas v. Calvert, 162 La. 378, 110 So. 621; Alex F. Dreyfus Co., Inc., v. Friedman, 171 La. 90, 129 So. 679; Clesi v. Cooney, 164 La. 657, 114 So. 584; Sollie v. Peoples Bank Trust Co., La.App., 194 So. 116; Doll v. Thornhill, La.App., 6 So.2d 793; Ramsey v. Harry Bros. Co., La.App., 11 So.2d 256; 24 A.L.R. 1537; Leicht-Benson Realty Const. Co. v. J. D. Stone Co., 138 Va. 511, 121 S.E. 883, 43 A.L.R. 1103; Walsh v. Grant, 256 Mass. 555, 152 N.E. 884, 47 A.L.R. 855, 128 A.L.R. 430; 12 C.J.S., Brokers, § 91, p. 207; § 92, p. 214; § 93, p. 215. There was no contractual relationship existing between the plaintiff and either of the defendants.

  2. Alex F. Dreyfus Co. v. Friedman

    129 So. 679 (La. 1930)   Cited 8 times

    This suit is therefore based upon the clause in the contract, by which Mrs. Friedman agreed to pay Alex F. Dreyfus Company, Inc., the commission of 4 per cent. on the gross amount of any agreement of sale or exchange of her property, for any price agreed upon, within 45 days after the expiration of the 30-day term of the contract, to any one to whom the Dreyfus Company had quoted the property during the 30-day term of the contract. The two judges of the Court of Appeal who concurred in the decision of this case declared, in the prevailing opinion which they rendered, that they would affirm the judgment of the civil district court if the case could be distinguished from Clesi v. Cooney, 164 La. 657, 114 So. 584. In that case, Cooney employed Clesi as his exclusive agent, for the period of 30 days, to sell Cooney's property for $60,000 cash, "or any other amount agreed upon.

  3. O'Neal v. Southland Lumber Co.

    121 So. 755 (La. 1929)   Cited 8 times

    In that case the owner had agreed with the broker not to sell the property except through him, thus giving the broker the exclusive right to sell the property. The case of Clesi v. Cooney, 164 La. 658, 114 So. 584, was before us on an exception of no cause of action, which was sustained by the lower court. We remanded the case, holding that the petition disclosed a cause of action.

  4. Ritchey v. Hilliard

    257 So. 2d 811 (La. Ct. App. 1972)

    " Defendants appellants contend that the case of Clesi v. Cooney, 164 La. 657, 114 So. 584 (1927) as interpreted by the case of Alex F. Dreyfus Co. v. Friedman, 171 La. 90, 129 So. 679 (1930) support the position that negotiations by the owner during the contract do not constitute interference. We find that Clesi as interpreted by Dreyfus supports the trial court's decision.

  5. Coppage v. Woodward

    105 So. 2d 306 (La. Ct. App. 1958)   Cited 2 times

    The said case made a distinction between the duty of an owner when his contract includes such a stipulation, and when the contract does not include such a stipulation. The court held that the cases of Clesi v. Cooney, 164 La. 657, 114 So. 584 and O'Neal v. Southland Lumber Co., Inc., 168 La. 235, 121 So. 755, differed from the Friedman case in that the contracts in the Clesi and O'Neal cases did not bear such a stipulation, and that therefore, under the doctrine of the Friedman case and the Doll case, the defendants had a duty to refer any prospective purchaser to his real estate agent, and his failure to do so would result in his liability for the real estate brokers commission if the sale was consummated during the term as provided in the contract. However, the Lower Court held that said real estate broker in this case actually contacted the purchaser relative to the purchase of the property, and it appears to us that the contact by the real estate broker did actually lead up to the sale of the property.

  6. Donlon v. Babin

    44 So. 2d 134 (La. Ct. App. 1950)   Cited 9 times

    There is no doubt that a contract of employment conferring upon a real estate broker the exclusive right to sell the property during a specified period of time entitles the broker to a commission on any sale of the property made during that time whether the sale be made by the owner personally or through another broker. Viguerie v. Davis, 5 La. App. 77; Veters v. Sweeney, 5 La. App. 548; Fowler v. Phillips, 159 La. 668, 106 So. 26; Clesi v. Cooney, 7 La. App. 182; Harvey v. Sehrt, 12 La. App. 583, 126 So. 568; Kaufman Agency v. Viccellio, La. App., 174 So. 709; Zollinger v. Gust, La. App., 192 So. 132; Sollie v. Peoples Bank Trust Co., La. App., 194 So. 116; Doll v. Thornhill, La. App., 6 So.2d 793; Nickerson Vennard v. Butcher, 14 La. App. 20, 129 So. 240. The Orleans Court of Appeal, in the case of Doll v. Thornhill, 6 So.2d 793, 795, considered a listing contract identical in all material respects with the contract now under consideration.

  7. Doll v. Thornhill

    6 So. 2d 793 (La. Ct. App. 1942)   Cited 14 times
    In Doll v. Thornhill, 6 So.2d 793 (La.Ct.App. 1942), the seller's contract with the broker contained a referral provision.

    But all of these questions need not be gone into. A real estate agent, who has an exclusive contract and who under it has done what he could to sell the property, need not show that it was actually through his efforts that a purchaser was produced. Counsel for defendant urges us to accept it as fact that nothing that Thornhill did interfered in any way with the success of Doll in finding a purchaser, and he argues that since there was no such interference, the rule of law which should be applied is that which was followed in Clesi v. Cooney, 164 La. 657, 114 So. 584, in which the Supreme Court refused to plaintiff, a real estate agent, a judgment on the face of the pleadings, when the defendant admitted that during the existence of the broker's exclusive contract, he had entered directly into a contingent contract with a third person to sell the property, after the termination of the agent's contract. But from that contract there was absent the stipulation which is present here and which is all important, and that is that the owner should not have the right to trade directly and independently with prospective purchasers, which is certainly the effect of the contractual provision that all prospects should be referred to the agent.