Opinion
Civil Action 04-02123 (HHK).
June 23, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Talayna Clements ("Clements"), brings this tort action against defendant ACE Cash Express, Inc. ("Ace"), her employer, alleging that she was injured due to Ace's negligent failure to ensure a safe workplace. Presently before this court is Ace's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA"), D.C. Code § 32-1501 et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for Clements's alleged injuries. Upon consideration of the motion, the opposition thereto, and the record of this case, the court concludes that Ace's motion must be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2004, Clements was hired to manage Ace in Washington, D.C. Compl. ¶ 4. During Clements's orientation, Willie Wiggins ("Wiggins"), an Ace district manager, showed her a panic button for summoning the police in emergencies. Id. Wiggins also told Clements that the store's door was broken and he would have it repaired. Id. On October 9, 2004, Clements was preparing to open Ace for business when an unidentified robber came inside. Id. She asserts that the robber "put a gun in [her] face, pulled a portion of her hair out, pushed her against a wall and demanded that she open the safe." Id. When Clements began to cry, "the robber told her if she did not stop crying he would shoot her." Id. Clements explained that opening the safe would take three minutes, so he took the contents of the cash register and left. Id. Clements then pushed the panic button to summon the police. Id. When nothing happened, she called Wiggins, who instructed her to push the button again. Id. This second attempt failed, and "for the first time[,] [Wiggins] told her where the operable panic button was located." Id. The police arrived about two minutes after she pressed this other button. Id. Following these events, Ace suspended Clements from her job without pay. Id.
II. ANALYSIS
Clements seeks relief from this court for her alleged injuries on the grounds that Ace negligently failed to ensure a safe workplace by not telling her where the operable panic button was and not repairing the store door. Ace argues that this action should be dismissed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) because the her injury is covered by the WCA. Ace's position has merit.The WCA provides the exclusive remedy for any workplace injury that falls within its scope. D.C. Code § 32-1504(b) ("The compensation to which an employee is entitled under this [statute] shall constitute the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer . . . for any illness, injury, or death arising out of and in the course of [her] employment. . . ."). "Injury" is defined as "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment . . . and includes an injury caused by the willful act of third persons directed against an employee because of his employment." § 32-1501(12). Thus, by definition, the only injuries not covered by the WCA are those that are "specifically intended by the employer to be inflicted on the particular employee who is injured." Grillo v. Nat'l Bank of Wash., 540 A.2d 743, 744 (D.C. 1988).
Accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment are "presumed covered under the [WCA] unless the employer presents substantial evidence that the assault was motivated by something entirely personal to the employee and unrelated to the employment." Clark v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 743 A.2d 722, 728 (D.C. 2000).
This specific intent exception has been interpreted narrowly. An employer's knowledge to a substantial certainty that an injury will result from an act does not constitute specific intent. See Grillo, 540 A.2d at 751 (barring a wrongful death suit because a bank's knowledge to a substantial certainty that injury would result to employees from the removal of safety glass at teller windows did not constitute specific intent). Furthermore, injuries caused by the intentional acts of third parties, a circumstance expressly covered by the WCA, cannot establish specific intent on the part of the employer unless an employer conspired with a third party to injure an employee. See id. at 748; Rustin v. District of Columbia, 491 A.2d 496, 502 (D.C. 1985) (determining that the plaintiff was precluded from pursuing a tort action against decedent's employer because there was no proof that the employer had the specific intent to kill or "participated in any manner in the killing" of the decedent).
Clements's alleged injuries fall squarely within the provisions of the WCA because the robbery occurred while Clements, in her capacity as manager, was opening Ace's store for business. See Compl. ¶ 4. Clements may not invoke the specific intent exception to the WCA's exclusivity provision because she has not made any allegation that Ace intended to injure her. Clements characterizes Ace's failure to repair the store door and show her the location of the working panic button as negligent, not intentional. See Compl. ¶ 5. She neither suggests that Ace knew or conspired with the robber nor contends that the robbery "was motivated by something entirely personal to [her] and unrelated to the employment." Clark, 743 A.2d at 728.
Consequently, the WCA provides the exclusive remedy for Clements's alleged injury.
Clements suggests that rather than dismissing this claim, the court should issue a stay pending determination by the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services as to whether she is entitled to compensation under the WCA. Pl.'s Opp'n at 1-2. When a "substantial question" exists as to whether the WCA applies, a stay may be appropriate to allow the administrative agency to "`make the initial determination concerning coverage' before the courts can exercise jurisdiction." Joyner v. Sibley Mem'l Hosp., 826 A.2d 362, 374 (D.C. 2003) (citing Estate of Underwood v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 665 A.2d 621, 631 (D.C. 1995)). When the injury occurs at work, a substantial question exists "unless the injuries were clearly not compensable under the statute." Id. Here, there is no question that Clements's alleged injuries are covered by the WCA because they were the result of "the willful act of [a third person] directed against an employee because of [her] employment." D.C. Code § 32-1501(12). Therefore, the claim must be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Ace's motion to dismiss must be granted. An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.