Cleary v. Chicago Title Trust Co.

2 Citing cases

  1. Baker v. State

    377 Md. 567 (Md. 2003)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that even if a circuit court judge had ceased to be a de jure judge at the time that he sentenced the appellant because of a change in residency, he was "at the very least a de facto judge" and therefore his actions were valid as they related to the appellant and were not subject to collateral attack

    Tenakee Springs, 954 P.2d 1035, 1038-1039 (Alaska 1998) (de facto doctrine applies even when judge no longer a resident of State, a statutory requirement for Alaska judges);People v. Owers, 69 P. 515, 519 (Colo. 1902) (although residency requirement is mandatory, judge should be removed from office only upon "substantial misconduct on his part"); State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 455 (1871) (where judge lawfully appointed becomes unqualified, "the defect, if it be one, is a defect of qualification in the officer, by reason of an omission of his, or of the clerk, and is not of a character to prevent his acts from being valid as the acts of an officer de facto, whether the law under which he was called in was constitutional or not."); State v. Whelan, 651 P.2d 916, 920 (Idaho 1982) ("A de facto officer performs his duties under color of right of an actual officer qualified in law so to act, both being distinguished from the mere usurper who has neither lawful title nor color of right."); Cleary v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 122 N.E.2d 227, 228 (Ill. 1954) cert. denied 348 U.S. 972, 75 S.Ct. 534, 99 L.Ed. 757 (1955) (appointment of appellate court judges may not be attacked in collateral proceeding; appointment confers a color of office, and the judgments rendered thereunder are valid); Hovanec v. Diaz, 397 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (Ind. 1979) (to be de facto officer, must claim the office, be in possession and perform duties under color of election); State v. Roberts 288 P. 761, 762 (Kan. 1930) ("`The acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual where they concern the public or rights of third persons, until his title to the office is judged insufficient, as though he were an officer de jure, and the legality of the acts of such an officer cannot be collaterally attacked in a proceeding to which he is not a party.'");Martin v. Stumbo, 140 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Ky. 1940) ("his [de facto judge's] acts . . . are not void but valid and binding); Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me. 423, 432 (1854) (noting that justice of the peace "acting with color of ti

  2. People v. Rios

    2013 Ill. App. 121072 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 16 times

    ΒΆ 18 The well-established de facto doctrine provides that a person performing the duties of an office under color of title is an officer de facto and such acts are valid so far as the public or third parties who have an interest in them are concerned. People ex rel. Rusch v. Wortman, 334 Ill. 298, 165 N.E. 788 (1928); Cleary v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 4 Ill.2d 57, 122 N.E.2d 227 (1954); People ex rel. Chillicothe Township v. Board of Review, 19 Ill.2d 424, 167 N.E.2d 553 (1960); People v. O'Neill, 33 Ill.2d 184, 210 N.E.2d 526 (1965). Defendant argues that because of Golniewicz's deception and fraud his authority as a judge cannot be recognized under the equitable de facto doctrine citing, without elaboration, Daniels v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Ill.2d 160, 266 Ill.Dec. 864, 775 N.E.2d 936 (2002).