Cleary v. Chicago Title Trust Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Daniels v. Industrial Comm'n

    201 Ill. 2d 160 (Ill. 2002)   Cited 57 times
    In Daniels, a plurality opinion rendered just six days after the opinion in this case, four members of this court agreed that the appointments of Commissioners Kane and Reichart did not comply with the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992)), and remanded the matter for a new hearing before a properly constituted panel of commissioners.

    People ex rel. Rusch v. Wortman, 334 Ill. 298, 302 (1928); see also 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers Employees Β§ 23 (1997) (purpose of the de facto officer doctrine is to "protect the public's reliance on an officer's authority and to ensure the orderly administration of government"). Importantly, an officeholder's eligibility to appointment and the validity of his or her official acts may be challenged only in a proceeding brought directly for that purpose. Wortman, 334 Ill. at 301; see also People v. Woodruff, 9 Ill. 2d 429, 437 (1956); Cleary v. Chicago Title Trust Co., 4 Ill. 2d 57, 58-59 (1954) (title to a public office cannot be questioned in a mere collateral proceeding). In Chillicothe Township, we applied the de facto officer doctrine and held valid the actions of a county board of review increasing the assessed valuation of the plaintiffs' property. It was stipulated that, based upon the results of the immediately prior general election, the county board of review should have been composed of two Republicans and one Democrat.

  2. Baker v. State

    377 Md. 567 (Md. 2003)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that even if a circuit court judge had ceased to be a de jure judge at the time that he sentenced the appellant because of a change in residency, he was "at the very least a de facto judge" and therefore his actions were valid as they related to the appellant and were not subject to collateral attack

    Tenakee Springs, 954 P.2d 1035, 1038-1039 (Alaska 1998) (de facto doctrine applies even when judge no longer a resident of State, a statutory requirement for Alaska judges);People v. Owers, 69 P. 515, 519 (Colo. 1902) (although residency requirement is mandatory, judge should be removed from office only upon "substantial misconduct on his part"); State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 455 (1871) (where judge lawfully appointed becomes unqualified, "the defect, if it be one, is a defect of qualification in the officer, by reason of an omission of his, or of the clerk, and is not of a character to prevent his acts from being valid as the acts of an officer de facto, whether the law under which he was called in was constitutional or not."); State v. Whelan, 651 P.2d 916, 920 (Idaho 1982) ("A de facto officer performs his duties under color of right of an actual officer qualified in law so to act, both being distinguished from the mere usurper who has neither lawful title nor color of right."); Cleary v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 122 N.E.2d 227, 228 (Ill. 1954) cert. denied 348 U.S. 972, 75 S.Ct. 534, 99 L.Ed. 757 (1955) (appointment of appellate court judges may not be attacked in collateral proceeding; appointment confers a color of office, and the judgments rendered thereunder are valid); Hovanec v. Diaz, 397 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (Ind. 1979) (to be de facto officer, must claim the office, be in possession and perform duties under color of election); State v. Roberts 288 P. 761, 762 (Kan. 1930) ("`The acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual where they concern the public or rights of third persons, until his title to the office is judged insufficient, as though he were an officer de jure, and the legality of the acts of such an officer cannot be collaterally attacked in a proceeding to which he is not a party.'");Martin v. Stumbo, 140 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Ky. 1940) ("his [de facto judge's] acts . . . are not void but valid and binding); Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me. 423, 432 (1854) (noting that justice of the peace "acting with color of ti

  3. In re Greene

    76 Ill. 2d 204 (Ill. 1979)   Cited 39 times
    Denying petition for stay pending appeal to this court

    The State's failure to establish age is analogous to prosecuting a defendant in the wrong county or to proceeding before a court that is improperly organized, objections to which can be waived (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1-6(a) (place of trial); People v. Ondrey (1976), 65 Ill.2d 360, 363-64 (place of trial); People v. Dunn (1972), 52 Ill.2d 400, 402 (place of trial); Cleary v. Chicago Title Trust Co. (1954), 4 Ill.2d 57, 59 (organization); People v. Link (1937), 365 Ill. 266, 290 (organization)). The situation of a respondent who remains silent about his age while proceeding to defend himself against an adjudication of delinquency under the Juvenile Court Act finds further analogy in cases which hold that a juvenile who wilfully misrepresents his age to an adult criminal court waives the statutory procedures which inure to juveniles accused of criminal offenses (Ill.

  4. Lopez v. Dart

    2018 Ill. App. 170733 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)   Cited 33 times
    In Lopez v. Dart, 118 N.E.3d 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018), the Illinois Appellate Court held that the "de facto officer doctrine" prevents the invalidation of any Merit Board decisions involving Rosales, except as to the "first challenger of the improper appointment," namely, Percy Taylor.

    " Id. at 187, 210 N.E.2d 526.See also People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner , 32 Ill. 2d 212, 222-23, 205 N.E.2d 33 (1965) (holding that state senators, although elected from unconstitutionally apportioned districts, were de facto officeholders with authority to act); Cleary v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. , 4 Ill. 2d 57, 59, 122 N.E.2d 227 (1954) (holding that, even assuming the invalidity of the appointment of appellate court justices, such appointment still conferred color of office, and judgments rendered thereunder were valid and could not be questioned in a mere collateral proceeding); People ex rel. Hess v. Wheeler , 353 Ill. 147, 150-51, 187 N.E. 146 (1933) ("An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid * * * where he acts under the color of an appointment which is void because he was not eligible to act as such officer, or because of want of power in the appointing body, or by reason of some defect unknown to the public."); People ex rel. Rusch v. Wortman , 334 Ill. 298, 301-304, 165 N.E. 788 (1928) (holding that an officeholder's eligibility to appointment and the validity of his or her official acts may be challenged only in a "proceeding brought directly for that purpose" (citing State v. Carroll , 38 Conn. 449 (Conn.

  5. Lopez v. Dart

    2018 Ill. App. 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)   Cited 1 times
    In Lopez v. Dart, 2018 IL App (1st) 17-0733-U (August 29, 2018), the Appellate Court held that the improperly constituted Merit Board's decision was valid pursuant to the de facto officer doctrine, which the Taylor court had declined to apply.

    Id. at 187. See also People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 32 Ill. 2d 212, 222-23 (1965) (holding that state senators, although elected from unconstitutionally apportioned districts, were de facto officeholders with authority to act); Cleary v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 4 Ill. 2d 57, 59 (1954) (holding that, even assuming the invalidity of the appointment of appellate court justices, such appointment still conferred color of office, and judgments rendered thereunder were valid and could not be questioned in a mere collateral proceeding); People ex rel. Hess v. Wheeler, 353 Ill. 147, 150-51 (1933) ("An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid *** where he acts under the color of an appointment which is void because he was not eligible to act as such officer, or because of want of power in the appointment body, or by reason of some defect unknown to the public."); People ex. rel. Rusch v. Wortman, 334 Ill. 298, 301-304 (1928) (holding that an officeholder's eligibility to appointment and the validity of his or her official acts "may be challenged only in a proceeding brought directly for that purpose") (citing State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 (1871)); Lavin v. Board of Commissioner

  6. Lopez v. Dart

    2018 Ill. App. 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    Id. at 187. See also People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 32 Ill. 2d 212, 222-23 (1965) (holding that state senators, although elected from unconstitutionally apportioned districts, were de facto officeholders with authority to act); Cleary v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 4 Ill. 2d 57, 59 (1954) (holding that, even assuming the invalidity of the appointment of appellate court justices, such appointment still conferred color of office, and judgments rendered thereunder were valid and could not be questioned in a mere collateral proceeding); People ex rel. Hess v. Wheeler, 353 Ill. 147, 150-51 (1933) ("An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid *** where he acts under the color of an appointment which is void because he was not eligible to act as such officer, or because of want of power in the appointment body, or by reason of some defect unknown to the public."); People ex. rel. Rusch v. Wortman, 334 Ill. 298, 301-304 (1928) (holding that an officeholder's eligibility to appointment and the validity of his or her official acts "may be challenged only in a proceeding brought directly for that purpose") (citing State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 (1871)); Lavin v. Board of Commissioner

  7. People v. Rios

    2013 Ill. App. 121072 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 16 times

    ΒΆ 18 The well-established de facto doctrine provides that a person performing the duties of an office under color of title is an officer de facto and such acts are valid so far as the public or third parties who have an interest in them are concerned. People ex rel. Rusch v. Wortman, 334 Ill. 298, 165 N.E. 788 (1928); Cleary v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 4 Ill.2d 57, 122 N.E.2d 227 (1954); People ex rel. Chillicothe Township v. Board of Review, 19 Ill.2d 424, 167 N.E.2d 553 (1960); People v. O'Neill, 33 Ill.2d 184, 210 N.E.2d 526 (1965). Defendant argues that because of Golniewicz's deception and fraud his authority as a judge cannot be recognized under the equitable de facto doctrine citing, without elaboration, Daniels v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Ill.2d 160, 266 Ill.Dec. 864, 775 N.E.2d 936 (2002).

  8. In re Estate of Trapani

    157 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959)   Cited 11 times

    No appeal therefrom was taken by anyone. It cannot be collaterally attacked here. Though the Probate Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction, nevertheless when acting within the scope of its jurisdiction as liberal intendments will be indulged in favor of its judgments, and they are entitled to the same protection against collateral attack, as those of Courts of general jurisdiction: Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Brown (1899) 183 Ill. 42; Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Turner (1930) 341 Ill. 101; Commissioners of Lincoln Park v. Schmidt (1946) 395 Ill. 316; no absence of jurisdiction to enter it appears on the face of the record: Cleary v. Chicago Title Trust Co. (1954) 4 Ill.2d 57. The petitioner-appellant's second petition in the Probate Court, as Executor of the deceased partner's estate related only to the payment or compromise of the previously determined amount and claim due the estate from the partnership, in which the petitioner-appellant, Executor, appears to be well aware of the amount due, raises no question as to that, and asks simply that she be authorized to accept a certain compromise method of payment thereof.