Considering that the conversation was admittedly short, that Volinski had access to a set of keys to the vehicle, that other employees had used the vehicle for more than commuting purposes, that the vehicle was taken in for repairs and given back to her to use, and that there was no timeframe placed on her use of the vehicle or questions regarding her commute, a reasonable person could conclude that Flor's grant of permission encompassed more than just driving to and from work. Nautilus points to Clayton v. Southern General Insurance Co., 702 S.E.2d 446, 448 (Ga. App. 2010), Conklin v. Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Co., 702 S.E.2d 727, 729 (Ga. App. 2010), and Prudential Property & Casaulty Insurance Co. v. Walker, 464 S.E.2d 230, 231 (Ga. App. 1995) as examples of cases where the borrower exceeded the scope of permission. In those cases, the circumstances of the arrangement clearly indicated that there were prohibitions on usage.

(punctuation omitted)).Roberson , 315 Ga. App. at 462, 726 S.E.2d 565 (punctuation omitted); accord Clayton v. S. Gen. Ins. Co. , 306 Ga. App. 394, 396, 702 S.E.2d 446 (2010). In this matter, the Declarations Page of the GEICO policy at issue lists the McMillans as the Named Insureds and lists Stanley as an Additional Driver. Under the provision titled "Section I—Liability Coverages," the policy defines "Insured" to mean "a person or organization described under ‘persons insured.

(punctuation omitted)).Roberson, 315 Ga. App. at 462, 726 S.E.2d 565 (punctuation omitted); accord Clayton v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 306 Ga. App. 394, 396, 702 S.E.2d 446 (2010).In this matter, both of the Sharpes' personal automobile insurance policies with Georgia Farm Bureau included uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

Roberson, 315 Ga. App. at 462, 726 S.E.2d 565 (punctuation omitted); accord Litton, 308 Ga. App. at 500, 707 S.E.2d 885.Roberson, 315 Ga. App. at 462, 726 S.E.2d 565 (punctuation omitted); accord Clayton v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 306 Ga. App. 394, 396, 702 S.E.2d 446 (2010).In this matter, the completed application for the Mercury policy explicitly indicated that the property was Lee's primary residence and that the property was occupied by Lee, the named insured.

Roberson , 315 Ga.App. at 462, 726 S.E.2d 565 (punctuation omitted); accord Litton , 308 Ga.App. at 500 (2), 707 S.E.2d 885.Roberson , 315 Ga.App. at 462, 726 S.E.2d 565 (punctuation omitted); accord Clayton v. S. Gen. Ins. Co. , 306 Ga.App. 394, 396, 702 S.E.2d 446 (2010).As previously noted, the title insurance policy issued by Old Republic to Peachtree Bank at the time the subject property was acquired by BBC insured the bank against loss or damage sustained or incurred by reason of, inter alia , “[a]ny defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title”; “[u]nmarketability of the title;”; and [l]ack of access to and from the land [.]” Additionally, the policy provided that it “is a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage sustained or incurred by the insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by reason of matters insured against by this policy and only to the extent herein described.

Varsalona v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 281 Ga.App. 644, 646, 637 S.E.2d 64 (2006) (punctuation omitted).Clayton v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 306 Ga.App. 394, 396, 702 S.E.2d 446 (2010) (punctuation omitted).Turning now to an examination of the subject policy, we first note that OCGA § 33–24–45(b)(2) defines renewal as “the issuance and delivery by an insurer of a policy superseding at the end of the policy period a policy previously issued and delivered by the same insurer and providing no less than the coverage contained in the superseded policy....” And here, the subject policy met these requirements in that “[i]t was issued by the same insurer to supersede an existing policy and to extend the term of the existing policy beyond its policy period conditioned upon payment of a continuation premium according to the terms of the renewal document.”

“Summary judgment is only proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Clayton v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 306 Ga.App. 394, 702 S.E.2d 446 (2010). See OCGA § 9–11–56(c).