Opinion
No. 35835.
April 23, 1945.
1. COUNTIES.
Where competitive bids must be had, order allowing claim against county must recite and adjudge the jurisdictional facts in such respect, but where amounts in order of allowance show that no competitive bids were required, order need not go further and negative a fact sufficiently negatived by such amounts (Code 1930, sec. 6386).
2. COUNTIES. Mandamus.
Order of board of supervisors allowing three claims against county for less than $250 each and referring to statute under which it was made was sufficient on its face without alleging jurisdictional facts with respect to competitive bids to constitute a valid, binding judgment, payment of which holders of claim were entitled to compel by mandamus (Code 1930, secs. 255, 6386, and sec. 6381, as amended by Laws 1932, ch. 196).
3. MANDAMUS.
Holders of claims against county were entitled to mandamus directing payment thereof, where case was tried before trial judge without a jury, both sides submitted case for decision on sufficiency of order of board of supervisors allowing claims which was sufficient on its face to constitute a valid and binding judgment, and defendants elected not to offer any evidence in support of their plea of the general issue and notice of special matter thereunder.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Chickasaw county, HON. T.H. McELROY, Judge.
W.J. Evans and Paul M. Moore, both of Calhoun City, for appellants.
It is our opinion of the case at bar that one question alone on the facts and law will settle all the issues involved in this lawsuit. That sole question, as we view it, is whether or not the order of the board of supervisors approving and allowing the claims in question complies with Sections 253 and 255 of the Code of 1930. The order of the board of supervisors allowing the claims in question fully complied with both the letter and the spirit of the law and especially Section 255 of the Code of 1930. The order specifies the name of the claimant, the amount allowed, and the law under which such an allowance is made and on what account; also it is given a number to correspond to the warrant to be issued therefor. We think that the only authorities necessary to be cited to show that the order in question followed the law and is a valid and legal judgment on its face is Section 255 of the Code of 1930 and the citations thereunder.
The only valid plea that could have been filed to this judgment was either nul tiel record or one attacking the judgment on the ground of fraud, as the judgment itself foreclosed the hearing of any facts concerning what happened, or did not happen, at or before the rendition of the judgment. The judgment as rendered imports absolute verity and cannot be collaterally attacked. This principle of law is well settled.
Scott County v. Dubois, 158 Miss. 245, 130 So. 106; Dean et al. v. Board of Supervisors of DeSoto County, 135 Miss. 268, 99 So. 563; Madison County v. City of Canton, 171 Miss. 547, 158 So. 149; Arthur v. Adam, 49 Miss. 404; Carroll v. Board of Police of Tishomingo County, 28 Miss. 38.
The only proper judgment for the lower court to have rendered would have been a judgment sustaining the prayer of the petition and ordering the writ of mandamus issued. But on the contrary the lower court refused to enter judgment for appellants and entered a judgment dismissing their petition, giving as its reason therefor that the said order failed to show jurisdictional facts in accordance with Section 9027 of the Code of 1942, which is the same as Section 6064 of the Code of 1930, and based its opinion on the case of Jackson Equipment Service Co. v. Dunlop, 172 Miss. 752, 160 So. 734. The lower court in its opinion stated, contrary to the record, that these purchases were made under the above statutes referred to in its opinion when as a matter of fact the purchases were made and the claims approved under Chapter 196, Laws of 1932, which is practically the same as Section 6381, Code of 1930. A reading of this law will show that the board of supervisors had discretionary authority to do all things necessary for the working and repairing of roads and building bridges. Under the section following, to-wit, Section 6386 of the Code of 1930, the board of supervisors has a right to make purchases up to the amount of $250 without any competitive bids for road supplies, and the record shows that not a single one of these claims in question amount to nearly this much. We respectfully submit that neither the statute nor the Dunlop case, as referred to by the lower court as a basis of his opinion in this cause, has any application, whatever, to the case at bar; but even if they did, the appellees could not now come in and attack their valid judgment on this ground, as they certainly cannot now say that there were some different facts which should have been considered but were not considered when they allowed the claims; for if they could do this then there would never be any finality to an order of the board of supervisors.
Watkins v. Mississippi State Board of Pharmacy, 170 Miss. 26, 154 So. 277.
It is presumed that officers do their duty and that their proceedings are regular.
6 Miss. Digest 419, Key No. 83, Evidence. George Bean, of Okolona, for appellees.
Counsel for the appellant is confused in that he is making no distinction between a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction and one of a court of limited jurisdiction. In a court of general jurisdiction, a presumption arises that all preliminary required steps have been taken, such as notice, advertising, etc., before the judgment is finally rendered. This is the kind of judgment which cannot be attacked collaterally except for fraud. In a court of special and limited jurisdiction, such as a court which the board of supervisors constitutes when it sits to pass on county affairs and business, nothing is presumed but the record on the contrary must show on its face that each preliminary step as required and set forth by the law must have been taken before the decision amounts to a valid judgment.
Appellants argue that the action of the board in this matter complied with both the letter and the spirit of the law set forth in Section 255 of the Code of 1930. We think not. This section is meant to be followed only when all conditions precedent to make the claim a valid claim have been complied with. The validity of claims are never presumed; it must be affirmatively shown, and until it is affirmatively shown by the records that all conditions precedent have been met, it is not a valid claim. An invalid claim cannot be the basis for a valid judgment, in a court of special and limited jurisdiction.
The board of supervisors of Chickasaw County at the time of these alleged purchases was, or should have been, operating under Section 6064 of the Code of 1930, which is identical with Section 9027 of the Code of 1942. Whether it was operating under this section in practice is immaterial, so far as the decision here to be reached is concerned. It so happens that the board of supervisors was, when it is alleged these purchases were made, strictly operating under this section, and did on these years advertise for competitive bidders to sell to it for the benefit of the districts, oil, grease and other supplies as contemplated. On each January first meeting day of these years by proper order it accepted some bidders and rejected others. Nowhere in the pleadings, nor in the proof, has it ever been shown that the appellant here was even qualified to sell products to the county; that they ever filed a bid, and that it was accepted by the board in proper form and manner.
In support of appellees' case, we think it unnecessary to cite authorities other than Section 6064 of the Code of 1930, which is Section 9027 of the Code of 1942, and the case of Jackson Equipment Service Co. et. al. v. Dunlop et al., 172 Miss. 752, 160 So. 734. The statute is unambiguous, plain and clearly understandable in its terms and meanings. If it were not, the Dunlop case, above cited, would correct any ambiguity. It would be very difficult to conceive of two cases having more similar state of facts than the Dunlop case and the case at bar. The chief difference is that in the Dunlop case the board and the claimants were more diligent in attempting to comply with the law in the making of valid contracts of purchase and showing by proper order that jurisdictional facts were existent and shown to have been existent. Both were mandamus cases, predicated on the orders being valid judgments in that they were not appealed from. Both present the question of what is necessary for a court of special and limited jurisdiction to do in order to render a valid judgment in cases of this kind.
The Mississippi Oil Corporation, the assets of which are now owned by the appellants, F.L. Clayton and Mrs. Velma B. Clayton, was allowed payment of certain claims at the November 1938 meeting of the board of supervisors of Chickasaw County under the terms of the following order:
"Be and it is hereby ordered by the Board that the following claims be and they are hereby allowed and the Clerk of this Board is hereby authorized to issue warrants therefor:
"C — #1324, Miss. Oil Corp. Supplies, Fund No. 1, Laws 1932, Chapter 196, ..................... $131.21 "C — #1271, Miss. Oil Corp. Supplies Fund No. 1, Laws 1932, Chapter 196 ...................... $114.30 "C — #351, Miss. Oil Corp. Supplies Fund No. 1, Laws 1932, Chapter 196, ..................... $ 55.49." Thereafter, the appellee, J.C. Paden, chancery clerk, acting as clerk of the board of supervisors, and with the acquiescence and approval of the members of said board, refused to issue warrants for the payment of said claims, respectively; and, wherefore, the appellants filed this proceeding for a writ of mandamus to compel the payment of the same, making the clerk and members of the board parties thereto, and alleging that there were ample funds on hand in the county treasury for the payment thereof, and that otherwise the petitioners were entitled to have the said judgment, which had duly allowed the claims and is unappealed from, paid in one of the methods provided for by law.The defendants filed a demurrer to the petition, which averred numerous grounds therefor, none of which were well taken, and the trial court so held and overruled the same.
Thereupon, the defendants filed the plea of the general issue to the petition for mandamus and gave a notice of special matter which they intended to prove thereunder, and reiterating therein the defenses theretofore set up in the demurrer which the court had overruled.
The petitioners then demurred to the general issue plea and moved to strike the notice, both of which were overruled, and with the result that the case stood for trial on its merits. The petitioners then introduced the judgment of the board and rested their case; and whereupon, the defendants also rested, and the court dismissed the petition, on the ground that the judgment did not affirmatively disclose all of the jurisdictional facts to show that the supplies were sold on competitive bids, after legal advertisement, etc., under a valid contract with the board of supervisors, as a court of special and limited jurisdiction, and based its decision on the case of Jackson Equipment Service Co. et al. v. Dunlop et al., 172 Miss. 752, 160 So. 734, wherein the purchase price of the supplies exceeded the sum of $250.
The orders of the board fully comply with the requirements of Sec. 255, Code 1930, as that section read at the time the orders were made, to-wit, at the November, 1938 Term. They refer to Chap. 196, Laws 1932, as the statute under which they were made. This chapter amended Sec. 6381, Code 1930, and is in the same terms as the amended section with the addition of a provision that road contracts should not be made so as to extend more than 30 days beyond the term of the board. The amended section took its place, therefore, in lieu of Sec. 6381 in the Code Chapter on Roads and Bridges, of which another section is Sec. 6386, Code 1930, which expressly allows that purchases "of material, equipment and supplies to be used as provided for in this chapter, may be made without competitive bids, where the amount of such contract or purchase does not exceed the sum of $250.00." The orders covering the three purchases therein mentioned show on their faces that neither of them exceeded $250.
The orders show on their faces that they were not made under Sec. 6064, Code 1930, Sec. 9027, Code 1942, on which appellees rely. And since the purchases did not exceed $250, Jackson Equipment, etc., Co. v. Dunlop, 172 Miss. 752, 160 So. 734, has no application. All our cases hold that where competitive bids must be had, the order or orders must recite and adjudge the jurisdictional facts in that respect, but where the amounts in the orders show that no competitive bids were required, then the order is not required to go further and negative a fact sufficiently negatived by the amounts.
The order of the board here invoked is sufficient on its face to constitute a valid and binding judgment, the payment of which the holders thereof are entitled to compel by writ of mandamus, if the same remains unpaid, since they could neither appeal from a judgment valid on its face in their favor, nor sue on claims which had been duly allowed. The case was tried before the trial judge without a jury, and both sides having submitted the case for decision on the sufficiency of the judgment, as introduced in evidence by the petitioners, they were entitled to judgment for the relief prayed for, since the defendants elected not to offer any evidence in support of their plea and the notice of special matter thereunder.
Reversed, and judgment here for the appellants.