Although language in some of our cases could be read as suggesting that mutual consent or agreement is the only essential element of a common law marriage, we have almost uniformly required that such consent or agreement be manifested by conduct that gives evidence of the mutual understanding of the parties. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 123 Colo. 285, 229 P.2d 142 (1951); Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 108 Colo. 388, 118 P.2d 769 (1941); Clayton Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Colo. 145, 25 P.2d 170 (1933); Davis v. People, 83 Colo. 295, 264 P. 658 (1928); Foley v. Gavin, 76 Colo. 286, 230 P. 618 (1924); In re Matteote's Estate, 59 Colo. 566, 151 P. 448 (1915). We affirm today that such conduct in a form of mutual public acknowledgment of the marital relationship is not only important evidence of the existence of mutual agreement but is essential to the establishment of a common law marriage.
An examination of decisions by this court, wherein the question for determination was dependency resulting from a common-law marriage and which the Commission found to exist, discloses that we have approved uniformly the commission's findings, even though, as was said in our decisions, if we were the fact-finding body we might disagree with those findings. Employer's Mutual Insurance Co. v. Morgulski, 69 Colo. 223, 193 Pac. 725; Clayton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 93 Colo. 145, 25 P.2d 175; Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra; Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Reed, supra. We also have held that, considering the statutory limitations as to grounds on which a court may review the Commission's award, it is apparent that even in a case where the Commission has never seen the witnesses, it was the legislative intent that its findings of fact nevertheless should be binding on the district court and therefore binding on us. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra. "While apparently the question has not heretofore been raised in the precise form in which it arises in this case, a long line of decisions of this body holds that the commission is a fact finding body and that its findings are binding on this court. [citing numerous cases]."
Edger v. Ackerman, supra; Poole v. People, 24 Colo. 510, 52 Pac. 1025. The foregoing authorities are cited merely as best illustrative of the rules relied on. Counsel on each side call our attention to numerous others, especially from our own jurisdiction, including: Davis v. People, 83 Colo. 295, 264 Pac. 658; Mock v. Chaney, 36 Colo. 60, 87 Pac. 538; Clayton Coal Co. v. Ind. Com., 93 Colo. 145, 25 P.2d 170; Moffat Coal Co. v. Ind. Com., 108 Colo. 388, 118 P.2d 769; Foley v. Gavin, 76 Colo. 286, 230 Pac. 618. These we find no occasion to here examine, reconcile and distinguish. That there are some minor conflicts, and much confusing diversity of facts, is indisputable.
Basis for such inference is furnished by the following excerpt from her testimony: "Q. Now, you said, Mrs. Todd, when you started to live with Pete that you intended to be married later on. That was the arrangement, was it, that you would start living together and at some future date — A. Yes, we would be married. Q. You would have a ceremony performed? A. Yes. Q. Was anything said about that afterwards? A. Two or three times we mentioned we would get married later on, and as I said, he always put me off. Q. Was there any reason for that? A. Not that I know of. Q. It was just something you would take care of later on? A. Yes." Impelling authority for the conclusion reached by the commission, its approval by the district court and affirmance here, is afforded by the case of Clayton Coal Co. v. IndustrialCommission, 93 Colo. 145, 25 P.2d 170, wherein this court, en banc, with no dissents, upheld a finding by the commission of a common-law marriage on facts almost precisely analogous to those in the case at bar. In that case, paralleling the instant record, as plaintiffs in error impliedly concede by their second hypothesis, there was uncontradicted evidence from which a continuing consent of the man to the marital relationship could be implied.