Opinion
Case No. A1-04-132, Docket Number: 19.
December 21, 2004
ORDER AWARDING COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
I. BACKGROUND
On October 25, 2004, the Plaintiffs learned that the Defendants intended to illegally increase the grazing fees on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation effective November 1, 2004. The Plaintiffs retained counsel and filed a lawsuit on October 28, 2004. The Court scheduled a hearing on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order for November 1, 2004. In the days prior to the hearing, the parties engaged in settlement discussions and ultimately resolved the dispute and entered into a Stipulation (Docket No. 12). In the Stipulation, the BIA admitted that it had not fully complied with the Court's Order of January 3, 2000, in a case entitled Claymore v. Babbitt, A1-99-131 (Claymore I). The parties agreed that the Plaintiffs may seek an award of costs and attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act by filing an application to the Court after the Stipulation was accepted. See Stipulation, ¶ 6. The Plaintiffs were successful in freezing the grazing rights for the 2005 grazing season and preventing trespass actions from being taken against them; in forming a committee which will study grazing rights on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation; and in obtaining assurances of fair notice and a right to appeal any future grazing rights increase.
On November 29, 2004, a Petition for Attorney's Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act was filed along with a brief in support of the petition (Docket No. 14). Counsel for the Plaintiffs has requested costs and attorney's fees in the amount of $18,534.05 for legal services rendered from February 4, 2004, through November 24, 2004.
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION
There is no dispute that the Plaintiffs are considered to be the prevailing party and are entitled to the recovery of their costs and attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). A plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party if he succeeds on "any significant issue in the litigation which achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit." Texas State Teachers Ass'n. v. Garland Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a prevailing party who meets special eligibility requirements is generally entitled to the recovery of fees unless the United States shows that its position was "substantially justified" or that special circumstances make an award unjust. The United States has conceded that its position in not complying with the Court's Order of January 3, 2000, was not substantially justified.
It is clear and undisputed that the United States had no substantial justification for ignoring the mandate of this Court's earlier order in Claymore I. The United States did not seek an amendment to the order nor an extension of time in which to comply with the order. The Government has acknowledged that it did not fully comply with the order. See Stipulation ¶ 1. As a result, the Plaintiffs were forced to commence a lawsuit and move for injunctive relief to compel compliance with the previous court order in Claymore I.
The United States has not disputed the Plaintiffs' right to recover costs and attorney's fees. The only dispute concerns 1) whether certain hours expended by the plaintiffs' attorneys in February 2004 should be compensated; 2) whether special factors exist which warrant a higher rate than the standard EAJA rate of $125 per hour; 3) whether the United States acted in bad faith; and 4) whether computerized legal research can be reimbursed under the EAJA.
The Plaintiffs contend that all of the hours expended in February 2004 should be reimbursed; that attorney Sarah Vogel's time should be compensated at a rate of $200 per hour due to special factors; that the United States acted in bad faith and must be required to pay fees at the regular hourly rate even though it admitted it acted without substantial justification; and that computerized legal research is a recoverable cost.
The United States has questioned whether the work done by attorney Sarah Vogel in February 2004 relates to the BIA's decision in October 2004 to increase the grazing fees which triggered the need for this lawsuit. The United States contends that work done on February 2, 2004; February 22, 2004; February 23, 2004; February 25, 2004; and February 26, 2004, should be excluded. The total hours expended during this time period amounts to 8.2 hours. Whether the work expended in February 2004 was appropriate and reasonably necessary to protect the Plaintiffs' rights as guaranteed under Claymore I is arguably questionable. Nevertheless, the Court, in its discretion, believes that the work is causally connected to the current dispute which was resolved via stipulation on November 1, 2004. The Court will award costs and attorneys' fees associated with the legal services rendered in February 2004.
With respect to the hourly rate of compensation under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), the EAJA specifically limits the hourly rate to $125 per hour unless the Court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor exists which justifies a higher fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). It is well-established that the Court is not required to grant a request for a cost of living adjustment, and such a decision is within the discretion of the district court. Rother v. Shalala, 869 F.Supp. 899, 902 (D.Kan. 1994); Dairy Maid Dairy, Inc. v. U.S. 837 F.Supp. 1370, 1384 (E.D. Va. 1993).
The Court acknowledges that attorney Sarah Vogel has developed expertise in litigating similar claims against the BIA which has required her to be familiar with the agency, its internal procedures, the governing statutes and regulations, and prior court orders. However, this was neither a unique nor a complex case in which special factors exist to justify a higher rate of compensation for the legal services rendered. The fact that a lawyer has outstanding skills, or has a unique familiarity with the federal agency and its internal procedures and regulations, does not necessarily warrant an upward adjustment of the statutory cap under the EAJA. See Lucas v. White, 63 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
The Court, in its discretion, believes that an award of costs and attorneys' fees for every hour expended (88.65 hours) at the statutory rate of $125 per hour is a fair and reasonable award under the circumstances. Costs are awarded in the amount of $1,008.32. This includes costs for computerized legal research which is compensable under the EAJA. Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Veneman, 304 F.Supp.2d 45, 60 (D.D.C. 2004); In Re Application of Mgndichian, 312 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1266 (C.D. Cal. 2003); U.S. v. Adkinson, 256 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1319 (N.D. Fla. 2003). Attorneys' fees are awarded for 88.65 hours at the statutory rate of $125 per hour for a total award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $11,081.25. In summary, the total costs and attorneys' fees awarded to the Plaintiffs is the sum of $12,089.57.
IT IS SO ORDERED.