Opinion
No. 1D2023-1623
08-21-2024
Finna Ann CLAY, Jackie Diane Clay, Finna Ann Clay, as Trustee of the Janie Mae Clay Special Needs Trust dated August 18, 2014, and Larry Jerome Clay, Appellants, v. SYNOVUS TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE OF the Teddie CLAY a/k/a Teddy Clay Revocable Trust dated August 18, 2014, Appellee.
Shiraz A. Hosein of Anchors Smith Grimsley, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellants. Brian W. Hoffman of Carver, Darden, Koretzky, Tessier, Finn, Blossman & Areaux, LLC, Pensacola, for Appellee.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. W. Joel Boles, Judge.
Shiraz A. Hosein of Anchors Smith Grimsley, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellants.
Brian W. Hoffman of Carver, Darden, Koretzky, Tessier, Finn, Blossman & Areaux, LLC, Pensacola, for Appellee.
Per Curiam.
Appellants seek review of an order granting summary judgment in a probate case. Upon review, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction. See Wade v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 57 So. 3d 869, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (reaffirming that appellate courts have an independent duty "to examine our jurisdiction in every case even if, as here, the issue was not raised"). The order sought to be reviewed is not a final order. See Cardiothoracic & Vascular Surgery, P.A. v. W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 993 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (dismissing an appeal as premature because the order merely grants a motion for summary judgment and "does not contain sufficient language of finality to unequivocally bring an end to the required judicial labor"); see also Cody v. Cody, 127 So. 3d 753, 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (holding that an order construing a will and determining the testator’s intent was not a final order for purposes of appeal because further judicial action was contemplated regarding the legal description of land to be distributed to the beneficiaries). Nor does the order fall within any of the enumerated categories of appealable nonfinal orders under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(3). Even if it were reviewable under rule 9.130, then the appeal would be untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of the order granting summary judgment.
Dismissed.
Roberts, Ray, and Kelsey, JJ., concur.