Opinion
No. 2-236 / 01-0528
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, RICHARD G. BLANE, II, Judge.
Helen Clay appeals from a district court order entering judgment in favor of the State of Iowa on her claim of disability discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. AFFIRMED.
Bruce H. Stoltze of Brick, Gentry, Bowers, Swartz, Stolze, Schuling Levis, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Grant K. Dugdale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Helen Clay appeals from a district court order entering judgment in favor of the State of Iowa on her claim of disability discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Clay contends the district court erred in applying the law to the facts of her case.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . Helen Clay was employed by the Iowa Department of Education (Department) from 1982 until she resigned in 1998. Clay was initially hired as a Clerk/Typist before becoming a Secretary I and, ultimately, an Administrative Assistant I.
In 1990, Clay suffered an injured back after slipping and falling on a wet floor in the Grimes State Office Building. Clay claimed and was awarded worker's compensation benefits. Clay's subsequent claim for additional worker's compensation benefits for knee and hip problems she alleged were caused by the back injury was denied. In 1997, Clay filed a claim for carpal tunnel syndrome in both hands and wrists, which the State settled.
After the 1990 back injury, it became more difficult for Clay to perform routine tasks at work and home. In an attempt to accommodate Clay, her employer provided her a lumbar support chair. She was also allowed to arrange her work schedule as needed to accommodate her medical condition, including leaving the office. However, Clay maintains she was doing duties beyond those listed in the job requirements of an Administrative Assistant I. She contends she was given many duties of an Administrative Assistant II. She complained to her supervisor regarding the discrepancy in work load and pay, but the department would not promote her to Administrative Assistant II. Clay argues the additional job duties she was required to perform were too difficult given her medical condition.
On January 16, 1998, Clay resigned her position at the Department of Education, citing the difficulties with her back and hands/wrists. At that time, Clay's duties were reallocated to other secretaries in the Department, or to other departments. On December 16, 1998, Clay filed an action against the State alleging she was discriminated against in her employment with the Department on the basis of her disability. She claimed she was discriminated against in her exercise of her worker's compensation benefits. She also alleged the State created a hostile work environment, leading to her constructive discharge.
After trial, the district court concluded Clay had not proved the State discriminated against her in its handling of her worker's compensation claims. It also denied Clay's wrongful discharge claim, finding Clay did not meet the prima facie requirement because she was not a qualified person with a disability.
Clay appeals, contending she met the prima facie requirement of being a qualified person with a disability. She argues the district court erred in failing to recognize she was required to perform additional duties outside her job description and these additional tasks caused her to resign. She also claims the court erred in failing to consider that an employer can make accommodation by adjusting its worker's compensation claim processing policies.
II. Scope of Review . We review disability discrimination claims tried to the court for errors at law. Schlitzer v. University of Iowa Hospitals Clinics, 641 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Iowa 2002). We are bound by the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. Hendricks v. Great Plains Supply Co., 609 N.W.2d 486, 490 (Iowa 2000). Evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. Id. We also view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the judgment. Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 529.
III. Wrongful Discharge . The Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any:
a. Person to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for employment or any employee because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation. If a person with a disability is qualified to perform a particular occupation, by reason of training or experience, the nature of that occupation shall not be the basis for exception to the unfair or discriminating practices prohibited by this subsection.
Iowa Code § 216.6(1) (1997) (emphasis added). In order to succeed in her claim against the State, Clay had to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she is disabled; (2) she was qualified to retain the job; (3) she was terminated; and (4) it is more likely than not that the termination was based on her disability. See Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co., 533 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 1995). The district court found Clay proved she is disabled within the meaning of the ICRA. However, the court concluded Clay failed to prove she was qualified for the Administrative Assistant position. Our review focuses on this issue.
Whether Clay was a qualified person with a disability is an essential element of all of Clay's claims.
To establish the second element of the prima facie case, Clay must prove she was qualified to perform the Administrative Assistant job by showing she could perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation. Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530.
If an employee's ability to do her job depends on reasonable accommodation, the employee must make a facial showing that reasonable accommodation was possible. If this factual showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the suggested accommodation was unreasonable or would constitute an undue hardship. However, as a general rule, any expense to the employer in accommodating a claimant that is more than de minimus is not required.Id. (citations omitted).
The district court concluded Clay had failed to prove she was able to perform the essential functions of her job when she resigned. The district court cited Clay's testimony that she resigned her position because she believed she could no longer perform the essential functions of her job. However, Clay argues she was able to perform the duties required of Administrative Assistant I. She contends it was the additional Administrative Assistant II duties that she was required to perform which were too difficult for her given her medical condition. She argues she could have continued in her job if the State had accommodated her by reassigning the Administrative Assistant II duties to other secretaries. Clay observes this accommodation would not constitute an undue hardship on the Department because her duties were reassigned to other secretaries after she resigned.
We find no error in the district court's finding Clay failed to prove she was able to perform the essential functions of her position as an Administrative Assistant I at the time of her resignation. When asked during cross-examination if she was able to perform the job duties of an Administrative Assistant I at the time of her resignation, Clay testified she was mentally able to do so. The following exchange then took place:
Q. You had the ability to do it but you physically could not perform the job duties at the time you resigned, is that correct?
A. Because of my disability with my back and hands, you are correct.
Q. And as you are sitting here today, you do not believe that you could go back in and perform the duties of an Administrative Assistant I at the Department of Education, is that correct?
A. I have been off from the job over two years now. The reason I could not do the duty — or the job duties would be because of the amount of pain I'm still having in my hands and my back.
We find substantial evidence supports the district court's conclusion Clay was unable to perform the essential duties of an Administrative Assistant I. Under our standard of review, we must affirm.
AFFIRMED.