And in Illinois, where a contract does not specify a time for performance of a particular obligation, a "reasonable" time is implied. Clay v. Harris, 592 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992). The consignment receipt contained an implied term that the painting would be returned to Mr. Nelson in a reasonable time, as determined by the usage of trade of auction house consignments.
"In Illinois, where a contract does not specify a time for performance of a particular obligation, a `reasonable time' is implied." Nelson v. Sotheby's Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Clay v. Harris, 592 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992)). "A reasonable time [is] such time as is necessary to do conveniently what the contract requires."
However, under Illinois law, "where a contract does not specify' a time for performance of a particular obligation, a `reasonable' time is implied." Nelson v. Sotheby's, Inc., 128 F. Supp.2d 1172, 1175 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Clay v. Harris, 592 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (111. App. Ct. 1992). Once more, based on the present record, a reasonable juror might conclude that payment of the interest credits was a precondition to transfer of the additional reserve so that the obligation continued as long as the reserve was held by Mutual. At any rate, a question of fact exists as to the parties' intent.
However, under Illinois law, "where a contract does not specify a time for performance of a particular obligation, a `reasonable' time is implied." Nelson v. Sotheby's, Inc., 128 F. Supp.2d 1172, 1175 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Clay v. Harris, 592 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill.App. Ct. 1992). Once more, based on the present record, a reasonable juror might conclude that payment of the interest credits was a precondition to transfer of the additional reserve so that the obligation continued as long as the reserve was held by Mutual. At any rate, a question of fact exists as to the parties' intent.
However, Section 3-112 and Illinois case law make clear that Greater Rockford's failing to deliver the certificate of title to Mr. Goldstein, a dealer, did not affect the passage of ownership. See e.g. Clay v. Harris, 228 Ill. App. 3d 475, 592 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding that an auction's failure to deliver certificate of title within a reasonable time after delivering possession of the vehicle gave purchaser a right to rescind the purchase). Here, neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant has submitted any form of written contract as evidence.
What constitutes a reasonable time for performance under an oral contract is a question of fact subject to manifest-weight review. Clay v. Harris, 228 Ill. App. 3d 475, 480-81 (1992). The trial court impliedly found that Richard did not demand performance, or tender his own, within a reasonable time, and we see no ground for disturbing that finding.
The amount of time that constitutes a reasonable amount of time is a question of fact that depends on the particular circumstances of the case, and the trial court's finding will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Wilmette Partners v. Hamel, 230 Ill.App.3d 248, 257, 171 Ill.Dec. 657, 594 N.E.2d 1177 (1992) ; Clay v. Harris, 228 Ill.App.3d 475, 480-81, 170 Ill.Dec. 474, 592 N.E.2d 1154 (1992) . A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clear from the record or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, and without a basis in the evidence. Lyonv. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill.2d 264, 271, 282 Ill.Dec. 799, 807 N.E.2d 423 (2004) .
We agree, for when a time for performance is not specified, a reasonable time will be implied. See Clay v. Harris (1992), 228 Ill. App.3d 475, 592 N.E.2d 1154, appealdenied (1992), 146 Ill.2d 624, 602 N.E.2d 448; Stanley v. Chastek (1962), 34 Ill. App.2d 220, 180 N.E.2d 512. In addition to relying on the analysis of the trial court, defendant raises two additional arguments supporting its contention that no contract existed.