Opinion
Rehearing Denied Oct. 1, 1974.
Rector, Melat & Wheeler, Justin R. Melat, Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellee.
Raymond S. Duitch, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellant.
VAN CISE, Judge.
Defendant Hightower appeals from a judgment entered against him for the amount of the damage to plaintiff Clausen's automobile. We affirm.
The facts as found by the trial court are not in dispute. Clausen, a deputy sheriff of El Paso County, owned and maintained his own car, equipped with emergency lights and siren, and received a mileage allowance for its use for the county. He was on duty during the early morning hours when defendant's car passed him at a high rate of speed. He pursued it with red lights and siren in use, but the speeding car failed to stop. Clausen's speed in pursuit reached up to 130 miles per hour. During the chase, Clausen veered to the right to avoid an oncoming car which was over the yellow line in his lane of travel. His car went over the right side of the highway, turned over several times, and came to rest on its wheels. The parties stipulated the damage to Clausen's car was $1,606.73.
The court found that Clausen had control of his car until he swerved to avoid the oncoming car. It further concluded that speed caused his car to go out of control and that this speed was brought about by Hightower's failure to stop for a law enforcement vehicle. From this, the court concluded that Hightower's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and of plaintiff's damages. Accordingly, judgment was entered against Hightower.
The only issue on this appeal is whether the intervening negligence of the oncoming driver was The sole proximate cause or only A proximate cause of the accident.
For an analysis of the distinction, See Reaves v. Horton, Colo.App., 518 P.2d 1380.
This case is controlled by Rhea v. Green, 29 Colo.App. 19, 476 P.2d 760. In Rhea, a high-speed chase by a law enforcement officer resulted in a collision of his and another police vehicle. On the question of proximate cause of the accident, this court quoted with approval from Brechtel v. Lopez, 140 So.2d 189 (Ct.App.La.):
'In our opinion, the proxiamte cause of the accident was Speed, the grossly excessive speed of young Lopez which induced the speed of the police, who not only had the right but the duty to attempt to overtake and apprehend him.'
This court then went on to say:
'In our opinion, the danger to the plaintiff and others resulting from the defendant's conduct was clearly foreseeable, and the trial court was correct in ruling that the defendant's negligence constituted a proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law.'
This decision is not intended to express any opinion as to the propriety of a law enforcement officer in traveling at speeds of 120 to 130 miles per hour in pursuit of a traffic law violator.
Judgment affirmed.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and COYTE, J., concur.