Appellate courts must apply the law as its exists at the time of the appellate court judgment, even though it may change the judgment of the trial court which was correct at the time it was rendered. Green v. State, 254 Ga. App. 881, 883 (1) ( 564 SE2d 731) (2002); Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301, 302 (2) ( 259 SE2d 697) (1979). The trial court specifically held that Handschuh's testing was performed pursuant to the provision in OCGA ยง 40-5-55 (a) that requires chemical testing, even in the absence of probable cause, of anyone driving a motor vehicle who "is involved in any traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities."
Therefore, this issue is properly before us, and we must apply the law as it exists at the time of our judgment, even though this may change the judgment of the trial court which was correct at the time it was rendered. Green v. State, 254 Ga. App. 881, 883(1) ( 564 S.E.2d 731) (2002); Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301, 302(2) ( 259 S.E.2d 697) (1979). Accordingly, the trial court erred by giving the charge in OCGA ยง 16-9-31(d) and Cade's conviction for financial transaction card theft must be reversed.
201 Ga. App. 456 ( 411 S.E.2d 537) (1991).Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301, 302 (2) ( 259 S.E.2d 697) (1979). [We] disapprove of Whitlock and Ross [v. State} only to the extent they suggest that it is not reversible error to preclude cross-examination of an accomplice regarding the deal he has reached with the State, including the disparity between the sentence the State will recommend in exchange for the accomplice's cooperation and the sentence he would have received without that cooperation.
Procedural law is that which prescribes the methods of enforcement of rights, duties, and obligations." Accord, Barner v. State, 263 Ga. 365, 367 (4) ( 434 S.E.2d 484) (1993); Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755 (1) ( 272 S.E.2d 709) (1965); Thurman v. Mabry, 221 Ga. 153, 154 ( 143 S.E.2d 645) (1965); Logan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 734, 736-737 (b) ( 442 S.E.2d 883) (1994); Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301, 302 (2) ( 259 S.E.2d 697) (1979); Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 475 (2) ( 143 S.E.2d 645) (1965); This was the first time that the General Assembly, in the many times amending the Civil Practice Act, has expressly restricted retroactive application of this procedural act. Thus, absent a clear and unambiguous expression of intent by the General Assembly, as in this amendment, to prohibit the retroactive application of a procedural act or amendment, such procedural act will apply retroactively.
No party has a vested right in a procedure; therefore, a procedural statute has retrospective application. Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 831 ( 289 S.E.2d 544) (1982); Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301 ( 259 S.E.2d 697) (1979). Therefore, the dismissal of Count 2 must be reversed under the 1997 revision of O.C.G.A. ยง 9-11-9.1 for failure to comply with pre-1997 O.C.G.A. ยง 9-11-9.1.
Although this case was decided before our Supreme Court's recent decision in Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 ( 493 S.E.2d 403), concerning grants of summary judgment in slip and fall cases, appellate courts must apply the law as it exists at the time of the appellate court's judgment, even though doing so might change the judgment of the trial court which was correct at the time it was rendered. Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301 ( 259 S.E.2d 697). Careful examination of Robinson v. Kroger, shows that the trial court's judgment in this appeal is not affected by that decision.
Although the Sharpe decision was handed down by our Supreme Court after the trial of this case, appellate courts must apply the law as it exists at the time of the appellate court judgment. Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301 ( 259 S.E.2d 697). Also, even though this witness did testify about the effect of the failure to pay the intangible taxes on a foreclosure, his testimony was cumulative to testimony on cross-examination from First Union's own expert to which there was no objection.
This case is controlled by our Supreme Court's recent decision in Yoho v. Ringier of America, 263 Ga. 338 ( 434 S.E.2d 57), which has clarified the application of tort immunity under the statutory employer principle. Although Yoho was decided after the trial court's action in this case, we are obliged to apply the decision to this appeal. Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301 ( 259 S.E.2d 697). In combination, OCGA ยงยง 34-9-8 (a) and 34-9-11 grant tort immunity to contractors who are secondarily liable for workers' compensation benefits.
That is not our function. Williams v. State, 150 Ga. App. 852, 854 ( 258 S.E.2d 659) (1979); Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301 (1) ( 259 S.E.2d 697) (1979)." Barnes v. State, 175 Ga. App. 621, 622 (1) ( 334 S.E.2d 205).
Burke v. State, 196 Ga. 702, 707 ( 27 S.E.2d 313) (1943); Davis v. State, 205 Ga. 248, 254 (5) ( 53 S.E.2d 545) (1949); Johnson v. State, 69 Ga. App. 663 (1) ( 26 S.E.2d 482) (1943). That is not our function. Williams v. State, 150 Ga. App. 852, 854 ( 258 S.E.2d 659) (1979); Clary v. State, 151 Ga. App. 301 (1) ( 259 S.E.2d 697) (1979). In our society we have delegated the task of determining the truth to lay citizens of the community in which crime occurs; they are not mere advisors to judges.