Clarke v. Mayor of New York

6 Citing cases

  1. Opn. No. 2001-F2

    Opn. No. 2001-F2 (Ops. N.Y. Atty. Gen. Oct. 12, 2001)

    Because the term is susceptible of two meanings, its intended meaning must be determined from the context and purpose of the statute. See McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 235. Early New York case law stated that the exclusive meaning of this term is the "more obvious meaning," but recognizes that "a very slight matter in the context would be sufficient to give it a different and inclusive sense."People v. Walker, 17 N.Y. 502, 503 (1858); accordClarke v. Mayor, 111 N.Y. 621 (1889); see alsoPeople v. Fitzgerald, 180 N.Y. 269, 274 (1905) ("While `until,' as an adverb of time, is usually a word of exclusion, it always includes the date which follows, when the connection and manifest intention so require."). Consequently, the Court of Appeals has interpreted statutory language referring to an event occurring until a date certain as either excluding or including the named date, depending on the context of the statutory language.

  2. Anderson v. Eischen

    16 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1926)   Cited 2 times

    Literally read, the expression from day to day would signify no time at all, or at most only nighttime. In the most favorable view to the plaintiff, the language of the permit is thought to be ambiguous. Kendall v. Kingsley, 120 Mass. 94; McGinley v. Laycock, 94 Wis. 205, 68 N.W. 871; Morris E.R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 31 N.J. Law, 205; Webster v. French, 12 Ill. 302; Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn. 18; Jeremy Fuel Co. v. Denver R. Co., 59 Utah, 266, 203 P. 863; Clarke v. Mayor, 111 N.Y. 621, 19 N.E. 436; Taylor v. Brown, 147 U.S. 640, 13 S. Ct. 549, 37 L. Ed. 313; State v. Elson, 77 Ohio St. 489, 83 N.E. 904, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 686. And under well-settled principles it was proper for the court to receive testimony in respect to all circumstances attending the issuance of the permit, including what was said by the parties, and upon such testimony to submit the question to the jury.

  3. Sugerman v. Jacobs

    160 A.D. 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914)   Cited 7 times

    In each instance its construction must depend upon the circumstances and subject-matter of the case presented. ( Clarke v. Mayor, etc., 111 N.Y. 621, 623.) In the case of People ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Hornbeck ( 30 Misc. Rep. 212) the court construed a provision of the statute with respect to the preparation of assessment rolls which stated that they must be open for inspection until a specified day as excluding that day, but the reason for that may be found in the further provision of the same statute that the board of assessors would sit on the day named as a board of review, which could not well be the case if during the entire day objections might be filed and must be received.

  4. No. 79-84

    No. 79-84 (Ops.Colo.Atty.Gen. Dec. 19, 1979)

    The words "up to" have been construed by courts as words of inclusion and therefore the definition is constructed to mean the first 35 acres. See, e.g., Stark v. Long, 210 Ky. 68, 273 S.W. 23 (1925); State v. Flutcher, 166 Mo. 582, 66 S.W. 429 (1902); Clarke v. City of New York, 111 N.Y. 621, 19 N.E. 436 (1889). The case law cited above supports the conclusion that the legislature meant the definition in C.R.S. 1973, 39-1-102(7.5) to mean the first 35 acres. For further explanation your attention is invited to the attorney general's opinion of January 11, 1978, copy attached.

  5. Lincoln Bank v. Healy

    86 Misc. 2d 373 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)   Cited 1 times

    Courts faced with the necessity of construing the word "until" have consistently held that the word standing by itself has an exclusionary meaning unless other language or surrounding circumstances dictate a contrary meaning. (See, e.g., Clark v Mayor, 111 N.Y. 621, and People v Fitzgerald, 96 App. Div. 242.) Not only does the context here not demand overcoming the presumption, but also the use of the precise and certain word "before" in the second clause is an overwhelming indication that February 18, 1976 was to be excluded.

  6. County Securities, v. Warwick Properties

    176 Misc. 272 (N.Y. Misc. 1940)   Cited 4 times

    This rule has been relaxed only in cases where the quality of the title conveyed by the municipality was questioned, not the authority or jurisdiction to convey. ( Clarke v. Mayor, 111 N.Y. 621; AEtna Ins. Co. v. Mayor, 153 id. 331.) These cases involved the payment of taxes.