Opinion
01-CV-1168 (LEK/DRH)
March 13, 2003
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
Familiarity with the background to this case, fully set forth in an earlier opinion, Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 213 F. Supp.2d 198 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), is presumed.
On July 19, 2001, Plaintiff Diane Clark ("Plaintiff") initiated this action, alleging that Defendants afforded less protection to women who are victims of domestic violence than to victims of other crimes. Plaintiff's complaint asserted causes of action against Defendants under several federal statutes. On July 24, 2002, this Court dismissed all but one of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 213 F. Supp.2d 198 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). In her remaining claim, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants employ an administrative classification of crime victims in the Town of Ticonderoga which discriminates against women who are victims of domestic violence in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On July 24, 2000, Plaintiff brought a lawsuit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Essex, against the same parties who are named as defendants in this suit. See Verified Complaint, attached as Exhibit A to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Docket No. 21. The state court complaint was based on the same facts as are at issue in this suit, but it did not assert a cause of action based on Defendants' alleged violations of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. On March 29, 2001, the Supreme Court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Third Department reversed the Supreme Court's decision and ordered that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendants and that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 291 A.D.2d 597 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604 (2002).
Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Defendants argue that the state court decision precludes Plaintiff's claim in this case.
II Discussion
A. Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings Standard
"The test for evaluating a 12(c) motion is the same as that applicable to a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6)." Irish Lesbian Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1998). Defendants' motion must be denied "`unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The Court must "assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and . . . view all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Dangler v. New York City Off Track Betting Corp., 193 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1999). Consideration is limited to the complaint, written instruments that are attached to the complaint as exhibits, statements or documents that are incorporated in the complaint by reference, and documents on which the complaint heavily relies. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). "Courts may also consider `matters of which judicial notice may be taken.'" G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron Budd, No. 01-CV-216, 2003 WL 193502, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2003) (quoting Hertz Corp v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1992)).
B. Claim Preclusion
This Court must give the judgment of a New York state court the same preclusive effect it would be given under New York law. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); EFCO Corp. v. U.W. Marx, Inc., 124 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 1997). "Under New York law, a prior decision dismissed `on the merits' is binding in all subsequent litigation between the same parties on claims arising out of the same facts, even if based upon different legal theories or seeking different relief on issues which were or might have been litigated in the prior action but were not." EFCO Corp., 124 F.3d at 397. This action and the state court action name the same defendants and arise out of the same facts. The state court's judgment was clearly "on the merits." And Plaintiff has identified no obstacle that would have prevented her from bringing her Fourteenth Amendment claim in state court. Accordingly, the state court judgment precludes Plaintiff from asserting the instant claim. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 85 (holding that state court judgments have preclusive effect in § 1983 suits).
Plaintiff's memorandum of law notes that in some circumstances a notice of claim must be served within 90 days of the date that the claim arises before suit may be brought. See N.Y. GEN MUN § 50-e. However, New York's notice of claim statute does not apply to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Mompoint v. City of New York, 299 A.D.2d 527, 527 (2d Dept. 2002).
III Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this order by regular mail upon the parties to this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.