These provisions, however, must be read in conjunction with the interpretive gloss which the appellate courts of Georgia have applied to the statute. See Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980); Skelton v. Slaton, 243 Ga. 426, 254 S.E.2d 704 (1979); Pitts v. State, 151 Ga. App. 691, 261 S.E.2d 435 (1979); Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611, 251 S.E.2d 832 (1979); Dubose v. State, 148 Ga. App. 9, 251 S.E.2d 15 (1978). The statutory scheme, as construed by the Georgia courts, can be summarized as follows.

The procedures are set out in Ga. Code § 27-1503, but must be read in conjunction with the interpretive gloss which appellate courts of Georgia have read into the statute. In particular, the following cases must be consulted to grasp the substance of § 27-1503: Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980); Skelton v. Slaton, 243 Ga. 426, 254 S.E.2d 704 (1979); Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611, 251 S.E.2d 832 (1979); Pitts v. State, 151 Ga. App. 691, 261 S.E.2d 435 (1979); Dubose v. State, 148 Ga. App. 9, 251 S.E.2d 15 (1978).

Accordingly, it has been held in Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611 (1) ( 251 S.E.2d 832) (1979); Pitts v. State, 151 Ga. App. 691 ( 261 S.E.2d 435) (1979), and in this case, that where a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is ordered committed to a mental hospital under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (a) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (e)] and files an application for release under Code Ann. § 27-1503(b) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (f)], there is a continuing presumption of insanity at the time of the release hearing." Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 631 ( 266 S.E.2d 466). The application for release must be made to the committing court and the burden of proof is upon the applicant.

Benham II, 678 F.2d at 528. Fourth, we held that under the narrowing construction of Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980), "no members of this class of acquittees [existed] for whom requiring court approval for release does not serve the State's interests." Benham II, 678 F.2d at 537.

Each of the enumerations of error is predicated upon the incorrect assumption that the burden of proof rests upon the state in a hearing on an application for release pursuant to Code § 27-1503, supra. As has been recently restated by the Supreme Court in Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 643-644 ( 266 S.E.2d 466), a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity reflects two crucial factual determinations. First, such a verdict indicates a determination beyond a reasonable doubt by the finder of fact that the defendant committed the crime in question.

Georgia's Criminal Code incorporates two insanity defenses. See Clark v. State , 245 Ga. 629, 629 (1), 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980) ; see also OCGA § 17-7-131 (a) (1) (defining "[i]nsane at the time of the crime" as "meeting the criteria of Code Section 16-3-2 or 16-3-3"). First, OCGA § 16-3-2 recognizes a defense of insanity based on mental incapacity, providing that

When the State does provide a hearing at some point in the course of administrative or judicial proceedings, the failure to hold a hearing at an earlier point in the proceedings generally becomes moot or is considered cured. See Atlanta City School Dist., 266 Ga. at 218 ; Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629 , 641 (5) (266 SE2d 466 ) (1980); Germane, 971 A2d at 580 (I) (A) (1) (a). Affording an evidentiary hearing to Gregory in which he might present evidence favorable to his cause and confront the evidence against him would satisfy the requirement of due process, regardless of whether the hearing is held before the Board or the superior court.

Insanity at the time of the trial is determined prior to trial on the merits, while a jury weighs the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense as a part of its normal function in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. As OCGA § 17-7-131 has been ruled constitutional, Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629 ( 266 S.E.2d 466) (1980), we find no error. 3. Edison contends that the trial court erred in allowing the state to read into evidence his testimony at his earlier trial for the murder of the Picketts that resulted in a hung jury.

In determining whether appellant carried his burden of proof on the issue of sanity, we must first address appellant's contention that the jury's verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as to the killing of Ben Cheese created a presumption that appellant was insane at the time he killed Horace Milam. In Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 643-646 (5) ( 266 S.E.2d 466) (1980), we held that a defendant's insanity acquittal established that he met the criteria for civil commitment at the time of the crime, and that such a finding, pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-21, raised a presumption of insanity which continued until the defendant's release hearing. Based on Clark, supra, 245 Ga., we hold that appellant's insanity acquittal with regard to the killing of Cheese raised a presumption that he was insane at the time he killed Horace Milam. Accord Evans v. State, 159 Ga. App. 776 (1) ( 285 S.E.2d 235) (1981); Whitfield v. State, 158 Ga. App. 660, 661 ( 281 S.E.2d 643) (1981).

Lynch v. Overholzer, 369 U.S. at 717, 82 S.Ct. at 1070-1071; Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769, 771 (1930); People v. Jones, 174 Cal.Rptr. 656, 659 (Cal.App. 1981); People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Colo. 1981); Mills v. State, 256 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1969); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466, 476-77 (1980); State v. Allan, 166 N.W.2d 752, 758 (Iowa 1969); Ex parte Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492, 495 (1912); Barnes v. Behan, 80 S.D. 370, 124 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1963); Fortune v. Reshetylo, 33 Ohio St.2d 22, 294 N.E.2d 880, 881 (1973); State ex rel. Thompson v. Snell, 46 Wn. 327, 89 P. 931, 933 (1907); see also Application of Jones, 228 Kan. 90, 612 P.2d 1211 (1980). Automatic commitment of an acquittee under such circumstances is therefore not based upon the unacceptable standard that there is only a reasonable doubt as to the acquittee's sanity, but rather upon his own admission of dangerous mental illness.