Opinion
A-14108 0367
04-24-2024
KEENEN CLARK, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Sharon Barr, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Scott A. Crawford, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Bethel, Nathaniel Peters, Judge Trial Court No. 4BE-20-00603 CR.
Sharon Barr, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Scott A. Crawford, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Keenen Clark pleaded guilty to second-degree assault after strangling his stepfather and attacking him with a knife. On appeal, Clark challenges four probation conditions that either prohibit him from using marijuana or require him to submit to drug testing and warrantless searches for drugs, including marijuana. Clark argues that there is no evidence that marijuana contributed to his criminal conduct and contends that the probation conditions are therefore not reasonably related to his rehabilitation or the protection of the public.
AS 11.41.210(a)(1).
We disagree with Clark's contention. After the incident, Clark's mother told the police that Clark had substance abuse issues and had previously been hospitalized for hallucinations, even though he did not have any diagnosed mental health issues. Clark's stepfather told the police that Clark was not allowed home if he was intoxicated, that Clark was normally a gentle person except when intoxicated, that Clark used a lot of marijuana, and that Clark had reported seeing things and hearing voices telling him to do evil things. Given these facts, the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it found that prohibiting marijuana use would "go towards [Clark's] rehabilitation and mak[e] him more likely to succeed on probation."
See Allain v. State, 810 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Alaska App. 1991) (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a probation condition prohibiting alcohol consumption where the condition was reasonably related to rehabilitation, even though there was no direct link between defendant's drinking and his conviction).
We note that two of the challenged conditions require Clark to submit to warrantless searches and are therefore subject to special scrutiny. This means that the court was required to find a "direct relationship" between the searches and the "nature of the crime" for which the defendant was convicted. But we have recognized that the nature of the crime encompasses more than the crime of conviction, and that a "direct relationship" may be found when the court concludes that the continued use of controlled substances would impede rehabilitation or contribute to renewed criminal behavior in light of the defendant's history of substance abuse. As we have just explained, the superior court made that finding in this case, and we therefore uphold the search conditions.
See State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 20 (Alaska 2018) (citing Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Alaska 1977)).
Roman, 570 P.2d at 1243.
State v. Thomas, 133 P.3d 684, 685-86 (Alaska App. 2005).
One of the probation conditions Clark challenges simply requires him to comply with all municipal, state, and federal laws. This condition is required by statute. See AS 12.55.100(a)(1). Clark asserts, however, that although marijuana is illegal under federal law, it is legal under state law, and thus he should not be penalized for using marijuana in Alaska. We need not address that issue because, as we have already explained, Clark was properly restricted from using marijuana regardless of whether it violates federal or state law to do so.
Finally, Clark requests that the written judgment be corrected to conform to the superior court's oral pronouncement of Clark's sentence. Clark points out that the court agreed to strike the words "cognitive skills" from Special Condition of Probation No. 1, which requires Clark to obtain a comprehensive behavioral health assessment and comply with all recommended programming. The State agrees that Clark's judgment should be corrected to conform to the court's oral pronouncement.
Graybill v. State, 822 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Alaska App. 1991) ("Where, as here, a conflict exists between an orally imposed sentence and a subsequently issued written judgment, it is well settled that the oral pronouncement of sentence must govern." (citing Burrell v. State, 626 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Alaska App. 1981))).
We therefore REMAND this case to the superior court to conform Clark's written judgment with the court's oral pronouncement. In all other respects, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.