[15] "In evaluating a claim that the trial court was required to give certain jury instructions, we view the charge as a whole to determine whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed." Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 440, 883 S.E.2d 317 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each essential element of the charged crimes, criminal intent, and parties to a crime.
Because this case requires an assessment of the harmful or prejudicial effect of one alleged trial court error and one alleged deficiency of trial counsel, "we lay out the evidence in detail and not only in the light most favorable to the verdicts." Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 424 (883 S.E.2d 317) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Additionally, a police officer, who testified that he believed there was "an ongoing dispute between the parties," "remember[ed] an incident where someone had shot at [the Priesters'] home," and an incident in May 2015 when "15 or so people" gathered around the Priesters' house "screaming and cursing at them and threatening [Ms. Priester] and her boys."
Id. See also Clark v. State , 315 Ga. 423, 428, 883 S.E.2d 317 (2023) (holding that although the evidence at trial showed that the defendant did not fire the shot that killed the victim, the evidence showed that he was a party to that crime and was constitutionally sufficient to support his conviction); White v. State , 298 Ga. 416, 418, 782 S.E.2d 280 (2016) (holding that the "fact that [the defendant] was merely the driver and did not actually fire the gun does not undermine the legal sufficiency of the evidence against him" where the evidence showed that he was a party to the crimes). "Conviction as a party to a crime requires proof of a common criminal intent, which the jury may infer from the defendant's presence, companionship, and conduct with another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes."
Additionally, "[c]onviction as a party to a crime requires proof of a common criminal intent, which the jury may infer from the defendant's presence, companionship, and conduct with another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes." Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 427 (2) (883 S.E.2d 317) (2023).
[14, 15] "An indictment is subject to a general demurrer if the accused could admit each and every fact alleged in the indictment and still be innocent of any crime." Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 443, 883 S.E.2d 317 (2023) (cleaned up). By contrast, a general demurrer fails if "the admission of the facts alleged in the indictment leads to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime." Id.
To prove deficient performance, Kimbro must establish that his trial counsel "performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms." Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 442 (883 S.E.2d 317) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).
See Cook , 270 Ga. at 827 (2), 514 S.E.2d 657 (concluding that the issue of whether a law enforcement parent was acting as a parent or an agent of the state in questioning his or her arrested child "must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, by viewing the totality of the circumstances"); Ortiz v. State , 306 Ga. App. 598, 599-600, 703 S.E.2d 59 (2010) (applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether a school administrator acted as an agent of law enforcement). Cf. Clark v. State , 315 Ga. 423, 434 (3) (b), 883 S.E.2d 317 (2023) (applying totality-of-the-circumstances test to juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights). And "proper application of a totality-of-the-circumstances test mandates inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation."
Of course, those factors are neither required nor exclusive. Cf. Clarkv.State, 315 Ga. 423, 429, 883 S.E.2d 317 (2023) (disapproving specific nine-factor framework to determine whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances).
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and consider whether any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ; Clark v. State , 315 Ga. 423, 427, 883 S.E.2d 317 (2023). "We leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts."
If, on the other hand, the admission of the facts alleged in the indictment leads to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, the indictment is sufficient. (Punctuation omitted.) Clark v. State , 315 Ga. 423, 442-443 (5) (b), 883 S.E.2d 317 (2023), citing Budhani v. State , 306 Ga. 315, 319 (1) (a), 830 S.E.2d 195 (2019). In other words,