Opinion
Case No. 5D14-3495
03-13-2015
WILLIAM CLARK, ET AL., Petitioners, v. STATE OF FLORIDA , Respondent.
Jason T. Forman, of Law Offices of Jason T. Forman, P.A., and Ted L. Hollander, of Gold & Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Petitioners. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robert Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Attorney General as Intervener. Samuel J. Salario, Jr. and Joseph H. Lang, Jr., of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Tampa, for Amicus Curiae.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED Petition for Certiorari Review of Decision from the Circuit Court for Orange County Acting in its Appellate Capacity. Jason T. Forman, of Law Offices of Jason T. Forman, P.A., and Ted L. Hollander, of Gold & Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Petitioners. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robert Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Attorney General as Intervener. Samuel J. Salario, Jr. and Joseph H. Lang, Jr., of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Tampa, for Amicus Curiae. PER CURIAM.
Petitioners, William Clark, Nicole Rivera, and Jose Torres Ortiz, petition this court for second-tier certiorari review of an opinion by the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, appellate division, which reversed the trial court's finding that photographic and video evidence obtained from red light cameras needed to be authenticated prior to being admitted into evidence.
Each Petitioner was separately issued a traffic citation pursuant to section 316.0083, Florida Statutes (2012), known as the Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Act, after a red light camera allegedly captured them running a red light. Petitioners contested the citations at a lengthy evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 7, 2012, and August 2, 2012. At the hearing, the State attempted to admit into evidence the photographs and video obtained from the red light cameras without first providing authentication of the evidence, claiming that pursuant to section 316.0083(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2012), authentication of this evidence was not required as a condition to its admissibility because the evidence was self-authenticating. The trial court determined that the photographic and video evidence obtained from the red light cameras were not self-authenticating and dismissed the citations because "the State had failed to prove that the [Petitioners] had committed the infraction."
See § 90.901, Fla. Stat. (2012) ("Authentication or identification of evidence is required as a condition precedent to its admissibility.").
Section 316.0083(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2012), provides, in full:
The photographic or electronic images or streaming video attached to or referenced in the traffic citation is evidence that a violation of s. 316.074(1) or s. 316.075(1)(c)1. when the driver failed to stop at a traffic signal has occurred and is admissible in any proceeding to enforce this section and raises a rebuttable presumption that the motor vehicle named in the report or shown in the photographic or electronic images or streaming video evidence was used in violation of s. 316.074(1) or s. 316.075(1)(c) 1. when the driver failed to stop at a traffic signal.§ 316.0083(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added).
The State appealed the trial court's order to the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, appellate division. The circuit court reversed the trial court's order in part, finding that since "the statute plainly states that photographic or electronic images or streaming video are admissible and evidence that a violation of section 316.074(1) or section 316.075(1)(c)(1) occurred, this evidence is self-authenticating, and it was error that the trial court did not automatically admit this evidence at the hearing." Petitioners now seek certiorari review on the sole issue of whether the circuit court erred in interpreting section 316.0083(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2012), to provide that photographic and video evidence obtained from red light cameras are self-authenticating.
Section 316.074(1), Florida Statutes (2012), provides:
The driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic control device applicable thereto, placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless otherwise directed by a police officer, subject to the exceptions granted the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle in this chapter.§ 316.074(1), Fla. Stat. (2012).
Section 316.075(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes (2012), provides:
Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then before entering the intersection and shall remain standing until a green indication is shown.§ 316.075(1)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2012).
When a district court reviews a petition for second-tier certiorari review, it must determine "whether the 'circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law.'" Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982)). In other words, we must determine whether the court departed from the essential requirements of law. See id. "[T]he departure from the essential requirements of the law necessary for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is something more than a simple legal error." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003) (citing Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 2000)). "A district court should exercise its discretion to grant certiorari review only when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Id.
Petitioners do not dispute that photographs and videos obtained from red light cameras are relevant evidence, see § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2012) ("Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact."), but argue that there is nothing in the plain language of section 316.0083(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2012), to indicate that the rules of evidence were not applicable or that the photographs and video from red light cameras were admissible without the need for authentication. However, the Legislature expressly provided in the statute that this evidence is admissible in any proceeding to enforce red light camera violations, leaving it unclear whether the Legislature, by its wording of the statute, equated admissibility with self-authentication.
Petitioners also claim that the circuit court's interpretation of section 316.0083(1)(e) results in a miscarriage of justice because it is capable of repetition in every case involving a traffic violation discovered by use of a red light camera. We disagree. Effective July 1, 2013, section 316.0083, Florida Statutes, was amended, and the new version explains that the formal rules of evidence do not apply to hearings under this statute. See § 316.0083(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2013). The effect of this amended statute makes red light camera photographs and video admissible in evidence without the need for authentication. Therefore, we find that the present question of whether the photographs and videos from red light cameras are admissible without authentication under the 2012 version of the statute is not likely to recur.
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A statute may be considered ambiguous if "reasonable persons can find different meanings in the same language." Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 297 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)). When interpreting the language in section 316.0083(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2012), courts have come to different conclusions. Compare Acosta v. Cnty. of Palm Beach, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 332a (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Sep. 22, 2014) (finding that section 316.0083(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2012), "does not dispense with the authentication requirement for the evidence referred to therein"), with State v. Tolos, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 860b (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Apr. 14, 2014) (finding that section 316.0083(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2012), allowed the videos and photographs from red light cameras to be self-authenticating). Because we find that the language of the 2012 version of the statute was ambiguous, we conclude that certiorari relief is not warranted because the circuit court did not violate a clearly established principle of law in finding that the photographs and video at issue were admissible in evidence without authentication.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI DENIED. ORFINGER, EVANDER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.