The Georgia Supreme Court has held that misdemeanors are not included in the definition of racketeering activity. In Clark v. Security Life Insur. Co., 270 Ga. 165, 509 S.E.2d 602, 605 (1998), it stated: O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(9)(A) meticulously defines "racketeering activity" by reference to specific state and federal statutes.

Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 229 Ga. App. 593 ( 494 S.E.2d 388) (1997).Clark v. Security Life Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 165 ( 509 S.E.2d 602) (1998).Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 239 Ga. App. 690 ( 521 S.E.2d 434) (1999)

" Clark v. Security Life Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 165 ( 509 S.E.2d 602) (1998).Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 239 Ga. App. 690 ( 521 S.E.2d 434) (1999).

BARNES, Judge. In Clark v. Security Life Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 165 ( 509 S.E.2d 602) (1999), the Supreme Court reversed our decision in Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 229 Ga. App. 593 ( 494 S.E.2d 388) (1997), in which we reversed the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, we must conform that decision to our Supreme Court's opinion in this case.

In Security Life Insurance Company v. Clark, 273 Ga. 44, ( 535 S.E.2d 234) (2000) ( Security IV), the Supreme Court reversed our decision in Security Life Insurance Co. v. Clark, 239 Ga. App. 690 ( 521 S.E.2d 434) (1999) ( Security III), in which we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Earlier, the Supreme Court in Clark v. Security Life Insurance Co., 270 Ga. 165 ( 509 S.E.2d 602) (1998) ( Security II), affirmed in part and reversed in part our decision in Security Life Insurance Co. v. Clark, 229 Ga. App. 593 ( 494 S.E.2d 388) (1997) ( Security I), which reversed the judgment of the trial court. Therefore, our opinion in Security III is vacated and the judgment of the Supreme Court Security IV is made the judgment of this court.

The weight of authority supports Defendant's argument. See Clark v. Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 270 Ga. 165, 167 n. 11, 509 S.E.2d 602, 604 n. 11 (1998) ("A corporation may also face prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a)(1) for a crime if the statute defining the crime clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation. RICO, however, in not such a statute because O.C.G.A. § 16-4-4 prohibits only 'persons' from engaging in racketeering activity."); Cobb County. 218 Ga. App. at 153, 460 S.E.2d at 521 ("'RICO does not contain in its definition any indication of a legislative purpose to impose criminal liability on a corporation.'")

The case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion. See Clark v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, 270 Ga. 165, 168, n. 11 ( 509 SE2d 602) (1998); see also Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 411 F3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005). See Reaugh v. Inner Harbour Hosp., 214 Ga. App. 259, 262-264 (5) (a) ( 447 SE2d 617) (1994); Cobb County v. Jones Group P.L.C., 218 Ga. App. 149, 153 (3) ( 460 SE2d 516) (1995); compare Security State Bank v. Visiting Nurses Assn. of Telfair County, 256 Ga. App. 374, 375-376 (1) ( 568 SE2d 491) (2002) (bank not liable under RICO for actions of bank teller who conspired to fraudulently cash checks payable to plaintiff, because bank did not profit from scheme).

The Georgia Supreme Court already has concluded that corporations may not be sued directly under RICO. Clark v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, 270 Ga. 165, 509 S.E.2d 602, 604 n. 11 (1998) ("A corporation may also face prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a)(1) for a crime if the statute defining the crime clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation. RICO, however, is not such a statute. . . .").

We accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals holding that "person" does not include a corporation. Furthermore, in reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on language contained in footnote 11 of Clark v. Security Life Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 165 (2), n. 11 ( 509 SE2d 602) (1998) that: A corporation may also face prosecution under OCGA § 16-2-22 (a) (1). . . . RICO, however, is not such a statute because OCGA § 16-4-4 [sic] prohibits only "persons" from engaging in racketeering activity.

As the surety on SLIC's appeal bond in its efforts to contest its liability to the plaintiffs, the insureds under the policy issued pursuant to the forgery, St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Company (SPFM) paid to the plaintiffs the amount of the most recent judgment rendered by the trial court and was substituted for them on appeal. See Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 229 Ga. App. 593 ( 494 SE2d 388) (1997) ( Security I); Clark v. Security Life Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 165 ( 509 SE2d 602) (1998) ( Security II); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 239 Ga. App. 690 ( 521 SE2d 434) (1999) ( Security III); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 273 Ga. 44 ( 535 SE2d 234) (2000) ( Security IV); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 249 Ga. App. 18 ( 547 SE2d 691) (2001) ( Security V); St. Paul Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga. App. 14 ( 566 SE2d 2) (2002) ( Security VI). 1. The UDIA is a statutory means by which an injured party may demand an amount of unliquidated damages from the tortfeasor prior to litigation and, should the tortfeasor decline to meet the injured party's demand, receive damages in the form of pre-judgment interest if "the judgment is for an amount not less than the amount demanded."