Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 1:19-CV-00762
10-31-2019
DONALD E. CLARK, JR., Plaintiff, v. SGT. SCHWARTZ, et al., Defendants.
(Chief Judge Conner) () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff Donald E. Clark, Jr. complains about being placed in a second-tier cell and about the medical care that he received at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. After screening Clark's amended complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, we conclude that the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Thus, we recommend that the court dismiss the amended complaint.
II. Background.
Clark commenced this action pro se on May 3, 2019, by filing a complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Although Clark is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Benner, he complains about events and conditions at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (SCI Camp Hill). In his complaint, Clark named as defendants Sergeant Swartz, of SCI Camp Hill; Guy Dumas, an inmate at SCI Camp Hill; Camera and X-Rays; and Jane/John Does.
In his complaint, Clark alleged that he fell several times while incarcerated, most recently at SCI Camp Hill on May 1, 2017, while going down the steps from his cell to "Med Line" with his cane. Doc. 1 at 3. According to Clark, at the time of this fall, he was not completely healed from an earlier fall at another institution. He alleged that he injured his left leg, his lower back, and his tail bone, resulting in an inability to sit very long, an inability to sleep, pain upon standing, and a limp. According to Clark, the doctor informed him he may be okay in "22 months [but] she was not sure." Id.
Although Clark referred to May 1, 2017, twice in his complaint, see doc. 1 at 3, 6, at another point he crossed out the May 1, 2017 date and wrote 4/28/19, see doc. 1 at 2. Thus, it is not clear on what date this fall occurred.
Clark further alleged that Sgt. Swartz was a block officer when the fall occurred. And he alleged that he had been placed on "bottom bunk bottom tier" status for the past two years. Id. at 3. Although Clark alleged that he is currently housed on the "first floor," he asked why the prison continues to "order [him] to [the] second tier all the time with a cane" and he feels "someone needs to put a stop to [it]." Id. at 6.
We granted Clark's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. And after screening the complaint, we concluded that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In so concluding, we explained that liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is personal in nature, and to be liable, a defendant must have been personally involved in the alleged wrongful conduct. But Clark did not allege personal involvement on the part of Sergeant Swartz. We also explained that Clark failed to allege that Dumas was acting under color of state law. Although the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we granted Clark leave to file an amended complaint.
On August 5, 2019, Clark filed an amended complaint. The only defendant Clark lists in the caption of the amended complaint is Sergeant Schwartz. Clark alleges that Schwartz placed him in a second-tier cell knowing that he "was or is bottom tier status due to disabilities." Doc. 15 at 2, § IV, ¶ 1.
In his amended complaint, Clark spells this defendant's name differently from how he spelled it in the original complaint. From now on, we will use the spelling used by Clark in his amended complaint.
Although not listed in the caption of the amended complaint, in the section of the amended complaint that lists the defendants, in addition to naming Sergeant Schwartz, Clark lists the "Medical Dept. at SCI Camp Hill," "Gene," and the Superintendent at SCI-Camp Hill. Id. at 2, § III. Clark alleges that the doctor saw him after his injury, but "dismissed [him] without properly diagnosing the injury"; that "Gene" "made [a] joke saying that [Clark] would be better in 22 months which is when [Clark] maxes his sentence"; and that the medical department did not follow up. Id. at 3, §IV, ¶ 2. He also alleges that staff confiscated his cane, and he had to be carried on to the transfer bus. Id. Clark alleges that the Superintendent failed to adequately train the sergeant and failed to compel the medical staff to attend to his injuries.
Clark seeks the appointment of counsel, damages, and "[a]ny other relief this Honorable Court may deem necessary in the administration of justice, equity, and in good conscience." Id. at 3, § 5. III. Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints—Standard of Review.
Clark also filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, which we have denied by a separate order.
This court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of complaints brought by prisoners given leave to proceed in forma pauperis in cases that seek redress against government officials. Specifically, the court must review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Screening. The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal. On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Under Section 1915A, the court must assess whether a complaint "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and of the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). "A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id.
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). But a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and "'however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV. Discussion.
Clark's claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). "It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely 'provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To state a claim under §1983, the plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
A. The amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Sergeant Schwartz.
Clark complains about Sergeant Schwartz placing him in a second-tier cell. We construe his claim against Sergeant Schwartz as an Eighth Amendment claim. "The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015). An Eighth Amendment claim gives rise to a two-prong analysis; such a claim has both an objective element and a subjective element. Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018) ("A properly stated Eighth Amendment claim must allege a subjective and objective element."). To allege a viable Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). And "a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id.
In requesting damages, Clark mentions negligence. But negligence does not amount to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 835 (holding that "deliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence"). And Clark has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that Sergeant Schwartz was deliberately indifferent to either a serious medical need of Clark or a substantial risk of serious harm to Clark. In this regard, we note that although in his original complaint, Clark alleged that he had fallen, his amended complaint is devoid of any allegations that he was injured because Sergeant Schwartz placed him in a second-tier cell. Further, Clark has not alleged what medical condition he has or had that warranted bottom-tier status, what Sergeant Schwartz knew about that condition, or that he asked Schwartz not to place him on the second tier or asked him to move him after he was so placed. Moreover, given that Clark alleges that he "was or is" bottom-tier status, it is not even clear that at the time Sergeant Schwartz placed him on the second tier, Clark had bottom-tier status. Finally, Clark has not alleged that Sergeant Schwartz had authority to make or influence cell assignments. In sum, Clark has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that Sergeant Schwartz was deliberately indifferent to either a serious medical need of Clark's or a substantial risk of serious harm to Clark. The amended complaint, thus, fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Sergeant Schwartz upon which relief may be granted.
B. The Medical Department at SCI Camp Hill is not a proper defendant.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
The Medical Department at SCI Camp Hill is not a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lindstrom v. SCI-Camp Hill Med. Dep't, No. 3:16-CV-2195, 2016 WL 6645775, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2016). Thus, the Medical Department is not a proper defendant in this case.
C. The amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against "Gene."
As set forth above, Clark alleges that "Gene" "made [a] joke saying that [Clark] would be better in 22 months which is when [Clark] maxes his sentence." But Clark does not allege who "Gene" is or what role he or she played in Clark's care. And a mere joke without more does not amount to a constitutional violation. In sum, Clark has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that "Gene" was deliberately indifferent to either a serious medical need of Clark's or a substantial risk of serious harm to Clark. Accordingly, the amended complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against "Gene" upon which relief may be granted.
D. The amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the Superintendent.
Clark asserts a claim against the Superintendent at SCI Camp Hill. He alleges that the Superintendent failed to adequately train the sergeant and failed to compel the medical staff to attend to his injuries. But he has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that the Superintendent was personally involved in a violation of his constitutional rights.
Liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is personal in nature, and to be liable, a defendant must have been personally involved in the wrongful conduct. Thus, respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018). In other words, "each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). And so, a constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the defendant was a supervisor when the incidents set forth in the complaint occurred. See Alexander v. Forr, 297 F. App'x 102, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2008). Rather, "[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Third Circuit has "recognized that 'there are two theories of supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm, and another under which they can be liable if they participated in violating plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates' violations.'" Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)).
"Where a supervisor with authority over a subordinate knows that the subordinate is violating someone's rights but fails to act to stop the subordinate from doing so, the factfinder may usually infer that the supervisor 'acquiesced' in (i.e., tacitly assented to or accepted) the subordinate's conduct." Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted), abrogated on other grounds, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). "A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant's personal involvement by describing the defendant's participation in or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct." Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015).
To set forth a claim for supervisory liability under the policy-and-practice strand of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must:
(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling's violation resulted from the supervisor's failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure.Id. at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). "Put another way, the inmate must identify the supervisor's specific acts or omissions demonstrating the supervisor's deliberate indifference to the inmate's risk of injury and must establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the injury." Id.
Here, Clark has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that the Superintendent established or maintained a policy, practice, or custom that directly caused him constitutional harm or that the Superintendent participated in violating his rights, directed others to violate his rights, or had knowledge of and acquiesced in a violation of his rights. Thus, he has not alleged that the Superintendent was personally involved in a violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the Superintendent.
E. Further leave to amend would be futile.
Before dismissing a complaint under the screening provision of 28 U.S.C.§ 1915, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, in light of the liberal-amendment standard, after screening the original complaint, we gave Clark leave to file an amended complaint. And, in the context of analyzing the claim against Sergeant Schwartz in the original complaint, we explained to Clark that he was required to plead the personal involvement of a defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Clark filed an amended complaint, but he still fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Given this, further leave to amend would be futile.
V. Recommendations.
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the court dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 31st day of October, 2019.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
Chief United States Magistrate Judge