Opinion
Case No. 5:99 CV 1240.
October 2, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ( Doc. No. 18) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Portage County, Ohio ( Doc. No. 21). Plaintiff Linda Clark has filed a seven-count complaint, generally alleging that the defendants, through the Portage County Child Support Enforcement Agency, violated her right under Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., to effective child support enforcement services. More specifically, Clark alleges two federal claims and five state claims, to wit: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on a violation of her federal rights under Title IV-D; (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; (3) a negligence claim based on violation of the Title IV-D duties and obligations owed to her under Ohio's state child support enforcement plan; (4) a breach of contract claim; (5) a violation of Chapter 1347 of the Ohio Revised Code; (6) a breach of fiduciary duty claim, and (7) unfair/unconscionable practices under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, O.R.C. § 1345.01, et seq. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will hereafter be cited as "Pltf's Motion." Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be cited as "Deft's Motion."
I. FACTS
Because this case primarily involves the interpretation of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651-669b, a brief explanation of the statutory scheme is in order. The State of Ohio has elected to participate in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program ("AFDC"), a federal program that provides welfare benefits to needy families. Social Security Act, Title IV-A, §§ 601-617; Cramer v. Petrie, 70 Ohio St.3d 131, 134 (1994). In order to qualify for federal AFDC funds, the State must certify that it will operate a child support enforcement program that conforms with the requirements of Title IV-D, and that it will do so pursuant to a plan that has been approved by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (the "Secretary"). 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) and 652(a)(3); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 333 (1997). Participating states received federal funds based on "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D requirements. The federal government generally underwrites over two-thirds of the cost of participating states' child support programs. 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(2); Blessing, 520 U.S. at 333.
Ohio is periodically audited by the Secretary to determine whether the State has complied with the numerous Title IV-D requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)(4); Cramer, 70 Ohio St.3d at 134. The ultimate goal of the requirements is the effective enforcement of child support orders. Id. If the audit reveals that Ohio has not met federal requirements, federal appropriations are decreased up to five percent. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(8); Cramer, 70 Ohio St.3d at 134. Conversely, there is a provision for incentive payments to states that perform effective child support enforcement services in a cost-efficient manner. 42 U.S.C. § 658.
The Division of Child Support was created within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to establish and administer Title IV-D programs. The Division of Child Support provides funding to the State of Ohio for its child support enforcement programs through the Ohio Department of Human Services (the "Ohio DHS"). The Ohio DHS then contracts with the Board of County Commissioners of each county to provide an agency to administer Title IV-D services. The agencies, in turn, contract with the county prosecutor's office to provide the legal services necessary for families to establish and collect support. Services are provided to all persons upon their submission of an application to the agency. In this case, Portage County contracted with the Ohio DHS to establish the Portage County Child Support Enforcement Agency — the vehicle through which Portage County provides Title IV-D services to its residents.
Plaintiff Linda Clark, a Portage County resident, is a divorced woman with two children (now aged 24 and 19). She is owed more than $20,000 in back child support from her ex-husband, James Clark. Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 5, Deft's Motion at 3. After her divorce in 1984, she began to take steps necessary to enforce court-ordered child support payments in the weekly amount of $90. Compl. ¶ ¶ 19-20. Thereafter, the facts reveal a frustrating battle between Ms. Clark and the Portage County Child Support Enforcement Agency (the "Agency") spanning more than eight years.
Defendants Sylvia Strasshofer, the Agency Administrator, Beverly Dreher and Tony Britt, Agency Investigators, Cynthia Kalow, the Agency Arrearage Specialist, and Portage County, Ohio will be collectively referenced as the "Agency."
Since 1984, James Clark has failed to pay child support and has taken active measures to avoid paying at all costs. Compl. ¶ 23. He quit jobs, lied about working, worked "under the table" to avoid wage attachment, moved without notice or leaving a forwarding address, and fled the state to avoid enforcement. Id. By 1990, Mr. Clark was several thousand dollars in arrears. Id. ¶ 26.
Plaintiff repeatedly asked the Agency to file contempt charges or take some other legal action to enforce the court order, but was told by Agency Administrator Beverly Dreher and Agency Attorney Anita Davis that the Agency's case load was too large for its available staff and that it would take several years before it could take any action against Mr. Clark. Compl. ¶ 28. They suggested that Clark hire a private attorney to obtain child support. Id. Ms. Clark took their advice and hired an attorney; however, after successfully obtaining court orders to enforce support payments, the Agency denied her access to its services because she was represented by counsel. Deft's Motion, Exh. A ¶ 5. Consequently, by late 1994, Mr. Clark was more than $17,0000 in arrears. Compl. ¶ 31.
In 1995, a pro bono attorney was successful in persuading the Agency to refer Ms. Clark's case to the Portage County Prosecutor's Office. Compl. ¶ 32. The record shows that once a case is sent to the Prosecutor's Office, the Agency serves only to receive, account for, and pay out any child support payments made by the obligor, to receive employment verification notices, and to receive alert notices from support enforcement agencies and schools throughout the country. The Agency can then undertake parent locator and other investigative activities only at the request of the Prosecutor's Office; it does not supervise the Prosecutor's child support activities. Stipulations, Doc. No. 19 ("Stip."), ¶ 7. Thus, when Ms. Clark later attempted to seek further services through the Agency, her requests were denied because the Prosecutor was now handling the case. Pltf's Motion, Exh. 1. Meanwhile, Mr. Clark, having learned of the Prosecutor's involvement, fled to South Carolina. Compl. ¶ 33.
In November 1995, Mr. Clark was indicted by a grand jury for criminal nonsupport, a felony. Compl ¶ 34. Although an indictment was obtained, the Agency failed to take timely and effective action to have Mr. Clark arrested in South Carolina and returned to the State of Ohio. Compl. ¶ 35.
Two years later, in March of 1997, after plaintiffs persistent efforts and demands, an arrest warrant was executed and Mr. Clark was seized and extradited from South Carolina. Compl. ¶ 36. In May of 1997, he pled guilty to criminal non-support and was sentenced to a definite term of 18 months. Id. ¶ 38. With 203 days of credit for time served, he was placed on two years probation with the condition that he obtain employment within 30 days and execute a wage withholding order to pay current support payments, as well as the $17,608 arrearage. Id. ¶ 39. Unsurprisingly, James Clark failed to comply, and neither the Agency nor the Prosecutor took any action to monitor or enforce Mr. Clark's compliance with the conditions of his probation. Compl. ¶ ¶ 40-41.
Ms. Clark insists that the Agency at all times knew, or had reason to know, of this failure since there was neither the requisite wage withholding order, nor evidence of any child support payments in their records. Compl. ¶ 42. After numerous phone calls to no avail, plaintiff wrote to the Agency on September 22, 1997, reminding it of Mr. Clark's probation conditions and of his failure to comply. Pltf's Motion at 3. Not until Ms. Clark brought the matter to the attention of the Prosecutor's Office on November 12, 1997, was Mr. Clark's probation finally revoked. Compl. ¶ 36. Mr. Clark was subsequently arrested and returned to prison.
In December 1997, Ms. Clark received notice from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections that her husband would be released from prison on or about April 20, 1998. Pltf's Motion at 4. She promptly conveyed this information to the Agency. Id.; Compl. ¶ 49.
Meanwhile, during Mr. Clark's incarceration, plaintiff also took steps to have his prison account garnished and/or to have him assigned to a prison work program to enable him to earn at least some money to pay child support. Compl. ¶ 50. She maintains, however, that "by policy or custom, defendant Portage County refused to take these steps or to act in any effective or timely fashion to satisfy the duties owed [to her]." Compl. ¶ 51. Instead, she was told by an Agency representative that the Agency "was not going to do anything more to enforce her support rights." Compl. ¶ 52.
In January 1998, Ms. Clark filed for an administrative hearing with the Ohio DHS to review "defendants unlawful denial of timely and effective services to which she was entitled." Compl. ¶ 53. Specifically, she challenged the Agency's refusal to garnish her ex-husband's prison earnings while he was incarcerated. The matter was set for an administrative hearing.
In preparing for the hearing, plaintiff requested an accounting of the support owed, as well as a complete copy of the case file from the Agency. Compl. ¶ 54. According to plaintiff, the Agency refused to comply with both of these requests, making her unable to adequately prepare her case and denying her the "right to a meaningful hearing." Compl. ¶ 55.
At the hearing, the Agency's investigator testified that the Agency lacked authority and responsibility over the Prosecutor's Office in its provision of child support services; thus, it could not order any enforcement action. Compl. ¶ 57; Compl., Exh. 1. Furthermore, citing cost effectiveness, the investigator indicated that the Prosecutor had refused to pursue garnishment of Mr. Clark's prison wages as those accounts rarely exceed $20. Compl., Exh. 1. The investigator did, however, promise to provide plaintiff with a copy of her child support enforcement record. Compl ¶ 58.
The hearing officer ruled in favor of the Agency and found that there was no improper conduct or failure to pursue Mr. Clark for child support. Specifically, the hearing officer determined that there was "no provision for the County Commissioners to seek a writ of mandamus to force the prosecutor's office to seek garnishment of [Mr. Clark's] prison wages." Compl., Exh. 1; Compl. ¶ 59.
Plaintiff appealed this decision. On May 29, 1998, the appeals panel reversed. See Compl., Exh. 1. It held that O.R.C. § 3113.16(c) required that 25% of any money earned by a prisoner who is an obligor in default under a child support order, shall be paid to the Agency for distribution to the obligee under the order. Id. Because the hearing officer did not apply § 3113.16(c), its decision constituted an incorrect application of the law. Id. Because the application of that particular provision was not discretionary, the panel ordered that the Agency instruct its legal counsel accordingly and require that 25% of any of Mr. Clark's earnings be forwarded to the Agency for distribution to plaintiff. Id. Moreover, citing Ohio Administrative Code 5101:6-8-01 which provides that "each obligor and obligee under a child support order may review all records maintained by a child support enforcement agency which pertain to the support order . . .," the panel "reminded" the Agency of its earlier agreement to provide plaintiff with requested records and ordered that an accounting be completed and provided to plaintiff. Id.
Despite plaintiffs success on appeal, the victory was hollow. Apparently, Mr. Clark had been released from prison three weeks prior to the decision. True to form, he did not provide a forwarding address, and though the Agency submitted Mr. Clark's name to the Parent Locator Service, he could not be located — leaving plaintiff and her children no further ahead than when they started. Compl. ¶ 64.
After the May 29th decision, the Agency had 15 days to comply with the Order to provide plaintiff with the accounting and a copy of the records. Compl. ¶ 65. However, on June 12, 1998, the Agency sent Ms. Clark a letter indicating its willingness to copy the files only after it received $202, or $1.00 per page to cover the cost of the copies. Id. ¶ 67-68. The Agency gave her the option of coming to its office and requesting only specific documents that she wanted copied, rather than the entire record. The Agency also informed her that, due to federal confidentiality laws, she was entitled to only those records that were public record and specifically concerned the plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 67; Compl., Exh. 3.
It was not until after Ms. Clark got the Ohio DHS to intervene that she received a copy of the file, at $0.07 per page. Compl ¶ ¶ 72-73. The documents she received, however, did not include the "running record," i.e., the cumulative record of the Agency's activities concerning her case. Compl. ¶ 75; Pltf's Motion at 8. The Agency contends that the only items from plaintiffs file not provided to her were "privileged" entries concerning Mr. Clark. Compl., Exh. 3; Stip. ¶ 9.
As of February 2, 2000, the filing date of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Ms. Clark was still unable to locate her ex-husband since his release from prison in May 1998. However, she has reason to believe that the Agency knows of his whereabouts since he has made a few "irregular" support payments through it. Compl. ¶ 80.
II. LAW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." All facts and inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). If, after reviewing the record as a whole, a rational factfinder could not find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate since there is no genuine issue of material fact for determination at trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of its case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 at 247-248. In order for there to be a genuine issue for trial, there must be sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 249.
As stated by the Supreme Court:
. . . Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' [Citations omitted.] . . . Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.Celotex, 477 U.S. 317 at 327.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private cause of action against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" Id.;Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Wood v. Tompkins, 33 F.3d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1994). The United States Supreme Court has held that this provision protects certain rights conferred by federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). "In order to seek redress through § 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law."Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)).
The Court must consider three factors in determining whether a statutory provision gives rise to a federal right: (1) whether the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the statute; (2) whether the plaintiffs asserted interests are so vague and amorphous as to be beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce it; and (3) whether the statute imposes a binding obligation on the State. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (citations omitted). If the plaintiff can demonstrate that a federal statute creates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983. Id. at 341. Dismissal is proper if Congress clearly foreclosed a § 1983 remedy, either expressly or impliedly "by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983." Id. (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994)).
In Blessing, class action plaintiffs sued the Director of the State of Arizona's child support enforcement agency, alleging that the agency failed to take adequate steps to obtain child support payments from their childrens' `deadbeat' fathers. They pointed to staff shortages. high caseloads, unmanageable backlogs, and deficiencies in accounting methods and record keeping. They did not allege that the agency violated a specific right, but that it did not substantially comply with Title IV-D. The Court found that the requirement that a state operate its child support program in "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents; rather, it was a "yardstick" for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a state's Title IV-D program. Consequently, the substantial compliance provision did not confer a federal right. 520 U.S. at 332. But the Court "did not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to individual rights." Id. at 345. The Blessing Court held that it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to "identify with particularity the rights they claimed." Id. at 342.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Federal Claims 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Violation of Federal Rights under Title IV-D
The crucial issue in plaintiffs first claim is whether she has established an individual right, under § 1983, to sue the Portage County defendants for failure to provide Title IV-D services to her. Essentially, Ms. Clark argues that the Agency's acceptance of her application for child support enforcement services along with $1.00 (as a non-public assistance applicant) entitled her to effective and timely services, including collection of court-ordered support and location of her ex-husband. She claims that the entities and persons charged with these services refused or failed to provide them. She also claims that they failed to provide her the records necessary to insure her right to a meaningful hearing, and that they later provided inadequate records and initially charged an exorbitant rate to do so. In other words, the defendants either refused to do their jobs, or failed to take adequate steps to effectively perform them. Invoking § 1983, she claims that the defendants' collective malfeasance violated her federal rights under Title IV-D.
Clark's allegations, which the Court must accept as true for summary judgment purposes, highlight the difficulties of enforcing child support orders in Portage County and elsewhere. Indeed, Ms. Clark's tenacity in attempting to enforce her court-ordered support and to enlist the aid of those agencies and persons whose job it is to help her do just that, is impressive. But it is incumbent upon Ms. Clark to identify and articulate with particularity the well-defined federal right she is claiming in order to survive summary judgment. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342.
For example, in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987), the Supreme Court focused its analysis on a specific statutory provision limiting rent to 30 percent of a tenant's income.Id. at 430. In Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 487 (1990), the Supreme Court held that health care providers had an enforceable right to reimbursement at "reasonable and adequate rates" pursuant to a particular provision in the Medicaid statute. Id. at 511-512. In Livadas, the Supreme Court discerned in provisions of the National Labor Relations Act the right of employees to complete the collective-bargaining process and to agree to an arbitration clause. 512 U.S. at 133.
In order to establish an actionable federal right, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she is the intended beneficiary of Title IV-D.Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. Ms. Clark contends that she is the intended beneficiary of Title IV-D based on 42 U.S.C. § 651, a provision that authorizes the payment of federal funds to states "[f]or the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their children and the spouse . . . with whom such children are living, locating absent parents, establishing paternity, obtaining child and spousal support, and assuring that assistance in obtaining support will be available under this part to all children . . . for whom such assistance is required . . ." Although Ms. Clark believes that this provision shows that families are the intended beneficiaries of Title IV-D. she herself seems to concede that this provision is too general to give rise to an individual federal right. Pltf's Opposition Memorandum at 11. The Court finds that the § 651 language authorizing the expenditure of funds to states is precatory, and that it is the states which are the direct intended beneficiaries of this provision.
Clark also cites 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(B) and 654(8) in support of her contention that she and her children are the intended beneficiaries of Title IV-D. These sections, however, delineate what must be incorporated in state plans, presumably in order to receive federal funds:
§ 654. A State plan for child and spousal support must —
(4) provide that the State will — (B) enforce any support obligation established with respect to — (i) a child with respect to whom the State provides services under the plan; or (ii) the custodial parent of such a child.
(8) provide that, for the purpose of establishing parentage, establishing, setting the amount of, modifying, or enforcing child support obligations . . . the agency administering the plan will establish a service to locate parents utilizing — (A) all sources of information and available records; and (B) the Federal Parent Locator Service . . .Id.
Clark cites various regulations located at 45 C.F.R. § 303 to establish that she and her children are the intended beneficiaries of Title IV-D. Section 303 prescribes:
(a) The minimum organizational and staffing requirements the State IV-D agency must meet in carrying out the IV-D program, and (b) The standards for program operation which the IV-D agency must meet.45 C.F.R. § 303.0. Specifically, plaintiff cites 45 C.F.R. § 303.3(b) and (c), and 303.6. Section 303.3 sets forth the guidelines states must employ in locating noncustodial parents. Section 303.6 which states generally that the IV-D agency must maintain and use an "effective system" for monitoring compliance with support obligations, identifying the occurrence of delinquencies, and enforcing the obligations (i.e., by initiating income withholding in accordance with § 303.100 or taking appropriate enforcement action). Id. The section also requires state agencies to provide to the Department of Health and Human Services an annual list of all cases which meet certain certification requirements for federal tax purposes. 45 C.F.R. § 303.6(3). These sections provide operating standards the state agencies must meet, presumably in order to receive federal funding. Thus, while Congress intended that families ultimately benefit from these regulations, the states appear to be the direct intended beneficiaries.
Even if Clark could show that she was the intended beneficiary of the cited provisions, she has failed to identify provisions that provide sufficient objective standards for the judiciary to competently enforce.Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41. Again, she cites 45 C.F.R. § 303.6 which provides that states must maintain and use "effective systems" for monitoring compliance with and enforcing support obligations. The Court finds that the effective system standard is entirely too "vague and amorphous" for consistent judicial enforcement. This case proves the point. Ms. Clark complains that the Agency was utterly ineffective in enforcing Mr. Clark's support obligations, while the Agency provided an affidavit showing that it was significantly more successful with Ms. Clark's case than the average case. The "effective system" standard is far too elusive to serve as a doctrinal basis for constitutional analysis.
While Ms. Clark is understandably frustrated at her inability to collect the child support to which she is legally entitled, it is not clear whether anything the defendants could have done would have made much of a difference. For after the defendants ultimately indicted Clark, extradited him from South Carolina, and convicted him and imprisoned him for nearly seven months, Clark still refused to pay his child support. The ultimate enforcement weapon government authorities have to collect child support is prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment. If this does not succeed, there is nothing else the government can do. Given limited resources, there is only so much time authorities can devote to one case without being unfair to all the other pending child support cases.
Even if Ms. Clark could demonstrate that the defendants' efforts were deficient in her case, as the Blessing Court noted, a state agency may be effective in enforcing support obligations generally, while dropping the ball in particular cases. And Blessing makes clear that sheer lack of effectiveness by a state in successfully enforcing support obligations alone does not give rise to an individual federal right. 520 U.S. at 335-36 (citing Arizona's abysmal record of enforcing child support obligations).
The closest plaintiff comes to articulating a well-defined federal right is the requirement that Title IV-D agencies must access all appropriate location sources within 75 calendar days of determining that location is necessary, etc. See 45 C.F.R. § 303.3(b)(3). However, Ms. Clark has made no specific allegation regarding a violation of the 75-day provision.
Since Blessing, no court has ventured to establish a provision of Title IV-D that confers an actionable federal right. Because Ms. Clark's essential assertion is that the Agency did not provide her adequate Title IV-D services, the Court is left to construe her claim as one that is based, like Blessing, on a generalized right to have the Agency comply with Title IV-D's requirements. Moreover, the Agency has set forth some valid, undisputed reasons for its failure to assist Ms. Clark at certain times in her mission to enforce her ex-husband's obligations (e.g., she hired a private attorney and her case was referred to the Prosecutor's Office). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Ms. Clark has not established an actionable federal right to Title IV-D services. Having failed to meet this threshold requirement, her § 1983 claim must fail.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Due Process Violation
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive a person of life or liberty or property without due process of law. . . ." Due process requires that no person be deprived of a constitutionally protected interest without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. v. Martin, 954 F.2d 553 557 (6th Cir. 1992). Ms. Clark maintains that the Agency's failure to provide her with timely and effective child support enforcement services constitutes a violation of due process. However, to the extent that she has failed to establish an actionable federal right to Title IV-D services, she is without recourse.
It should be noted that despite the Court's conclusion that plaintiffs claim to child support services under Title IV-D is not protected by due process because she does not have a constitutionally-protected interest, the Court believes that plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated that she was deprived of due process. Plaintiff had two administrative appeals. Her husband was arrested, extradited and imprisoned. Despite plaintiffs assertion that she learned of these appeals from someone other than the Agency, she has not demonstrated that the appellate procedure was hidden from her, or that she was denied the information by the Agency. DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding plaintiff was not deprived of due process when parking ticket did not inform him of how to contest a complaint because he received a summons to court where he could present his case.) Under the law as it stands, plaintiff was not constitutionally deprived of her due process rights.
Clark also contends that when a state places "substantive limitations on official discretion," it creates an interest protected by due process. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990). Ms. Clark argues that because the Ohio child support laws leave the Agency with no discretion as to the substance or extent of the services which it must provide, her right to those services should be accorded due process protection. Pltf's Opposition Memorandum at 15. She acknowledges, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect state-created procedural rights where such procedures merely create an expectation of process and not an expectation of a particular result. Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect a victim of crime from the failure to notify her of a prisoner's release from prison, despite provisions of the Victim's Act requiring notification, because any right created was merely an expectation of process). Plaintiff asserts that child support services are not procedural or discretionary, and thus, should be accorded Fourteenth Amendment protection. Pltf's Opposition Memorandum at 15.
However, Ms. Clark has failed to demonstrate that Title IV-D child support services are different from the Victim's Act services. That is, she has not demonstrated how the collection and disbursement of child support or parent locator services are anything other than procedural which, under Pusey, only creates expectations, rather than entitlements. Without such proof, it can be assumed that, like the victim's rights notification requirement in Pusey, the child support laws merely create an expectation of a particular process, rather than a result. Child support laws are not intended to guarantee every Title IV-D applicant a successful result. Furthermore, as long as the Agency is in substantial compliance with Title IV-D requirements, the child support laws are not required to provide every person all services, thus the Agency is afforded some discretion as to the nature of services provided to a particular individual. Accordingly, the Court also finds that the Fourteenth Amendment does not operate to protect Ms. Clark's state procedural rights to child support services.
B. State Claims
The remaining claims are strictly state-law claims: negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of Chapter 1347 of the Ohio Revised Code, and unfair/unconscionable practices under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, O.R.C. § 1345.01, et seq.
Title 28 Section 1367 of the United States Code allows the district court to have supplemental jurisdiction over state claims that are so related to the federal claims in the action that they form part of the same case or controversy. Transcontinental Leasing, Inc. v. Michigan National Bank of Detroit, 738 F.2d 163, 164 (6th Cir. 1984). It has consistently been recognized, however, that supplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). If federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well.Id. A court may exercise its discretion and continue to hear a state claim after dismissal of the federal claim if the court determines that its decision to dismiss the federal claim did not occur until after the court and the parties had expended time and energy toward the resolution of a dispute that plaintiffs were entitled to bring in federal court.Transcontinental, 738 F.2d 163 at 166.
Accordingly, as the federal claims have all been dismissed, the Court shall exercise its discretion to dismiss Clark's state law claims without prejudice before the parties expend any further time and energy towards resolution of purely state law issues in this Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
It cannot be disputed that Linda Clark has engaged in a struggle of Sisyphean proportions with the Agency in order to obtain Title IV-D services and thereby provide for her children. Nor is it disputed that the Agency operated to the extent it did only at the insistence of this courageous woman. This having been said, the Title IV-D provisions and regulations cited by the plaintiff do not give rise to a constitutional claim against the defendants. Despite Clark's understandable frustrations with the Agency's "services," the Court is not prepared to walk through the door left ajar in Blessing.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ( Doc. No. 18) is DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ( Doc. No. 21) is GRANTED with respect to Counts I and II, which are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The remaining state law claims, Counts III through VII, are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum of Opinion and Order filed contemporaneously with this Judgment Entry, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above-captioned case is hereby terminated and dismissed as final.
IT IS SO ORDERED.