Clark v. Machette

4 Citing cases

  1. J.F. WHITE ENG'G v. GENERAL INS. CO. OF AM

    351 F.2d 231 (10th Cir. 1965)   Cited 5 times
    In J.F. White Engineering Corp. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 351 F.2d 231, 233 (10th Cir.1965), the court evaluated the reasonableness of a bonding company's decision to allow the contractor to complete the project.

    The statute does not bar the admission of evidence of continuing representations as in this case. See Clark v. Machette, 92 Colo. 365, 21 P.2d 182; Caplin v. United Feature Syndicate, D.C., 8 F.R.D. 424. CROSS-APPEAL

  2. Overfield v. Pennroad Corporation

    146 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1944)   Cited 71 times
    Noting that "Courts can and do take judicial notice of" governmental reports such as "Congressional proceedings" and "the existence of facts disclosed by them"

    No decision of the Delaware courts throws any clear light upon the question of substantive law here involved, though the decisions in Eshleman v. Keenan, Guth v. Loft, Inc., and in Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby Co., supra, indicate that the courts of Delaware will not under circumstances like those at bar break down a course of dealings between corporate managers and their corporation into single, individual transactions. I conclude that if the present question were before the Delaware Chancery Court on a bill in equity containing allegations similar to those of the complaints at bar and the evidence presented was like that in the instant cases, the Court would adopt the reasoning of such cases as United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607, 31 S.Ct. 124, 54 L.Ed. 1168, Northern Kentucky Tel. Co. v. Southern Bell T. T. Co., 6 Cir., 73 F.2d 333, 335, 97 A.L.R. 133, and Clark v. Machette, 92 Colo. 365, 372, 21 P.2d 182, 184. In this connection see the decision of this court in Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820, 824.

  3. Universal Film Exchanges v. Swanson

    165 F. Supp. 95 (D. Minn. 1958)   Cited 6 times

    This has been plaintiffs' theory in briefs and on argument. Compare: Canellos v. Zotalis, 145 Minn. 292, 177 N.W. 133; Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251; Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 96 F. Supp. 1014; Clark v. Machette, 92 Colo. 365, 21 P.2d 182. Rutkin v. Reinfeld, 2 Cir., 229 F.2d 248; Northern Kentucky Telephone Co. v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co., 6 Cir., 73 F.2d 333, 97 A.L.R. 133, certiorari denied 294 U.S. 719, 55 S.Ct. 546, 79 L.Ed. 1251; Roche v. Blair, 305 Mich. 608, 9 N.W.2d 861; Glassberg v. Boyd, Del., 116 A.2d 711; And see cases collected at 97 A.L.R. 137, 152.

  4. Patel v. Thomas and Ceresko

    793 P.2d 632 (Colo. App. 1990)   Cited 30 times
    In Patel, the court of appeals applied the continuing violation doctrine to hold that a plaintiff's sexual harassment claims were not barred for failure to comply with the CGIA 180-day notice of claim deadline.

    Unless the actions complained of are discrete, unrelated acts, suits based in part thereon should be allowed as part of a continuing violation as long as one instance of the practice occurs within the limitations period. See Furr v. A T T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Clark v. Machette, 92 Colo. 365, 21 P.2d 182 (1933) (conspiracy claim evidenced in part by assaults and other acts occurring prior to statute of limitations not barred); Wright v. Ulrich, 40 Colo. 437, 91 P. 43 (1907) (because a nuisance or trespass is continuous, plaintiff may seek a decree abating it at any time during its existence unless she has estopped herself by some act or agreement). To the extent that plaintiff's common law claims are based on discrete incidents, such as Thomas' allegedly defamatory statements about his sexual relationship with Patel, the notice of claims statute could operate as a bar.